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COMMANDER TASK GROUP 78.2

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP EIGHT

SEVENTH FLEET

REG. NO 132
R S. NO 03866
REG. SHEET NO 247

ACTION REPORT







BALIKPAPAN

OPERATION

137070

JUNE - JULY 1945

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COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP EIGHT
SEVENTH FLEET
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

AUG 14 1945

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From: Commander Task Group 78.2 (Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT, SEVENTH Fleet).
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 78 (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR-BORNEO June 15 - July 6, 1945.

References: (a) CANF-SWPA and Commander 7th Fleet Operation Plan No. 11-45.
(b) Commander Task Force 78 (Commander 7th Amphibious Force) Operation Plan No. 12-45.
(c) Commander 7th Amphibious Force Top Secret Despatch No. 041225 of May 1945.
(d) Articles 712, 874(6) U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
(e) Com7thPhibFor Conf. ltr. serial 0563 of 10 March 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Commander Task Group 78.2 (Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT, SEVENTH Fleet) Action Report on BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR-BORNEO, June 15 to July 6, 1945.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded in compliance with references (a) through (e).

A. G. NOBLE

8 03866

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2	ComAdComdPhibsPac	1	ComDesRon 22
1	ComAdComdSubordComPhibsPac	1	ComDesDiv 44
2	CASCUPhibsPac	1	DRAYTON (DD 366)
1	ComFwdAreaCenPac	1	FLUSSER (DD 368)
1	Com3rdFlt	1	CONYNGHAM (DD 371)
2	Com3rdPhibFor	1	SMITH (DD 378)
1	Com5thFlt	1	BAILEY (DD 492)
2	Com5thPhibFor	1	FRAZIER (DD 607)
1	CG, FEAF	1	SAUFLEY (DD 465)
1	CG, 5thAirForce	1	PHILIP (DD 498)
1	CG, 13thAirForce	1	WALLER (DD 466)
1	AdRAAFCom, MOROTAI	1	ROBINSON (DD 568)
1	HdqlstTAF(RAAF) MOROTAI	1	HELM (DD 388)
1	HdqRAAFComd (BRISBANE)	1	CONWAY (DD 507)
1	AdvHdq, RAAFComd (MOROTAI)	1	CONY (DD 508)
1	ComNavSecBase, (MOROTAI)	1	EATON (DD 510)
1	CG, 6th Army	1	STEVENS (DD 479)
1	CG, 8th Army	1	KILLEN (DD 593)

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1	A. W. GRANT (DD 649)	1	ComMinRon 12
1	METCALF (DD 595)	1	ComMinDiv 34
1	HART (DD 594)	1	ComUDTPac
1	HMAS ARUNTA (D-5)	1	CO, UDT 11
1	ComCortDiv 74	1	CO, UDT 18
1	ComCortDiv 76	1	ComLCI(L)Flot 24
1	ComMTBRonsPac	1	ComLCI(L)Flot 7
1	ComMTBRon 10	1	ComLCSFlot 1
1	ComMTBRon 27	1	ComLCTFlot 7
1	ComRAN	1	ComLCTFlot 25
1	ComSalvage & Firefighting Unit (CABLE ARS 19)	2	ComPhibTraLant
		5	ComPhibTraPac
1	ComTransUnit (HMAS MANOORA)	1	Naval War College
1	ComTransDiv 103	1	Marine Corps Schools, Quantico
1	ComLSTFlot 22	1	Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
1	ComLSTFlot 15		
1	ComLSTFlot 7	1	Army and Navy Staff College
1	ComLSTFlot 8	1	CO, ATB, Ft. Pierce, Fla.
1	ComLSMFlot 2	1	CO, ATB, Coronado, Calif.
1	ComMinPac	1	CO, PhibTraGrp, 7thPhibFor
1	AdComMinPac	1	War Diary

AUTHENTICATED
L. L. Keesling
L. L. KEESLING
Lieut., USNR
Acting Flag Secretary

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ENCLOSURE (A)

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 78.2
(COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP EIGHT)

ACTION REPORT ON BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR,
BORNEO. (June 15 - July 6, 1945)

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PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A - PURPOSE

1. The BALIKPAPAN Operation was ordered for the purpose of seizing and occupying the BALIKPAPAN, BORNEO area in order to establish naval, air and logistic facilities and to conserve petroleum producing and processing installations therein. This operation was one of several operations designed to deny the enemy the fruits of his conquests in the Netherlands East Indies and his use of the approaches to these areas. TARAKAN and BRUNEI Operations were completed prior to the target date for BALIKPAPAN. These operations involved:

(a) Capture of TARAKAN in order to obtain the petroleum resources of that area and to provide an air field for support of the BALIKPAPAN Operation.

(b) Seizure of BRUNEI BAY and vicinity to establish an advanced fleet base and protect resources in the area.

2. A target date of 1 July 1945 for BALIKPAPAN Operation was specified by Operation Instructions 103/45 issued by GHQ SWPA. Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, U. S. Navy, Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force was designated as Commander BALIKPAPAN Attack Force. Rear Admiral A. G. NOBLE, U. S. Navy, Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT, SEVENTH Fleet, was assigned Commander BALIKPAPAN Attack Group with designation as Commander Task Group 78.2. Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs, U. S. Navy was assigned Commander Cruiser Covering Group with designation as Commander Task Group 74.2.

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B - CONCEPT OF OPERATION

1. It was considered that the following operations would be required:

(a) Heavy air strikes by planes of the Allied Air Forces from PALAWAN, ZAMBOANGA, MOROTAI and TARAKAN prior to F-Day to neutralize enemy airfields within striking distance of the objective area and to destroy enemy defensive installations which might be used to oppose the operations.

(b) Extensive minesweeping and removal of underwater obstacles and beach defenses by demolition prior to arrival of assault forces in the objective area.

(c) Preliminary Naval bombardment in support of minesweeping operations; and to destroy enemy coastal defenses, with particular reference to assisting Air Forces in destroying petroleum facilities which might be used to provide a burning oil defense; and in support of the assault.

(d) Mounting elements of the FIRST Australian Corps and supporting forces from MOROTAI and TARAKAN.

(e) Escorting and protecting enroute, all of the forces from staging areas to the objective area, via the CELEBES SEA and MAKASSAR STRAITS.

(f) Landing the assault forces and establishing them ashore in the objective area on the South coast of the BALIKPAPAN PENINSULA in Eastern BORNEO. Conducting such subsequent operations as might be required to destroy remaining hostile elements and to secure BALIKPAPAN and such other areas as might be necessary to allow the establishment of facilities required in the objective area.

(g) Conduct of motor torpedo boat operations along East coast of BORNEO, from a tender based in the objective area at the earliest practicable date.

(h) Establishment of required air installations in the objective area without delay.

(i) Conservation and protecting of oil installations.

2. It was decided to conduct the above operations in the following manner:

(a) Phase One - Preparation

(1) Air Bombardment - During the month prior to F-Day Allied Air Forces planes from PALAWAN, ZAMBOANGA, MOROTAI and TARAKAN, when in operation, would conduct bombing attacks in progressively increasing intensity until the period F-12 to F-Day when

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maximum available forces would be employed. These raids would be designed to neutralize and destroy aviation facilities, anti-aircraft and coast defense guns, defensive positions, and petroleum installations capable of being used to provide a burning oil defense of landing beaches.

(2) Naval Bombardment - On F-16 cruisers and destroyers of the Cruiser Covering and Support Group would arrive in the objective area to cover minesweeping and underwater demolition operations. While covering these operations this group would conduct counter battery and bombardment of known gun emplacements and defense positions in the BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR area. The ranges involved in this bombardment would require the use of cruiser sea planes for effective spotting. It was therefore desirable that enemy air and anti-aircraft installations be destroyed prior to the commencement of this bombardment. It was expected that the available cruisers and destroyers would expend a total of 2250 rounds of six inch and 2250 rounds of five inch ammunition in the preparatory phase of the operation.

(3) Minesweeping - On F-16 sixteen YMSs would arrive in the objective area, and, covered by the Cruiser Covering and Support Group, would commence sweeping the approaches to the KLANDASSAN Beaches. On F-8 four AMs and three YMSs and the LSM 1 (Minesweeping Tender) would arrive in the objective area to augment this sweeping unit. The presence of Allied influence mines in addition to Dutch and Japanese mine fields would further complicate and greatly increase a difficult minesweeping task.

(4) Underwater Demolition - On F-6 two Underwater Demolition Teams would arrive in the objective area and on that night would commence work on removal of obstructions of the KLANDASSAN-SEPINGGANG and MANGGAR Beaches. This work, although extensive, would be completed prior to the morning of F-Day.

(5) Loading Assault Shipping - Commencing about F-21 assault shipping would become available and would stage principally at MOROTAI with some units staging at TARAKAN and LEYTE. This shipping would load troops and equipment of the SEVENTH Australian Division and supporting units and transport them to the objective area.

(b) Phase Two - Assault

(1) Schedule Bombardment - Commencing at daylight on F-Day five cruisers and six destroyers of the Cruiser Covering and Support Group and eight destroyers of the Attack Group would conduct in relays a bombardment of known enemy defense installations and of the beachhead area to a depth of 800 yards inland and to 600 yards on both flanks of the selected beaches. The cruisers would expend a total of 2870 rounds of six inch and 2670 rounds of five inch while the destroyers would expend a total of 3450 rounds of five inch ammunition.

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(2) Air Strike - At H-70 an air strike by 12 B-25s loaded with 100 lb. GP bombs would be made on the landing beaches for the purpose of destroying land mines. At H-20 a heavy strike by B-24 aircraft loaded with 100 lb. anti-personnel bombs would be made on defenses in the vicinity of landing beaches.

(3) Close Support - Ten LCS(L)s, eight LCI(R)s and six LCI(G)s would be utilized for close support and neutralization of the beaches to a depth of 800 yards and for 600 yards on both flanks. At H-76 the first rocket attack would be made. Immediately preceeding the first assault wave a second run would be made. On each run approximately 4400 rockets would be fired making a total expenditure of 8800 rockets augmented by 3 inch, 40mm and 20mm strafing fire.

(4) Assault Landings - Commencing at H-Hour assault troops would be landed three battalions abreast on beaches RED, YELLOW and GREEN in nine waves in the following order: Two waves LVTs, three waves LCVPs, one wave LCMs, one wave DUKWs, one wave LCTs, one wave LCMs and one wave LCIs. Additional reserve troops embarked in LCVPs, LCIs and LCMs would be landed on call.

(5) Call Air Strikes - From six to twelve R AF Beaufighters or Mosquitoes would be utilized during daylight for close support of troops on call missions.

(6) Combat Air Patrol - Four Fighters would provide the combat air patrol from 0730 to 1830 daily. Two Beaufighters or P-61s would provide dawn and dusk C.A.P.

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(7) Call Naval Gunfire - Cruisers and destroyers of the Covering and Support Groups and the Attack Group would be utilized as required for call fire in close support troops.

(8) Landing Supplies - Immediately following the assault, pontoon causeways would be installed on the right (Eastern) end of GREEN Beach to facilitate landing of vehicles and supplies. Simultaneously LCT, LCM and pontoon barges would be utilized for ramp-to-ramp unloading from LST and LSM and for alongside unloading from LSI and AK. When the situation warrants, LST and LSI would be beached or unloaded over the pontoon causeways which would be developed to handle at least five LSTs simultaneously.

(c) Phase Three - Consolidation

(1) Convoys - During the consolidation period as well as during the assault the incoming shipping would be so regulated as to keep assault shipping in the objective areas as short a time as possible. Shipping would not be brought forward until it could be unloaded and would be withdrawn as soon after being unloaded as practicable. To implement this policy eight incoming convoys and ten outbound convoys would be used.

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(2) Support - Naval forces would continue to support this operation during the consolidation period by (a) Naval gunfire (b) protection of shipping enroute and in the objective area (c) minor consolidation operations (d) operation of resupply echelons.

(d) Alternate Landing Plan - An Alternate Landing Plan provided for landings on beaches located at [redacted] if for any reason it should be decided not to land on the primary beaches.

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C - COMPOSITION OF BALIKPAPAN ATTACK GROUP

TASK ORGANIZATION

78.2 BALIKPAPAN Attack Group - Rear Admiral Noble

(a) 78.2.1 Group Flagship Unit - Captain Ringle

WASATCH (AGC 9) - Captain Ringle	1 AGC
SPENCER (CGC 36) - Comdr. Hinnant	1 CGC

(b) Headquarters Support Aircraft (in WASATCH)

(c) 78.2.2 Transport Unit - Captain Cousin, RANR(S)

MANOORA(F), WESTRALIA, KANIMBLA	3 LSI
TITANIA (AKA 13)	1 AKA
CARTER HALL (LSD 3)	1 LSD

(d) 78.2.3 Fast Transport Unit - Comdr. Parsons

LLOYD(F)(APD 63), NEWMAN (APD 59), KEPHART (APD 61) LIDDLE (APD 60), ALEX DIACHENKO (APD 123)	5 APD

(e) 78.2.4 LSM Unit (LSM Flot 2, mod)(22 LSM) - Captain Weintraub

LCFF 789	1 LCFF
LSM Group 4 - Lt. Comdr. Johnson	
LSM 18(GF), 19, 21, 257, 258, 22, 310, 311	8 LSM
LSM Group 5 - Lt. Comdr. Smith	
LSM 36(GF), 37, 130, 148, 150, 151, 205	7 LSM
LSM Group 6 (Mod) - Lt. Comdr. Weire	
LSM 38, 39, 40, 42(GF), 267, 223, 224	7 LSM

(f) 78.2.5 LST Unit (35 LST) - Captain Mee

LST Flot 22 - Captain Mee	
LST 632(FF), 639(P), 714(P),721(P), 935(P),938(P),	6 LST
LST Flot 7 (15 LST) - Captain Sinclair	
LST Group 19 - Commander Van Zandt	
LST 181(P), 245, 470, 471(P), 474(GF), 466(FF)	6 LST
LST Group 20 - Commander Baker	
LST 452(GF), 454(P), 456(PB), 457(P), 462	5 LST
From LST Group 21	
LST 66, 168, 206	3 LST
From LST Flot 8 (11 LST)	

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LST Group 23 - Commander Linthicum
LST 395(PB), 397(S)(P), 911, 1016, 1017, 1018(GF)(S)(PB) — 6 LST

From LST Groups 22 and 24
LST 666(S)(P), 673(PB), 694(PB), 740, 910 — 5 LST

From LST Flot 15
LST 703(P), 753(P), 777(S)(P), 579 — 4 LST

(P) - Pontoon
(PB) - Pontoon Barges
(S) - Surgical

(g) 78.2.6 LCI Unit (LCI Flot 24, mod) - Commander Jannotta

LCI 624 (FF) — 1 LCI(L)
LCI 622, 625, 636, 634, 655, 699, 700, 712, 999, 1002(GF), 1003, 1008(GF), 1025, 1072, 1076 — 15 LCI(L)

(h) 78.2.7 Control Unit - Commander Petersen

PC 610, 1134(F) — 2 PC
SC 698, 750, 747 — 3 SC

(i) 78.2.8 Close Support Unit - Commander Day

LCS(L) 50, 8, 27, 28, 29, 30(GF), 41, 43, 44, 48 — 10 LCS(L)
LCI(R) 31, 34, 73, 226, 230(F), 331, 337, 338 — 8 LCI(R)
LCI(G) 21, 22, 24, 61, 66, 67 — 6 LCI(G)

(j) 78.2.9 Minesweeping Unit - Lt. Comdr. Fonick

AMs - Lt. Comdr. Fonick
SENTRY(F)(AM299), SCOUT (AM296), SCUFFLE (AM298) — 3 AM

YMSs - Lt. Comdr. Blakeslee
COFER (APD 62) — 1 APD
TENDER (LSM 1) — 1 LSM
YMS 4, 6, *9, 10, 11, 39, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 65, 68, 73, 84, 95, 97, 197, 224, 259, 269 313, 314, 315, 334, 335, 336, 338, 339, 340, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 392 — 39 YMS

* - In reserve at MOROTAI

(k) 78.2.10 Beach Party Unit - Commander Graff

Beach Party No. 2

(l) 78.2.11 Demolition Unit - Lieut. States

KLINE (APD 120), SCHMIDT (APD 76) — 2 APD
UDT No. 11, UDT No. 18

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(m) 78.2.12 LCT Unit - Lieut. Buckley

LCT Group 73 - Lieut. Buckley	
LCT 1081, 1289, 1291, 1293(F), 1295, 1297, 1299, 1301, 1302, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1325, 1329	14 LCT
LCT Group 21 - Lieut. Coffin	
LCT 83, 178, 372, 373, 864, 898, 990, 992, 1016, 1296, 1298(GF), 1327	12 LCT

(n) 78.2.13 Salvage and Firefighting Unit - Lt. Comdr. Pond

CABLE (ARS 19)(F)	1 ARS
LCI(S) 701, 702, 1000, 1071	4 LCI(S)
ATR 61	1 ATR

(o) 78.2.14 Service Unit - Lt. Comdr. Wallace

CHEPACHET (AO 78)	1 AO
CREON (ARL 11)	1 ARL
LST 67, 171	2 LST
SAKATONCHEE (AOG 19), GUALALA (AOG 28)	2 AOG
POINSETT (AK 205)	1 AK
BANSHEE (IX 178)	1 IX
LSM 129	1 LSM
FS 164, 361	2 FS
YP 421	1 YP
PINTO (ATF 90)	1 ATF
YD 65	1 YD

(p) 78.2.15 Screening Unit - Captain McCorkle

Destroyer Squadron 5 - Captain McCorkle	
DRAYTON (DD 366), FLUSSER (DD 368)(F) CONYNGHAM (DD 371)(FD), SMITH (DD 378)(FD)	4 DD
Destroyer Squadron 14 - Captain Sims	
BAILEY (DD 492)(FD), FRAZIER (DD 607)(F)	2 DD
Destroyer Squadron 22 - Captain Smith	
SAUFLEY (DD 465), WALLER (DD 466)(FD) PHILIP (DD 498)(FD), ROBINSON (DD 562)(F)	4 DD
CHAFFEE (DE 230), EDWIN A HOWARD (DE 346) KEY (DE 348), LELAND E. THOMAS (DE 420) RUTHERFORD (DE 347)	5 DE
GASCOYNE	1 PF

(q) 78.2.16 Press Unit

LCI(L) 635	1 LCI(L)
FP 47	1 FP

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(r) 78.2.17 Hydrographic Unit - Commander Little (RAN)

WARREGO	1 AGS
YMS 196	1 YMS
MANGO (AN 24)	1 AN

(s) 78.2.18 Representative Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force - Captain Gray

(To be designated CTG 76.16 on becoming SOPA)

(t) 78.2.31-37 Forward Convoy Units

(As detailed in Movement Plan, Annex (B))

(u) 78.2.71-75 Returning Convoy Units

(As detailed in Movement Plan, Annex (B))

(v) 70.1.5 Motor Torpedo Boat Unit - Lt. Comdr. Tappan

MTB Squadron 10 and 27	23 PT
MOBJACK (AGP 7), VARUNA (AGP 20)	2 AGP
ATR 56	1 ATR

(w) 74.2 Support and Covering Group - Rear Admiral Riggs

MONTPELIER (CL 57)(F), DENVER (CL 58)	2 CL
CONWAY (DD 507)(F), CONY (DD 508) EATON (DD 510), STEVENS (DD 479)	4 DD
CLEVELAND (CL 55), COLUMBIA (CL 56)	2 CL
KILLEN (DD 593), A.W. GRANT (DD 649)	2 DD
HNMS TROMP	1 CL
HMAS ARUNTA (D-5)	1 DD
74.1 HMS SHROPSHIRE (C 30), HOBART (C 3)	2 CL
HART (DD 594), METCALF (DD 595)	2 DD
74.3 PHOENIX (CL 46), NASHVILLE (CL 43)	2 CL
BELL (DD 587), CHARRETTE (DD 581) CONNER (DD 532), BURNS (DD 588)	4 DD

(x) 78.4 Escort Carrier Group - Rear Admiral Sample

SUWANEE(F)(CVE 27), GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE 107) BLOCK ISLAND (CVE 106)	3 CVE
HELM (DD 388)	1 DD
CLOUES (DE 265), MITCHELL (DE 43), KYNE (DE 744), LAMONS (DE 743), DONALDSON (DE 44)	5 DE

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D -- SUMMARY INCLUDING PRE-ASSAULT PHASE OF OPERATION

1. The Amphibious Operation for the capture of Balikpapan, Borneo, was notable primarily for the exceedingly heavy active and passive defenses of the enemy, his aggressive and desperate resistance, and the additional hazard of a thickly sown Allied mine field which necessitated extensive sweeping operations under the muzzles of enemy shore batteries. Available photographs and other intelligence concerning defense installations were uniformly accurate.

2. During the pre-assault period, from F-16 to Fox Day, scheduled operations centered about minesweeping, underwater demolition activities, and the systematic reduction of enemy guns and defense positions by an advance force of cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, underwater demolition teams, elements of the Close Support Unit and the Allied Air Force. Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs, U.S.N., Commander of the Support and Covering Group (TG 74.2) coordinated all operations in the Balikpapan area prior to Fox Day.

3. The stepped up bombing starting on Fox-20 day and the appearance of our minesweepers in the objective area on F-16 day indicated to the enemy our intentions, and in a general way, the landing beaches. Realizing the potentialities of the minefield already sown, he made determined and sustained efforts to stop, interrupt, harass, and cause the abandonment of minesweeping operations.

4. During the first part of the minesweeping phase, the shallow and mineable waters in the area forced the Support and Covering Group to remain at ranges of 12000 to 14000 yards where neutralization, or reduction of active enemy guns, was difficult. In addition, the enemy instituted the use of smoke from burning oil in an attempt to screen his activites and installations. At this time also, heavy AA defenses forced Allied bombers and cruiser spotting planes to remain at an altitude which precluded the pin-point bombing and spotting necessary for destructive effect. A DENVER spotting plane was damaged by such fire on 18 June.

5. The period from 16 to 23 June was a most difficult phase of the sweeping operations. During this time YMSs 50 and 368 were damaged by Allied mine detonations, YMS 50 so seriously that she had to be sunk by own gunfire. Three YMSs, 10, 335, and 364 were damaged by enemy gunfire. In addition, many YMSs were forced to jettison their sweeps while maneuvering to avoid enemy shell fire; other sweeps were actually damaged by such fire. The prospects of sweeping the area essential for the landing in the remaining time to meet the target date seemed somewhat doubtful.

6. With the entrance of destroyers into the Southern part of area PHILLIES on 24 June, the overall outlook brightened. Their presence caused the enemy to keep many of the troublesome batteries masked, and others which opened up were quickly smothered by fire from both cruisers and destroyers. Allied air strikes, consisting of approximately 100 planes per day carrying 1000 lb, 500 lb, 250 lb and Napalm bombs had started to make themselves felt, and enemy AA defenses, barracks areas and other strategic targets were receiving a heavy and sustained bombing. Moreover, cruiser spotting planes had become more familiar with the territory and the location of enemy defenses, and long range firing, despite the small probability of

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direct hits, had started to show tangible results. Enemy batteries which did attempt to maintain fire were quickly neutralized. From this time onward, minesweeping operations were only slightly hampered by enemy activity, but mine detonations continued to take their toll, YMSs 39 and 365 being lost on 26 June and YMS 47 damaged on 27 June. The gallantry and fortitude of the Minesweeping Unit in continuing operations despite there heavy losses is deserving of the highest praise.

7. The excessive distance between Balikpapan and the home field of the Combat Air Patrol, TAMI TAMI, coupled with the too frequent unfavorable weather conditions throughout the area, prevented the continuous presence of a protective CAP over the Advance Group in the objective area. In order to insure adequate air cover while assault troops approached Balikpapan and during the critical period of landing and consolidation of the beachhead, the assignment of an escort carrier unit with screen, was requested and provided for the period F-1 through F+2.

8. On 17 June at 1100 I an enemy plane reconnoitered the activities in the objective area. This was followed on the night of 17-18 June by an attack of seven aircraft. Three raids were made between 2000 and 2055I, the aircraft dropping about seven bombs, all of which fell astern of the Support and Covering Group causing no damage. Again on 25 June four enemy torpedo planes, at 2030I made a night attack which centered about the minesweepers. The minesweepers shot down three of the attacking planes without receiving damage to themselves. There was no CAP on station during either of these attacks. This experience evidently discouraged enemy aircraft activity, for no other attacks were made on ships during the operation.

9. Underwater Demolition Teams Eleven and Eighteen carried out reconnaissance and demolition missions on 25, 26, 27, 28, and 30 June in an outstanding manner under the fire of enemy shore batteries which ranged in intensity from heavy to light. The excellent coordination of gunfire from cruisers, destroyers, and close support craft working in conjunction with perfectly timed air strikes kept the casualties to a minimum; there were no fatalities. Reconnaissance of primary beaches at Klandasan and secondary beaches at Manggar and Manggar Ketjil disclosed no beach mines and verified the available information on beach profiles. Gaps of 800 yards each were blown in the Manggar and Manggar Ketjil obstacles and a 1600 yard breach in the way of the primary beach at Klandasan. Light casualties and minor damage were sustained by LCS(L)s 8 and 30 from hits by enemy 3 inch gunfire; others received small arms and shrapnel fire without damage.

10. In accordance with the air plan the Escort Carrier Group (TG 78.4), consisting of three escort carriers with screen, Rear Admiral W.D. Sample, U.S. Navy Commanding, arrived in the objective area at 0730 I on F-1 Day. At that time responsibility for both day and night protection of the Balikpapan area against attacks by enemy aircraft was taken over by TG 78.4 In addition to the target Combat Air Patrol this group provided their own CAP and antisubmarine patrols. Carrier aircraft for close support missions were maintained on board in a two hour "on call" status. This carrier group was joined enroute by CLEVELAND (CL 55), with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur embarked, PHOENIX (CL46) with Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey, Commander Balikpapan Attack Force and CTG 74.3 with Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey embarked in NASHVILLE (CL 57)

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11. The Assault Echelon under the Command of CTG 78.2 (Rear Admiral A. G. Noble), Commander Balikpapan Attack Group, composed of 121 ships in which were embarked the assault units of the 7th Australian Division departed Morotai on the afternoon of 26 June and proceeded to the objective area without encountering enemy resistance. Convoy 02-L from TANJUNG TIMI made rendezvous on schedule, 29 June, and these twenty additional ships proceeded in company.

12. Because of difficulties encountered in the minesweeping operations at the objective area, it became problematical if the operation could be carried out as scheduled. On 27 June an Estimate of the Situation was made based on reports of progress in the objective area. Progress of minesweeping, underwater demolition and reconnaissance, cumulative effectiveness of bombardment and air strikes, enemy reaction to operations, volume of enemy fire and availability of replacement ammunition were given special consideration. As a result of this estimate, decision to land on scheduled date was made on 28 June and remained firm.

13. At daylight (0700I) on 1 July (Fox Day), the scheduled pre-assault bombardment of the landing beaches and adjacent areas was commenced by 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers. This two hour bombardment was continous except for a fifteen minute period (H-75 to H-60) during the combined first rocket barrage and low level air strike. Commencing with deliberate fire it increased to a maximum intensity at H-10 as the first waves approached within 1300 yards of the landing beaches at which time fire was shifted to the flanks and rear areas. The second rocket barrage commencing at H-10 immediately preceded the actual landing. In preparation for this landing the Balikpapan-Manggar Area had felt the weight of more than 3000 tons of bombs, 7361 rockets, 38,052 rounds of ammunition ranging from 8 to 3 inch and 114,000 rounds from automatic weapons. This expenditure of ammunition may, in comparison with that expended in previous operations in this theatre, appear to be excessive but examination of the captured area definitely indicates that any less effort would have proven insufficient.

14. The assault ships, although slightly behind schedule at the point of deployment, moved into their assigned areas with smartness and precision. Due to the error of a signalman who inadvertently two blocked the signal on the control vessel while seeking shelter from enemy fire from the beach, the first wave was dispatched from the line of departure slightly ahead of schedule and landed at 0855 (How Hour 0900). In spite of sporadic fire from enemy artillery, mortars and small arms which fell among the boat waves and on the landing beaches, all seventeen assault waves had landed by 1055I without casualty to a single man. The aggressive manner in which the enemy manned and fought his guns to meet this frontal attack was borne out in the counted 160 enemy dead found in the immediate area of the landing beaches, and 300 additional dead in the area of fortified positions in the high ground to the Northwest of the beaches.

15. Landing in assault, two battalions abreast, the 21st Brigade on the right over beaches Green One and Two, 18th Brigade on the left over beaches Red and Yellow, met only light fire in the vicinity of the beaches. In accordance with basic plan they moved rapidly inland to the North, East and West and by 1230 had occupied all phase one objectives. The 2/7 Cavalry

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Commando Squadron which was also landed over Green One pushed eastward along the highway with Seppingg ng airfield as the objective, and crossed the Klandassan River before being held up by fire from six heavy machine guns north of the airfield.

16. On Fox Day a total of 10,500 assault troops, 700 vehicles and 1950 tons of stores was landed over the very mediocre beaches. A 3 to 4 foot surf further impeded unloading both on the beach and by the ramp to ramp method necessary for clearing LSTs into LCTs and LCMs. Some progress was made in the placing of the pontoon causeways both for single LST unloading points and for the pontoon dock. The beach was cluttered with logs and fragments from the beach defenses demolished by the Underwater Demolition Teams. First returning echelon of 3 LSI, 1 AKA, 1 LSD and 3 APD was unloaded and departed at 1930I.

17. Progress of the troops inland although rapid at first soon met stiffening resistance from prepared tunnel defenses, revetted batteries and defended positions employing trenches and pill boxes. Effective fire support was rendered by cruisers and destroyers both day and night. Artillery which had been landed in pre-loaded DUK's at H/40 minutes was emplaced and ready to commence registration fire by H/140. Primary air support was by groups of six B-24s on station at two hour intervals. By nightfall all F Day phase lines had been reached leaving some pockets surrounded for later clean up. The General Officer Commanding 7th Australian Division, AIF, Major General Milford assumed command ashore at 1900I, 1 July 1945.

18. Consolidation of the beachhead, steady advances by the troops ashore and intensified unloading activity continued on succeeding days. On 2 July all second phase lines were occupied and advances made to eastward beyond Seppinggang air strip. Unloading continued slow due to rough water and the necessity for shifting pontoon dock 400 yards to eastward on discovery of a shoal in approach area to dock. Cruiser Division Twelve which had been in the area since F-16 was relieved and departed for Leyte. One B-24 with air observer and one P-38 were lost to AA fire. Second returning echelon of unloaded ships (22 LSM, 16 LCI, 7 LST) departed at 1900I.

19. In the early morning of 3 July two enemy float planes approached the area, presumably on reconnaissance. Night fighter from CVE shot down one of these planes. First reinforcing convoy arrived and commenced unloading. 52 planes from the Escort Carrier Group made a heavy strike in the late afternoon on enemy concentrations and supply dumps north of Seppinggang. This strike caused appreciable damage in the area and exploded an ammunition dump. This group was relieved of responsibility for air protection of the area at 1830I and departed for Leyte. Considerable improvement was noted in unloading as a total of 13,260 tons had been unloaded by the afternoon of 3 July.

20. The Fourth of July witnessed additional advances along the coastal area, the capture of the Manggar air strip and subsequent halting of the advance by enemy heavy artillery and machine guns emplaced in the hills to the northeast of the strip. 4830 tons of vehicles and stores were unloaded during the twenty-four hour period. Beach obstacles opposite Seppinggang

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air strip were demolished by Underwater Demolition Team 11 to permit the construction of a pontoon causeway for unloading heavy engineering equipment direct to the landing field.

21. The period 5-7 July inclusive was devoted to continuing unloading on a twenty-four hour basis and further advances ashore. On 5 July, preceded by bombardment from one cruiser, two destroyers and Corp artillery, Cape Penadjam on the west side of Balikpapan Bay was captured in the afternoon without opposition, by shore to shore movement in LVTs and LCMs. Call fire missions both day and night were executed by cruisers, destroyers and close support craft particularly in the area to the north of Sepinggang and to the northeast of Manggar air strips. Balikpapan Town area was completely cleared on the fifth. A single plane flew over the beachhead area at 0625 the morning of 5 July dropping two small bombs in the bivouac area wounding two men. There was no combat air patrol on station at the time. Minesweeping continued throughout the period with primary emphasis on the clearance of a channel into the harbor. Eighteen moored mines were swept in one section of the channel along a 2000 yard stretch.

22. Commander Task Group 78.2 departed from the Balikpapan area at 1830I on 7 July in SPENCER (CGC 30) for Manila on orders of Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force. Captain C. W. Gray, U.S.N., with designation of CTG 76.6 becoming the SEVENTH Amphibious Force representative in the area.

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E. PREPARATION AND PLANNING.

1. Preliminary planning for this operation commenced immediately after the receipt on 4 May 1945 of the order designating Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT as the Commander Balikpapan Attack Group. Available information consisting of Engineer's Terrain Studies, strike photographs and basic intelligence of the area was assembled for preliminary study.

2. Upon release from the operation for the recapture of Mindanao on 17 May 1945, the Group Commander proceeded by air to Manila to confer with Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force; at the same time the Staff proceeded to Tacloban in WASATCH arriving on 19 May. The Group Commander returned on 20 May.

3. The advance planning team arrived MOROTAI in SPENCER (CGC 36) on 25 May and commenced active planning with the 7th Australian Division AIF. After preliminary conferences with Commander SEVENTH Fleet, Commander Service Force SEVENTH Fleet, Commander Motor Torpedo Boats, SEVENTH Fleet, and the 13th Army Air Force in the Leyte area, Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT and Staff proceeded to MOROTAI in WASATCH arriving on 28 May and immediately commenced detailed planning for the Balikpapan assault.

4. As plans progressed for the sweeping of the thickly sown Allied minefield, it became apparent that the original allocation of 16 YMS and 4 AMs would be inadequate to accomplish the task in the available period. The request for six additional YMS equipped with magnetic sweep gear met with immediate approval; the sweepers and gear, however, could not be made available until released from the Brunei Bay Operation. A total of 33 YMS and 3 AMs were eventually used over varying periods.

5. A second Underwater Demolition Team was obtained from CINCPAC due to the extent of the beach defense which required removal on the primary and alternate beaches. Two teams required five days for the reconnaissance and demolition operations on Klandassan, Manggar Ketjil and Manggar beaches.

6. The original Air Support Plan provided for objective CAP and Close Support Aircraft to be flown from the then incompleted air strip at TARAKAN. An Alternate Plan provided these two vital air operations to be conducted from TAWI-TAWI in case the Tarakan airstrip was not activated prior to the required date, which proved to be the case. In spite of the earnest efforts on the part of the air forces involved, the combination of distance (440 air-miles) and weather prevented both satisfactory CAP and close support aircraft operations at the objective. As soon as this became apparent, a request was made for a division of escort carriers to provide essential air cover for the assault operations. Three CVEs of ESCARDIV 22 and 27 were made available and were present in the target area from F-1 to F + 2 days.

7. As better photographic intelligence disclosed the presence of additional gun defenses, both coastal and AA, the need for a larger gunfire support group was indicated, also a greatly increased supply of 6" and 5" ammunition over that which could be carried in the ammunition LST provided. These needs were adequately filled by TG 74.1 (SHROPSHIRE, HOBART, ARUNTA, HART, METCALF, EDWIN A. HOWARD) on 27 June and TG 74.3 (NASHVILLE, PHOENIX, CLEVELAND, A. W. GRANT, KILLEN, CHARRETTE, BELL, WALLER, CONNOR) on 30 June. Additional ammunition was sent forward in POINSETT (1900 rounds 6", 8000 rounds 5") and FS 164

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(4000 rounds 6" MC).

8. In spite of the many nationalities and military services involved in this operation there was little difficulty experienced in the preparation and planning for this operation. Minor differences in organization and methods of operation were quickly adjusted by adoption of the other's ideas, or, when necessary, by compromise.

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F. REHEARSAL.

1. Rehearsal for the Balikpapan Operation was conducted on the east coast of MOROTAI in the vicinity of the MIRI River. Authority to use the area for this purpose was obtained from the Island Commander, C. G. 93rd, Infantry Division and NICA. Assurances were given all natives would be cleared from the vicinity on the rehearsal date to permit a limited Pre-assault bombardment and rocket barrage.

2. All units scheduled for the assault echelon participated in this full scale rehearsal. Sortie was made from MOROTAI anchorage on the afternoon of 23 June and the rehearsal landing was made on the morning of 24 June with "H" Hour 0900I.

3. All scheduled waves (17) were formed and dispatched from the line of departure. Only the LVTs actually landed, the other waves turning off just short of the beach. Troops were loaded into the boats and disembarked upon return to parent ship.

4. Transport areas, approach lane and line of departure were identical with those of the regular landing. Approach was made from the north followed by a change to the westward which simulated the Balikpapan approach. Due to adverse currents the assault echelon was about 1/2 hour late in arriving at the deployment point. H Hour was changed from 0830 to 0900 which permitted exact duplication of schedule for the actual assault.

5. Only minor adjustments were necessary as the result of the rehearsal. The deployment, made partially in darkness, was smartly executed by all concerned. The complicated boat movements necessitated by the situation went off without error. This is attributed primarily to careful study of the operation plan and a series of conferences and instructions which extended down to the coxswains of individual boats.

6. Upon completion of the rehearsal, units returned independently to assigned anchorages at MOROTAI.

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PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS

4 May 1945 (F-58)

Flagship (WASATCH (AGC 9)) anchored in POLLOC HARBOR, PARANG, MINDANAO, P.I. continuing, for recapture of Eastern MINDANAO, operations with X Corps.

Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT (Rear Admiral A. G. Noble, USN) designated as BALIKPAPAN Attack Group Commander by Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force.

5-12 May 1945 (F-57 to F-50)

Despatch received stating that target date for BALIKPAPAN changed from 28 June to 1 July. Tentative date to be confirmed later. Preliminary studies and planning commenced.

14-16 May 1945 (F-49 to F-46)

Preliminary planning continued.

17 May 1945 (F-45)

Rear Admiral A. G. Noble, USN, left PARANG by air at 1330 for conference with Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force in MANILA. Administrative Command, Amphibious Group EIGHT, remained in USS WASATCH. WASATCH, escorted by LELAND E. THOMAS (DE 420), left PARANG for LEYTE at 1900.

18 May 1945 (F-44)

0800 Position: Lat. 07-02 N, Long. 121-46 E.

1200 Position: Lat. 07-59 N, Long. 121-53 E.

2000 Position: Lat. 08-55 N, Long. 123-38 E.

19 May 1945 (F-43)

0800 Position: Lat. 10-32-15 N, Long. 125-23-15 E.

1058 WASATCH arrived and anchored TOLOSA, LEYTE, P.I.

20 May 1945 (F-42)

Rear Admiral A. G. Noble, USN, returned at 1130 from MANILA conference. Com7thFlt OpPlan No. 11-45 received and became effective for planning and preliminary employment of forces.

21-23 May 1945 (F-41 to F-39)

Planning team departed from LEYTE aboard the SPENCER (CGC-36) for MOROTAI at 1600 23 May for advance planning with the 1st Australian Corps and the 7th Australian Division for the coming operation.

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[illegible] 1945 (F-38)

Conference held with Commander Motor Torpedo Boats, SEVENTH Fleet aboard the [illegible] regarding participation of Motor Torpedo Boats in coming operation.

[illegible] 1945 (F-36)

[illegible] Received Com7thPhibFor OpPlan No. 12-45 which became effective for planning upon receipt.

[illegible] WASATCH, escorted by KEY (DE 348), departed TOLOSA, LEYTE, P.I., for MOROTAI, N.E.I. for staging and preparation for coming operation.

[illegible] Position: Lat. 09-47 N, Long 126-25 E.

27 May 1945 (F-35)

ComAir7thFlt requested to destroy a net tending tug sighted at objective area thought possibly to be laying mines and constructing off shore underwater defenses.

0800 Position: Lat. 06-56 N, Long. 127-29 E.

1200 Position: Lat. 05-59 N, Long. 127-43 E.

2000 Position: Lat. 04-14 N, Long. 128-37 E.

28 May 1945 (F-34)

0800 Position: Lat. 01-55 N, Long. 127-28 E.

1000 WASATCH arrived and anchored MOROTAI.

1330 Commander, Amphibious Group EIGHT conferred with General Officer Commanding, SEVENTH Australian Division on coming operation.

29 May 1945 (F-33)

Conference held with GOC, 1st Australian Corps and GOC, 7th Australian Division. No definite decision reached at the conference concerning the exact location of the landing beaches in the objective area. ComPhibGrp 8 requested that a representative of ComAir7thFlt be sent to MOROTAI for conference on air searches.

30 May 1945 (F-32)

Priority targets furnished to TAF after conference with GOC, 7th Australian Division. Com7thPhibFor requested to make 6 YMSs available in reserve at TAWI TAWI to be called forward to the objective area in case minesweepers were engaged in pre-assault sweeping at the objective area. Services of a degaussing officer were requested to check all YMSs assigned to coming operation.

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31 May - 5 June 1945 (F-31 to F-26)

Planning conferences held between members of the Staff of PhibGrp 8 and Staff, 7th Australian Division.

6 June 1945 (F-25)

Draft of Naval concept of operation delivered to General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Corps.

7 June - 10 June 1945 (F-24 to F-21)

Conference held ashore on 7 June with 1st Australian Corps, 7th Australian Division and RAAF. Agreement reached on all major questions presented. Commander, Allied Naval Forces informed of agreement. General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Corps informed that the target date (1 July) would be met by the Allied Naval Forces.

11 June 1945 (F-20)

ComPhibGrp 8 OpPlan No. 6-45 distributed and became effective upon receipt for planning. Convoy 02-A (Minesweeping Elements) sailed from MOROTAI at 0800 to rendezvous with CruDiv 12 (Support and Covering Group), both due to arrive objective area 15 June to begin pre-assault sweeping of minefields.

12-15 June 1945 (F-19 to F-16)

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Pre-assault minesweeping began 15 June in objective area in accordance with plan. Swept 6,000 yard lane, working North to Lat. 01-14-05 S, Long. 117-17-05 E and then back to point OAKLAND. Area RED SOX swept for moored and acoustic mines. All results negative, no casualties. Four P-38s reported for CAP and remained on station 20 minutes. Communication with CAP good, but difficulty experienced getting other planes entering area to answer up. In afternoon bogey tracked in from 240°T for distance about 60 miles on course 060°T. No IFF nor answer on any frequency. Area overcast and plane could not be seen. At 1447 fired on plane using radar control. Shortly after opening fire, plane came in sight. IFF came on and fire ceased when plane recognized as B-24. Unable to communicate with plane at any time. Within half hour, 2nd B-24 came in on same bearing; also unable to establish communication or see IFF, but held fire and plane was finally identified as a B-24 at a range of only 8,000 yards because of clouds. Allowing a plane to close to this range is dangerous. Noon strike caused fires, resulting in heavy smoke. Results of damage unknown. No enemy air seen. CAP reported one SC anchored and two motor launches underway in BALIKPAPAN. Weather: Mostly cloudy all day. Intermittent rain early afternoon clearing later. Sea calm. At 1930 wind south 10 knots. Temperature 82, humidity 92 per cent. Pressure 1008.5, visibility 10 miles, clouds 6/10ths. At point OAKLAND current 030 at 2.5 knots at 1500 I.

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16 June 1945 (F-15)

Coml3thAirForce notified that current situation required that night cover be provided at objective area.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Sweeping work in areas RED SOX and CARDINALS completed. Results negative. CAP on station from 0920 to 1000 and 1315 to 1645. No enemy air encountered. Possible one Jap plane landed BALIKPAPAN at 2000 I, as bogey orbited and appeared to land there. CAP reported four small craft and one barge underway at BALIKPAPAN; also one ship from 6000 to 8000 tons with bow above water burning in harbor. CAP drew AA fire from beach. At 1400 I, two large columns of smoke seen in BALIKPAPAN. Weather: Wind 175 degrees 13 knots. Distant lightning. Scattered cumulus. Ceiling unlimited, visibility 20 miles. Pressure 1009 MB. Temperature 82. Sea light.

17 June 1945 (F-14)

Com7thPhibFor OpPlan No. 12-45 became effective for operation.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Sweeping results negative. Fired 36 six inch HC at long range for harassing effect and familiarization of plane spotters with terrain. Cruiser planes did not close beach too close and were not fired on. Noted own bombers using "window" over BALIKPAPAN. Observed several columns of smoke from town. Fires visible 30 miles during night on retirement. Jap plane (Irving) bearing 240°T closed to within 11 miles, made short reconnaissance and departed to Southwest at 1110 I. CAP from 1300 to 1500 and 1700 to 1830 I. Pilot reported attacking possible submarine Lat. 00-50 S, Long. 117-30 E in morning. Further survey by pilot says he saw oil after attack. Same plane reported noon today observing three unexplained underwater explosions at Lat. 01-00 S, Long. 117-30 E. Indications are Japs have figured BALIKPAPAN as next on our list and established small sub base near mouth of MOERA or KOETEI River. Established local A/SP by cruiser planes as a precautionary measure. From 2000 I to 2053 I, three raids, total seven planes, dropped seven bombs in general area between cruisers and minesweepers. No damage. Weather: Haze, visibility 8 miles. Scattered cumulus at 3,000. .4 alto stratus. Ceiling unlimited. Pressure 1008.5 MB. Temperature 86. Sea slight. Wind 180 degrees 11 knots.

18 June 1945 (F-13)

ComPhibGrp 8 departed MOROTAI for MANILA via air to confer with Com7thPhibFor. GOC 1st Australian Corps notified that the Attack Group was ready to meet the target day (1 July). Conference held with 13th Air Force on air support for UDT work in objective area. Heavy encrusted spherical mine (3 feet in Dia.), without horns, destroyed in MOROTAI harbor in the vicinity of KOKOJA Island. Evidence of increased Japanese aircraft activity reported on JAVA.

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SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Pre-assault minesweeping progressing according to schedule. YMS 50 damaged by Allied magnetic mine and shore gunfire, estimated to come from three inch guns with two firing at a time. Crew rescued. After unseccessful attempt to tow out of danger it was necessary to sink YMS 50 by gunfire as she was drifting towards the beach. Sank in 5½ fathoms of water. Recommendation made to Army to give more bombing to BALIKPAPAN Town area from tops of hill line to seaward. Gunfire at YMS 50 not too impressive, but difficult for cruisers to silence because of range and difficulty in securing exact location. On first daily approach to area, enemy sets off large smudge fires to conceal vital areas by smoke. By time cruisers are in position, and before planes arrive on station, smoke is very thick. DENVER plane damaged by AA fire. At 1451 I, one Jap (Dinah) plane closed formation but retired after being taken under fire. CAP consisted of 4 P-38s from 1515 to 1550 and 1 P-61 from 1650 to 1924. Total CAP station time of 12 hours since operation started five days ago. At 1830 I, bogey (Pete) picked up and CAP vectored to intercept. From about 1850 I to 1915 I, Pete circled formation in plain sight and P-61 trailed astern. At 1920 I, Pete lost overland and P-61 ordered to return to base because of low gas supply. Weather: Wind 12 knots from 165°T. Visibility 10 miles. Pressure 1008.2 MB, temperature 84 degrees. Two tenths cumulus 3000 feet five tenths, alto stratus 1500. Sea slight.

19 June 1945 (F-12)

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrivals HNMS TROMP. One high speed bogey closed formation in forenoon, but not sighted visually. No CAP on station. Sweepers fired on by three inch guns now definitely located. One enemy radar heard working today with characteristics 107/500/25, believed to be on SIGNAL HILL as this corresponds closely with characteristics of radar given by Intelligence Annex. No deaths as a result of mining of YMS 50 yesterday. Four serious and seven ambulatory cases transferred to the MONTPELIER. One large fire seen in area from 25 miles out on retirement at dusk. Definitely established that enemy started large smoke screen cover on approach of our ships and planes in the morning to cover vital installations in BALIKPAPAN Town Area. Weather: Haze visibility 12. Scattered cumulus at 3500. One tenth alto stratus. Ceiling unlimited. Pressure 1007.5 mbs. Temperature 86 degrees. Sea slight. Wind 180 degrees, 11 knots.

20 June 1945 (F-11)

Convoy 02-E and 02-G (combined), including YMS 9, departed MOROTAI at 1800 I for objective area. ComPhibGrp 8 returned from conference with Com7thPhibFor at MANILA and boarded the WASATCH at 1200. ComCruDiv 12 advised that no close support Beaufighters would be available at objective area until activation of TARAKAN Airstrip, date of which is indefinite. Report received that enemy planes are beginning to become more active in the objective area, and requested better air coverage be given the operation. Air cover for objective area reported as unsatisfactory to date. Aircraft unable to reach objective area due to poor weather conditions and

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SANGA SANGA airstrip being inoperative due to excessive rain. CAP for night of 20-21 June weathered out. ComCruDiv 12 at objective area notified that landing plan would be adhered to; if necessary, tempo of minesweeping must be accelerated to permit Fox Day on 1 July.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Harrassing fire maintained. At 1520 I, HNMS TROMP dropped depth charges on sound contact, later evaluated as probable hulk, At 1522 I, YMS 368 detonated Allied mine; lost magnetic sweep, some hull leaks and gyro out. Two stretcher and one ambulatory cases transferred to DENVER. One bogey snooped formation from position over land from 1912 to 2015. CAP from 1650 to 1900 I. During retirement, eight large columns of smoke with one large oil tank fire seen as result of Army bombing. Weather: Wind 180 degrees 9 knots. Scattered cumulus at 3000. Ceiling unlimited, visibility 12 miles, pressure 1010.5 MBS, temperature 81 degrees. Sea slight.

21 June 1945 (F-10)

COLUMBIA (CL 56), escorted by SCHMITT (AFD 76), with UDT No. 18 embarked, departed MOROTAI for BALIKPAPAN. Urgent dispatch received from CTG 74.2 requesting that afternoon strikes bomb guns as primary target. Guns interfering with minesweeping and proving difficult for ship's guns to neutralize. This request passed immediately to Ad RAAF Com MOROTAI by officer messenger for action.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

CAP situation improved. Oil tanks on fire and large column of smoke as results of air bombing. Sweepers still being fired on; unable to neutralize guns from ships due to long range because of shoals and minefields. Requested air force try to neutralize same. Shore batteries opened fire on sweepers three times disrupting sweeping twice. Due to damaged magnetic cable, plus one jettisoned to avoid gun fire, only six serviceable magnetic sweepers on hand. Minesweeping results negative. Channel buoys planted. YMS 335 hit by enemy shell causing four deaths and 6 wounded. Material damage confined to forecastle and three inch gun. It required 1347 rounds of six inch, 270 rounds of 5.9 inch and 451 rounds of five inch projectiles to hold Jap batteries down enough to push sweepers through. Smoke from bombing and smoke fires set off by enemy makes locations of guns difficult. Ordered LST 67 to report to objective area for ammunition replenishment. Weather: Winds 5 knots from 175. Nine tenths alto cumulus at 30,000. Visibility 15 miles. Temperature 82 degrees. Pressure 1011.5 MB. Sea moderate to calm.

22 June 1945 (F-9)

Completed embarkation of Army personnel aboard ships for rehearsal 24 June. Condition three (darken ship) set on all ships in MOROTAI harbor at 2340.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrivals SENTRY, SCOUT, YMS 39, 314, 365 and LSM 1. Sweeps fired on twice. YMS

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10 holed slightly above water line by estimated three inch shell. No personnel casualties. Lost two more magnetic sweeptails in afternoon's work. Cruiser aviators fired on by AA just before shore batteries opened on sweeps. No new batteries sighted. No bogies. CAP situation better. Japs apparently logging arrivals and departures of CAP by their radar. Upon retirement, oil fires estimated to be 800 to 1000 feet high were visible as a result of Army bombing.

23 June 1945 (F-8)

0342 Condition RED at MOROTAI. General Quarters sounded. Two enemy planes raided MOROTAI. Approached on course 040°T at 2200 feet, no visual sighting due to overcast.

0346 Enemy planes dropped bombs off shore to eastward of harbor; no damage. Planes retired reverse of approach course.

0405 Secured from General Quarters.

1000 Embarked Staff of 7th Australian Division aboard WASATCH for rehearsal.

1100 GOC, 7th Australian Division, arrived aboard Flagship for rehearsal.

1210 Commenced sortie of rehearsal group for official rehearsal at MIRI RIVER, East coast of MOROTAI.

1319 Flagship (WASATCH), with ComPhibGrp 8 as OTC aboard, underway for rehearsal.

1400 Flagship passed through point ABLE, set fleet course and axis 281°T, speed 8 knots.

1431 Changed fleet course and axis to 349°T.

1436 Flagship passed through point ALVIN.

1440 Completed sortie of rehearsal group.

1457 Formed Cruising Disposition ONE. Fleet course and axis 349°T, speed of guide 5 knots.

1625 Changed fleet speed to 07 knots.

1632 Changed fleet course and axis to 342°T.

1821 Changed fleet course and axis to 035°T.

1910 Changed fleet speed to 07½ knots.

2000 Position: Lat. 02-32 N, Long. 28-10 E.

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2100 Changed fleet course and axis to 070°T.

2347 Changed fleet course and axis to 090°T.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrival CHEPATCHET (AO 78), THOMAS (DE420), COLUMBIA and SCHMITT (APD 76). Departures YMS 335 with damaged YMS 368 in tow. CHEPATCHET completed fueling all units. Shore batteries opened fire three times, firing on DENVER at 0835 I, but short by about 4 or 5,000 yards. Shore batteries fired twice on sweeps, quickly smothered by counter battery fire. YMS 364 hit by three inch projectile in chart house, projectile did not explode. Personnel recovered projectile and threw over the side. No casualties. YMS 364 still operative. Four mental patients transferred to CHEPATCHET. Shortage of magnetic sweeping gear still most critical factor of operation. New shore batteries revealed themselves today. Six inch salvo from MONTPELLIER hit magazine which initiated a series of violent explosions and flames up to 200 feet lasting intermittently until 2130 I. Harassing bombardment and counter battery fire very effective. Shore batteries quickly silenced. No RED alerts. Weather: Wind 18 knots from 210°T. Pressure 1009 MBS. Temperature 89 degrees. 6/10th alto cumulus estimated 8000 feet. Scattered cumulus at 3000. Visibility unlimited. Sea slight.

24 June 1945 (F-7)

0045 Changed fleet course and axis to 130°T.

0120 Changed fleet speed to 08 knots.

0221 Changed fleet course and axis to 180°T.

0328 Changed fleet speed to 08½ knots.

0445 General quarters for dawn alert.

0456 Changed fleet course and axis to 210°T.

0547 Signal given to deploy, proceeding as scheduled on rehearsal plan. Decision made to delay H Hour 30 minutes until 0900 due to adverse currents delaying rehearsal group. This permitted timing to coincide with that scheduled for actual assault.

Rehearsal successfully completed with all waves on schedule.

1133 Flagship underway from rehearsal area to anchorage at MOROTAI. Other units proceeding independently to anchorage on completion of rehearsal.

1358 WASATCH arrived and anchored at MOROTAI.

1415 GOC, 7th Australian Division left WASATCH.

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1700 Com7thPhibFor and Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force (Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey, USN) arrived MOROTAI and embarked temporarily in the WASATCH.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrivals, KLINE (APD 120), MANGO (AN 24), LCS(L) 27, 28, 30, 41, 43, 44, 48 and 88, YMS 9, LST 67 and BELL (DD 587). Departures none. Minesweeping satisfactory, no interruptions. No mines swept. Enemy activity confined to AA fire. Bombers gave excellent coverage. Good CAP cover and no bogies. COLUMBIA (CL 56) and DENVER (CL 58) obtained direct hits on enemy AA positions and coast defense guns respectively. Weather: Wind 180 degrees 10 knots. Pressure 1010.1 MBS. Temperature 82 degrees. 4/10ths cumulus at 2500 feet, 3/10ths alto cumulus above 1000 feet. Visibility unlimited. Sea calm.

25 June 1945 (F-6)

Transport Unit conducted embarkation drill today to insure expeditious embarkation of troops and landing boats.

0920 Conference held aboard WASATCH of all Unit Commanders, Commanding Officer and Staff members of the 7th Australian Division and Task Group 78.2 in which a detailed briefing of the operation was given.

1400 Press conference held aboard WASATCH for all War Correspondents and Public Relations Officers assigned to this operation.

1800 Com7thPhibFor and Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force (Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey, USN) and Staff present, transferred to the USS PHOENIX (CL 46), where he hoisted his flag as Com7thPhibFor and Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force. YMS 11, 72, 97, 197 and 336 directed to proceed direct to the objective area from LEYTE.
AdRAFCom advised that the break in the BALIKPAPAN oil line should be accomplished prior to F-2 Day.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrivals none, departures BELL (DD 587) and LST 67. All 5 inch and 6 inch aboard LST 67 removed prior to her departure. Minesweeping satisfactory. Four mines swept. Enemy shore batteries opened fire twice, six shells falling short of EATON (DD 510). At 2030 I, ships under attack by estimated 5 to 7 torpedo planes. CONY reported one torpedo passed within 100 yards. Three planes reported shot down by Minesweeping Group (COFER splashed 1, SENTRY 1, unknown YMS 1). At 2046 I, attack over. No CAP on station at time of attack. UDT No. 11 made reconnaissance of MANGGAR Beach. No beach mines found. Underwater search handicapped by muddy water. No beach found suitable for LST landings. Beach exits believed poor; underwater obstacles of light construction but numerous. Enemy personnel on beach, but opposition light. Permission requested and obtained to blast gap in obstacles in MANGGAR beach area. UDT No. 18 unable to exactly locate beach at MANGGAR-KETJIL

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due to smoke from extremely heavy oil fires which obscured entire area. Weather: Wind 6 knots from 180°T. Pressure 1009.1 MBS. Temperature 86 degrees. .6 cumulus at 3000 feet. Scattered cumulus at 3000 feet. Visibility unlimited. Sea Calm.

26 June 1945 (F-5)

0900 General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander in Chief, Australian Military Forces, accompanied by General Officer Commanding, 1st Australian Corps; General Officer Commanding, 7th Australian Division; and Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT inspected troops embarked in the MANOORA, KANIMBLA and WESTRALIA.
Transport Unit held embarkation drill to insure expeditious embarkation of troops and landing boats.

1235 Commenced sortie of assault forces from MOROTAI with plans and dates for the BALIKPAPAN operation unchanged.

1315 CTG 76.13 designated representative of CTG 78.2 at MOROTAI.

1400 Flagship passed through point ABLE. Sortie of Assault Group completed on schedule.

1456 Formation formed Cruising Disposition ONE; fleet course and axis 349°T, speed 05 knots.

1510 Screen commenced practicing AA firing.

1611 Fleet speed increased to 07½ knots.

1630 NEWMAN (APD 59) joined formation.

1650 Screen completed practicing AA firing.

1714 Changed fleet course and axis to 340°T.

1740 Strike photographs dropped by plane, picked up by FLUSSER and delivered to the WASATCH.

1845 Changed fleet course and axis to 295°T.

2000 Position: Lat. 02-38 N, Long. 127-55-40 E.

2012 Changed fleet speed to 08 knots.

2055 Changed fleet course and axis to 270°T.
Change No. 4 to ComPhibGrp 8 OpPlan was disseminated by visual dispatch to all ships in the formation. Will be delivered to balance of holders of ComPhibGrp 8 OpPlan No. 6-45 in the objective area. ComEsCarGrp 12, with ComCarDiv 27, left LEYTE for rendezvous with ComCruDiv 15. All scheduled to arrive objective area at 0700 I, F-1 Day (30 June).

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SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

AA firing and also probably coast defense guns, reported. Late photographs identify coast defense guns as probable 5 inch. ComCruDiv 12 requested that these guns be designated as targets for scheduling of air strikes. YMS 365 exploded Allied influence mine and sank. Entire crew rescued, 6 seriously injured. YMS 39 exploded Allied influence mine directly underneath her and sank in less than one minute. Three killed, seven seriously wounded, no report received on missing. Ratio of ships damaged to Allied magnetic mines swept is one ship for each three mines. SCUFFLE (AM 298) and YMS 196 arrived, departures none. No opposition to minesweeping this date, but the progress of sweeping was very slow due to the apalling number of sweep gear and operational casualties. Number of minesweepers actively engaged very low and constitute a critical factor in scheduled sweeping. One coast defense gun with large earth emplacement and one heavy AA position were destroyed by our heavy units. Six moored mines and three other types swept. UDT No. 11 at MANGGAR blasted gap through underwater obstacles to high water mark estimated 800 yards wide. Continued search for beach mines negative. Seaward face of anti-tank ditch appears as log wall backed with earth. Rapid construction of exits will require bulldozer work. In simultaneous operation, UDT No. 18 on MANGGAR-KETJIL blasted gap through underwater obstacles to high water mark estimated 650 yards wide. Search for land mines negative. Beach proper is extremely narrow and very firm. No beach suitable for LSTs. Found good exits on right and left flanks, other exits blocked by heavy undergrowth. Surf 15 yards off shore two feet high at 10 second intervals. Heavy AA fire from left flank of beach. Bridge over MANGGAR-KETJIL reported destroyed. No casualties. Difficulty in locating exact beaches continues. Landmarks not visible at 1000 yards due to smoke from fires. Weather: Wind 220 degrees 12 knots. Moderate thunder showers. Pressure 1010.8 MBS. Temperature 79 degrees. Clouds 10 tenths cumulus, nimbus visibility 2 miles, Sea choppy with white caps.

27 June 1945 (F-4)

0652 LCI(FF) 789 reported engine casualty.

0705 LCI(FF) 789 taken in tow by LCI 624.

0800 Position: Lat. 02-30 N, Long. 126-22 E.

1025 LCI(FF) 789 effected engine repairs and returned to station in formation.

1200 Position: Lat. 02-34 N, Long. 126-01 E.

1324 Changed fleet course and axis to 250°T.

1551 Changed fleet speed to 8½ knots.
A current estimate of the situation which included all factors involved in the operation was made. As a result of this estimate the decision was reached to proceed in accordance with basic plan.

1810 PC 610 transferred passenger with symptoms of acute appendicitis from ISM 310 to MANOORA.

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2000 Position: Lat. 02-30 N, Long. 125-04-30 E.

2100 Changed fleet course and axis to 270°T.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrivals ComRANCruRon in SHROPSHIRE with HOBART, ARUNTA, HART, METCALF, EDWIN A. HOWARD, ComMTBRon 10 in MOBJACK with 8 Motor Torpedo Boats. Departures none. Preliminary underwater reconnaissance made of KLANDASAN Beach. Casualties low and none serious. YMS 325 inoperative due to generator trouble. One magnetic mine exploded; one floating mine destroyed by gunfire. Small amount of fire from beach quickly silenced. COLUMBIA plane hit by AA fire. Pilot suffered slight wound. PT Patrols established. No Red alerts. Weather: wind 240 degrees 9 knots. Six tenths cumulus at 2000 feet, scattered alto cumulus above 10,000. Pressure 1009.9 MBS. Temperature 82 degrees. Visibility 12 miles. Sea moderate.

28 June 1945 (Z-3)

0800 Position: Lat. 02-30 N, Long. 123-24 E.

0840 Changed fleet speed to 07½ knots.

1200 Position: Lat. 02-31 N, Long. 122-56 E.

1330 Convoy 02-L departed TAWI TAWI on schedule. Scheduled to join formation on 29 June.

1400 Simulated landing drill held on WASATCH to exercise interior communication circuits.

1500 Communication drill completed.

1610 Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Group issued following order to all ships present in convoy: "The wearing of life jackets while underway in mineable waters in the objective area is mandatory. Wearing of steel helmets, particularly below decks, is recommended as protection against head and spinal injuries which are most common type connected with mine explosions".

1650 LST 457 dropped out of formation to effect repairs to faulty clutch.

1655 LST 457 engine reported capable of operation. Ordered to resume station in formation.

1706 POINSETT (AK 205) reported for operational control by dispatch to CTG 78.2.

1846 SC 747 reported radar out of commission and unable to make repairs.

2000 Position: Lat. 02-30 N, Long. 122-02 E.

2000 CHEPATCHET (AO 78) and FS 164, escorted by LELAND E. THOMAS (DE 420),

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reported as having departed on schedule from TANAPAG TANAPAG for objective area with fuel and ammunition replenishment.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Report received that YMS 72, one of five YMSs enroute to objective area from LEYTE, ran aground and could not proceed. Notified by 419 Nightfighter Unit that CAP scheduled for objective area and Convoy 02-I from 1700 until 2130 would not be furnished due to bad weather conditions. MTBs harassed MANGGAR Beach area. Due to insufficient time to prepare charges and to rest swimmers, demolition operations for the 29th cancelled. ComCruDiv 12 requested that air mission in support of UDT operations scheduled for morning of F-2 be cancelled. Two magnetic mines swept, one of which detonated close to YMS 49 flooding stern compartment and injuring ten men. ComMinesweepingUnit estimates area PHILLIES and GIANTS will be covered for average of five ship counts, and that areas ATHLETICS and BEAVERS will not be covered by F Day. Operated ships repeatedly in unswept waters to meet schedule and furnish adequate fire support. Enough area now swept to discontinue such dangerous practice. Of 15 remaining YMSs, three are inoperative mechanically, 9 can sweep magnetic mines and 3 have badly damaged cables and are being used as moored sweepers. YMS 335 hit 21 June by enemy shell fire transferred all minesweeping gear to LSM 1 (Tender). Entire problem of meeting target date has been lack of ability of assigned minesweepers to cope with the Allied magnetic mine. No CAP since 1045 I. At 1140 I, bogey closed to within 28 miles. Vectored out two P-28s from beach strike to intercept but interception failed. Bogey retired to Southwest. LCS(L) 8, while supporting UDT operations, had one officer, four men slightly wounded due to enemy fire. Hit three times by probable 3 inch shore fire. Very little of the shore fire received was visible from fire support ships or spotting planes. Indication mostly small caliber.

UDT Unit reconnoitered KLANDASAN Beach from 0815 to 0930. No land mines found. Water still murky, but specific and thorough search of suspected areas in photographs revealed these areas spotted with stumps of old piling. Sea bottom of firm sand and loose rubble of small stones and coral, slopes gently from two fathom line to beach and is not considered a hazard to hull bottoms. No unloading points for LSTs found. Left flank YELLOW and center GREEN possible with 50 yards causeway, but should be verified after assault. One fathom line averages 100 yards offshore. Two fathom line averages 300 yards off RED, 200 yards off YELLOW, GREEN. Offshore current sets East about one knot. Surf 15 to 30 yards offshore three feet high at eight second intervals. Almost no beach at high tide. Low bank at waters edge not considered obstacle to LVTs. Sand back of bank is firm. Numerous emplacements, mostly earth covered and some concrete, near waters edge. Larger structures back of beach are in ruins, but provide good cover for personnel with small caliber arms. Beach obstacles blown up. Good exits along entire beach leading to road parallel to beach 100 yards inland. Cannot estimate enemy fire due to poor visibility and much of our LCS light caliber fire falling in water. Unit retired under three inch enemy fire. UDT No. 11 officer believed heavy mortar was three inch. Underwater obstacles are more numerous and of heavier construction than expected.

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Native fishermen intercepted enroute CELEBES reports Jap troop concentration and barracks outside BALIKPAPAN. Reported pipeline along beach broached some months ago in several places and not repaired. Refining plant not in operation since last November. Few Japs west of bay. All natives evacuated a month ago to 3 kilometers from coast. Weather: Wind 30 degrees 10 knots. Scattered thundershowers. Eight tenths cumulonimbus pressure 1011 MBS. Temperature 80 degrees. Visibility 8 miles. Sea moderate.

29 June 1945 (F-2)

0438 Changed fleet course and axis to 230°T.

0550 General Quarters sounded for dawn alert.

0655 Secured from General Quarters.

0658 419th night fighter squadron at SANGA. SANGA advised that CAP for objective area and CAP for all convoys cancelled due to unserviceability of strip.

0800 Position: Lat. 02-18N, Long. 120-52E. Distance to objective area 330 miles.

0915 All ships in formation advised of location of Japanese channel buoys in BALIKPAPAN area.

0917 LVT wave leaders directed to instruct drivers that in case of breakdown or damage not to stop to help disabled LVT, as it will disorganize that wave and succeeding waves.

0920 SC 747 reports radar repaired and operative.

1000 Escort Carrier Group sighted bearing 065°T, distance 17 miles.

1009 Changed fleet speed to 08 knots.

1018 FLUSSER (DD 368) picked up late strike photographs dropped by carrier plane and delivered to U.S. TCH.

1044 ComEsCarGrp requested to be prepared to launch strike Fox Day at H-70 minutes in case B-25s weathered out. 8 VT and 8 VF with maximum load of 100 lb bombs and rockets desired. To be informed not later than H-120 minutes if strike is to be launched.

1100 Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force and Carrier Group, with escorts, passed formation enroute to objective area, distance 17 miles, bearing 065°T.

1200 Position: Lat. 01-50 N, Long. 120-21 E. Distance to objective area 291 miles.

1210 Transport Unit advised that if parawanes are not effective at slow speed, they need not be launched.

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1231 Mail and passenger delivered aboard WASATCH by DALE (DD 353).

1245 Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force notified that landing according to basic plan is feasible from all information received.

1350 Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force requested that a report of the general situation be forwarded to him every two hours during daylight in objective area.

1425 Convoy O2-L sighted visually.

1458 Submarine contact made by screen of Carrier Group. Depth charges dropped. Search made with negative results. Evaluated as non-submarine.

1505 Hospital ship HOPE directed to proceed to TARAKAN to await call forward to objective area.

1519 FLUSSER (DD 368) delivered photos dropped by B-25 to WASATCH (AGC 9).

1540 FLUSSER (DD 368) resumed position in convoy.

1645 Convoy O2-L joined formation.

1924 FLUSSER (DD 368) delivered minesweeping and UDT reports dropped by PBY to Task Group Commander aboard WASATCH.

1945 FLUSSER (DD 368) resumed position in formation.

2000 Position: Lat. 01-09 N, Long. 119-50 E. Distance to objective area 241 miles.

2230 ROBINSON (DD 562) reported sound gear inoperative.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Motor Torpedo Boat Patrols night 28-29th negative. Fired heckling rounds and illuminated MANGGAR and MANGGAR-KETJIL at irregular intervals. Slow progress made in minesweeping in areas PHILLIPS and INDIANS. Will concentrate sweeping with all available sweepers in approach lanes to beach with both moored and magnetic sweeps. Two moored mines found very close together. YMS 10, while recovering gear, blew a mine; discovered one or two more in sweep gear. Swept assault channel and reswept western half of INDIANS at 15 foot depth with negative results. Two magnetic cables damaged. One YMS with sweeping generator casualty. Arrivals YMS 65 and 269. Five magnetic cables arrived on CHEPACHET (AO 78). Weather; wind 07 knots. Pressure 1009.9 MBS. Temperature 85.5°. .3 cumulus at 3000. .4 alto stratus above 10,000, visibility 12 miles. Heavy smoke over BALIKPAPAN.

30 June 1945 (F-1)

0800 Position: Lat. 00-09 S, Long. 118-42 E. Distance to objective area 137 miles.

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0800 Changed fleet speed to 07 knots.

0811 Changed fleet course and axis to 220°T.

0813 CLEVELAND (CL 55), with escorts, sighted visually bearing 120°T, distance 15 miles.

0843 All ships present in Convoy 02-I advised by Balikpapan Attack Group Commander that ships and craft must proceed between transport area and landing beaches in the buoyed approach channel because certain areas had not been completely swept.

0852 Visual message sent CinCSWPA (CLEVELAND) that all preparations were completed for coming operation.

0930 Australian Army patient with symptoms of acute appendicitis aboard the LSM 150 transferred to the MANOORA by the PC 1134.

0939 Seven LSTs carrying pontoons directed to launch 14 causeways at objective area as soon as LCMs assigned to tow have reported, but not prior to How Hour, and not to interfere with assault waves.

1015 Group Beachmaster, Principal Beachmaster and Shore Party Commander, with mail for delivery to ships in formation, transferred to PC 610 from WASATCH while underway.

1040 Mail for delivery to ships in formation transferred to PC 1134.

1200 Position: Lat. 00-35 S, Long. 118-20 E. Distance to objective area 102 miles.

1324 PC 1134 and PC 610 completed mail delivery to ships in formation and returned to station.

1325 Permission granted for embarked troops to test-fire automatic weapons.

1436 Changed fleet speed to 06 knots.

1454 ROBINSON (DD 562) reported unable to make repairs to her sonar equipment.

1615 Dan buoy, with flag, sighted bearing 190°T, distance 7000 yards, probably drifted from BALIKPAPAN.

1645 Attack Group Commander notified ships in the assault phase of the operation that all beach obstacles were removed.

1810 ComTHFlt authorized retention of CruDiv 12 beyond F/1 day in objective area if local conditions indicated such action advisable.

1830 ComEscGrp (CTG 78.4) assumed responsibility for protection of BALIKPAPAN area from air attack.

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1837 SC 747 reported radar inoperative again and unable to make repairs.

1910 KLINE (APD 120) ordered to take position at point QUEEN by 2130 to act as marker to assist assault echelon in making approach to objective area.

2000 Position: Lat. 01-14-30 S, Long. 117-53 E. Distance to objective area 56.5 miles.

2100 Changed fleet course and axis to 250°T.

2150 Changed fleet course and axis to 272°T.

2230 Surface target bearing 260°T, distance 24 miles.

2245 Surface target identified as CruDiv 12.

2314 Task Group crossed the 100 fathom curve.

SUMMARY REPORT OF ACTIVITY AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Arrivals CLEVELAND, A. W. GRANT, KILLEN, CHEPATCHET, LELAND E. THOMAS, FS 164, YMS 65 and 269, SUWANE, BLOCK ISLAND, GILBERT ISLAND, HEIM, CLOUES, MITCHELL, KYNE, LAMONS, DONALDSON. Departures none. Motor torpedo boats patrol night 29-30 June negative.

Underwater Demolition Operation completed at KLANDASAN Beach. Little Opposition. No casualties. Sweeping results, one magnetic mine exploded, two moored mines cut and destroyed. A total of 27 mines so far removed for this operation. Area PHILLIES completed today for a minimum average of 3 ship counts. Clearance sweep in western half INDIANS at 15 feet negative. Will conduct influence sweeps of SHIEFS and INDIANS tomorrow keeping clear of assault echelons. Assault path to KLANDASAN Beach is reasonably clear. Until further sweeping is done, no ships should enter BEAVERS, BISONS or that portion of GIANTS west of western limit of PHILLIES or INDIANS outside assault lane and over 500 yards in other part east of PHILLIES. Fueled all except two cruisers and one destroyer. Took all ammunition from FS 164. All pre-Fox Day buoys plus JANALI REEF Buoy specified in OpPlan planted. Weather: Wind 180 degrees 11 knots. Pressure 1009.5 MBS. Temperature 84 degrees. Four-tenths heavy cumulus 2500 feet, four-tenths alto stratus above 1000. Visibility 12 miles. Sea moderate. Weak squall line passing overhead northeast to southwest moving to northwest estimated speed 10 knots.

1 July 1945 (Fox Day)

0300 Sighted fire bearing 280 degrees T, assumed to be oil fire in BALIKPAPAN.

0420 Changed fleet speed to 07 knots.

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0442 Changed fleet speed to 08 knots.

0520 Sighted guide light on KLINE bearing 258 degrees T, distance approximately 12 miles.

0550 Executed "Deploy".

0620 Base of oil fire ashore greatly enlarged.

0621 Starshell observed over BALIKPAPAN.

0700 Air observer in B-24 on station.

0700 Cruisers and destroyers commenced scheduled bombardment.

0713 Oil fire observed ashore bearing 324 degrees T.

0715 Second oil fire observed ashore bearing 318 degrees T.

0725 CAP (4 F4Us) arrived on station.

0726 Splashes observed near the LCI(R)s.

0734 Shore batteries active.

0736 CONYNGHAM reports being fired upon.

0738 DRAYTON silenced battery firing at CONYNGHAM.

0740 Report made to Commander, BALIKPAPAN Attack Force that assault echelon arrived on schedule without incident. How Hour confirmed as 0900.

0740 PBY landed with Lieut. General Morshead, Air Vice Marshal Bostock and members of their staffs. Plane damaged hull and tail assembly on landing.

0742 Close Support Unit left line of departure for first run on beaches.

0745 First rocket run completed.

0745 Three oil tanks appear intack in cracking area, one burning.

0746 Report received that 8th wave would be two minuted late at line of departure.

0748 No movement observed in MANGGAR area or along coastal road. Oil line appears broken and burning.

0748 Report received CAP would be on station at 0805.

0740 Air observer reports only one tank on tank plateau appears serviceable.

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0752 Air observer reports oil fires burning in BALIKPAPAN.

0755 B-25 mission cancelled. Planes unable to meet time schedule.

0800 Rocket fire reported well within target area. No signs of enemy movement.

0805 Six B-24s on station.

0806 Air observer reported Vasey Highway cut in three places by craters. Seven oil tanks burning. No enemy movement observed.

0813 21 B-24s completed attack. Air observer reports good coverage.

0819 SMITH (DD 378) straddled twice by shore battery.

0819 Huge flames observed ashore.

0820 Air Vice Marshall Bostock, Ad RAAF and General Morshead, GOC, 1st Australian Corps with members of their staffs, boarded WASATCH.

0821 CONY (DD 508) straddled by shore battery.

0825 17 B-24s struck targets.

0827 CAP (4 F4U) from BLOCK ISLAND (CVE 106) on station.

0830 SMITH (DD 378) reports batteries ashore silenced.

0830 Gun flashes observed from shore. Line of departure area under fire. Destroyer took guns under fire. Firing ceased.

0830 Commander Close Support Unit reports two splashes on his left flank. Caliber about 37 mm.

0834 First wave crossed line of departure.

0837 Second wave crossed line of departure.

0839 Rocket fire observed striking beach.

0840 No enemy movement observed on valley road or Vasey Highway by air observer.

0840 Large fires observed burning in tank area. Light return fire observed from beaches and town area.

0842 Few splashes and air bursts observed near wave one.

0844 First wave reported to be 1300 yards from beach.

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0845	Considerable amount of burning oil observed flowing north from tank plateau.
0846	First wave fired upon from the beach.
0848	Several splashes observed among first wave LVTs.
0849	Air observer reports many rockets from LCI(R)s falling 100-200 yards short.
0849	Smoke shells falling on GREEN Beach.
0852	All scheduled pre-assault air strikes completed. Targets 2, 4, 6 and 8 reported well covered. Rocket fire observed heavy on target apparently spotted as an enemy machine gun nest.
0853	Third wave crossed line of departure.
0854	CONYNGHAM (DD 371) engaging in counter battery fire.
0855	First wave landed RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches (5 minutes early).
0856	Support craft firing on flanks of beaches.
0857	Second wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
0857	Oil tank ashore observed bursting into flames.
0858	Naval bombardment covering Hill 87 begun.
0858	Fourth wave crossed line of departure.
0900	Commander Control Unit reports LST 666 has two inoperative boats.
0900	Commander Control Unit directed to use wave guide boats as replacements.
0903	Third wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches. No opposition to troops on beaches. other than intermittent gun and mortar fire which has not caused any casualties.
0903	Fifth wave crossed line of departure.
0904	Support ships on left flank being subjected to accurate mortar fire and some small caliber fire.
0908	Sixth wave crossed line of departure.
0908	Fourth wave landed on RED and YELLOW Beaches.
0909	Fourth wave landed GREEN Beach.
0910	Possible oil fires observed on pipe line.

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0911 Fifth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.

0912 C & D Cos. reported as having reached pipe line.

0913 Seventh wave crossed line of departure.

0915 CONYNGHAM (DD 371), SMITH (DD 378), and CONY (DD 508) completed scheduled fire and joined screen.

0915 Ninth wave crossed line of departure.

0916 TROMP (HNMS) completed scheduled fire.

0916 Air observer reports three friendly tanks on Vasey Highway.

0918 Eighth wave crossed line of departure.

0918 Close support craft and third wave returning from beach taken under hostile 3" fire. Splashes very close and FLUSSER (DD 368) opened fire immediately on these guns. No further hostile fire received.

0920 MONTPELIER (CL 57) ceased scheduled fire.

0920 SC 750 moving to new position delay due to fouled anchor.

0920 Sixth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.

0924 SHROPSHIRE (HMAS) relieved CLEVELAND (CL 55) on station. All destroyers on stations assigned.

0924 Five P-38s on station for direct support. Three have 1 x 1000 lb bombs and two have Napalm bombs.

0925 Sixth wave boats reported returning to ships.

0925 "D" Company reported phase one line reached.

0925 Close support craft on left flank under intermittent 37 mm fire; also control boats (RED and YELLOW Beaches).

0926 Commander Close Support Unit spotted mortar. Ordered his ships to knock out mortar.

0928 CAP (4 F4U) left station.

0928 SC 750 spotted several flashes from shore batteries. Gunboats engaging them in counter-battery fire. Enemy AA fired at plane bearing 315 degrees T.

0928 Eighth wave beaching.

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0928	STEVENS (DD 479), DENVER (CL 58), MONTPELIER (CL 57), firing on gun which was firing on close support craft.
0928	Tenth wave crossed line of departure.
0933	Eleventh wave crossed line of departure.
0935	Ninth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
0935	Five P-38s attacking defense positions in back of beaches.
0935	Mortar fire reported coming from hill behind RED Beach.
0936	Seventh wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
0939	2/27 Bn. reported approximately one mile inland climbing ridge and encountering no strong opposition.
0939	PC 610 reported 40 mm fire falling close aboard.
0940	"A" Co. reports no opposition. Pushing on to Rottnest.
0940	Five P-38s completed strike. Bombs in area. Results unobserved.
0940	Twelfth wave crossed line of departure.
0942	Tenth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
0942	Six B-24s directed to hit defenses and stores at road junction.
0943	Thirteenth wave crossed line of departure.
0944	DENVER (CL 58) completed scheduled bombardment.
0944	MONTPELIER (CL 57) resumed counter-battery fire.
0945	Troops reported moving northeast along Vasey Highway by air observer.
0945	HOBART (HMAS) engaging shore battery with aid of air spotter.
0946	Eleventh wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
0948	Beachmaster reported 300 yards of RED Beach unsuitable for any type craft.
0949	CONWAY (DD 507) firing on coast defense gun.
0950	Request received from Beachmaster on YELLOW Beach not to land any more wheeled vehicles on YELLOW Beach until mesh is layed.
0950	Fourteenth wave crossed line of departure.

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0953	Eleventh wave retracting. One craft remained beached.
0953	Twelfth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
0957	RED Beach line of departure under fire.
1000	"A" Co. 300 yards southwest of crossing. Meeting slight opposition on Spur.
1000	Line of departure RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches receiving intermittent fire.
1000	GREEN line of departure reported under fire.
1000	YELLOW and GREEN Boat lanes under enemy fire.
1000	Troops reached first phase line.
1001	Thirteenth wave on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches. One boat broached. Salvage crew working on same.
1001	All 2/16 Bn. in position. Meeting light calibre mortar fire in assembly area.
1001	Air observer reports from 30 to 40 enemy motor trucks escaping along main road going inland, one on fire. Trucks and cars of all varieties present.
1001	Air observer in B-24 going to strike motor trucks parked on road.
1003	Fourteenth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
1005	Fifteenth wave crossed line of departure.
1006	Thirteenth and fourteenth waves retracted.
1011	Intermittent gunfire falling about control ship.
1014	Principal beachmaster (RAN) closed left half of RED Beach to landing craft; unsafe.
1015	Fifteenth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.
1016	"A" Co. occupied Rottnest.
1019	Sixteenth wave left line of departure.
1020	HOBART (HMAS) firing on enemy battery 200 yards inland from beach.
1022	Huge flames observed ashore bearing 315 degrees T.
1024	2/12 Bn. has taken all their objectives to Phase Two.
1028	Group Beachmaster reported enemy retiring from right flank GREEN Beach. No

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casualties on beach. Beaching and retracting satisfactory. Surf negligible. Beach packed by soft sand. Many loose logs cluttered up beach. Hold up at exits to GREEN and YELLOW Beaches. Creeks not marked on map must be bridged. Guns not yet in position. No land mines encountered so far.

1035 COLUMBIA (CL 56) firing on defended position.

1035 Mesh on YELLOW Beach laid. Vehicles able to land.

1036 Romilly occupied by assault troops.

1036 BELL (DD 587) straddled by enemy fire.

1037 Last of organized waves, 17th, crossed line of departure.

1037 Sixteenth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.

1040 EATON (DD510) engaging in counter battery fire.

1044 Six air liaison parties established ashore and operating.

1044 Signal Hill hit. Large explosion observed on southern end near shoreline.

1045 Six P-38s on station for direct support missions. Four with 1000 lb bombs and two with Napalm.

1045 Four fighters directed to strafe trucks on road.

1046 Six B-24s completed attack on enemy gun positions.

1050 EATON (DD 510) scored several direct hits on gun. Gun crew dispersed.

1050 LCS Group 1 moved 2500 yards to the east of their regular assigned positions to avoid shell fire from beach.

1051 TROMP (HNMS) engaging in counter battery fire.

1055 Seventeenth wave landed on RED, GREEN and YELLOW Beaches.

1057 2/16th Inf. Bn. reported their position 300 yards from beach.

1059 ARUNTA (HMAS) relieving EATON (DD 510) for ammunition replenishment.

1100 Permission granted to have LSMs land on GREEN Beach.

1100 2/10th Inf. Bn. advancing towards position Rottnest. No opposition.

1100 Troops advanced inland approximately 1000 yards. Very slight opposition. Casualties light.

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1100 2/10 Bn. reports fire being received from PARRAMATTA. Tanks bogged down. Whereabouts unknown.

1100 Commander LST Unit advised vehicles would be unloaded in the priority shown in Loading Plan.

1103 Flank markers of GREEN beach moved 150 yards to right.

1108 LCS 29 reported spotting two gun emplacements.

1114 Forward troops using mortar fire on enemy.

1120 CAP (4 F6F) arrived on station.

1124 One P-38 hit in wing by AA fire. Able to return to base.

1126 AA fire observed north of Signal Hill.

1130 No direct support planes on station.

1130 General MacArthur (CinCSWPA), Vice Admiral Barbey (ComBALIKPAPANattack Force), Lieut. General Morshead (GOC, 1st AusCorps) and Air Marshall Bostock (RAAF), went ashore to inspect positions.

1138 Enemy spotted. Forward companies have pin-pointed position and will engage them as soon as 25 pounders become available.

1140 Troops engaged enemy, using mortar, machine gun and naval gunfire in lieu of 25 pounders.

1140 Commander Destroyer Squadron 5 reports SMITH (DD 378) holed in 3 places in forward stack at bridge level by 3" projectile which failed to explode. No casualties.

1142 Four fighters from GILBERT ISLAND (CVE 107) ordered to attack targets of opportunity along road.

1143 Control craft moved to post-assault position.

1145 Five of our tanks observed moving north along road by air observer.

1150 Troops advancing to PARRAMATTA encountered enemy fire. Tanks moved in to neutralize fire. Enemy reported moving to defenses between PORTEE and POLTS.

1158 Six B-24s on station, each with 9 x 500 lb. bombs, for support missions.

1200 Troops reported inland approximately two miles.

1208 Troops now attacking PARRAMATTA with tank support.

1213 EATON (DD 510) and CONWAY (DD 507) alongside LST 67 for ammunition replenishment

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1220 Report occasional sniper fire being received on beach. Twelve casualties evacuated from inland. No casualties on beach. All phase 1 objectives taken.

1248 Four P-38s with 1000 lb bombs and four P-38s with Napalm reported on station.

1253 METCALF (DD 595) relieved CONWAY (DD 507) on fire support station.

1300 Front lines reported same as of 1200.

1308 STEVENS (DD 479) directed to furnish call fire as requested by advancing troops.

1315 CAP (4 F6F) left station.

1315 Four fighters from SUWANEE (CVE27) made strafing run along highway. Thirty vehicles, trucks or staff cars strafed; most of vehicles damaged by strafing, and four set on fire.

1320 CAP (4 F4U) arrived on station.

1322 Eight P-38s completed strikes. Results unobserved except for two small fires. Planes returned to base.

1340 GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE 107) reported one plane lost to AA fire. Plane down behind enemy lines. Flight leader reports heavy AA.

1351 Six B-24s completed attack. No results observed.

1351 Report received assault Bns. reached objectives. Little opposition. 2nd Bn moving to MALANG. Reserve Bn. moving to RANDWICK FEATURE. Two wounded. Some light enemy opposition on beaches beyond leading Bn. objective.

1358 Six B-24s reported for request mission. Available two hours. Each plane has 9 x 500 lb. GP bombs.

1400 Report received transports unloaded 100% vehicles; 30% bulk. LSMs unable to beach until pontoons are in place.

1411 PARRAMATTA captured. 20 casualties.

1424 2/27 Bn. reported 2 killed, 6 wounded.

1442 Air observer reports no movement north of SEPINGGANG area. Bridge destroyed.

1504 Eight P-38s reported for direct support, 4 with 1000 lb bombs, 4 with Napalm.

1506 Tank traps reported on road.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

1520 CAP (four F4U) left station.

1520 CAP (four F6F) arrived.

1550 Eight P-38s completed attack on AA guns. All bombs in area.

1600 Six B-24s hit defensive positions north of the east-west road.

1601 MONTPELIER (CL 57) reports demolition observed at radar station.

1605 CLEVELAND (CL 55) with CinCSWPA aboard left objective area.

1615 Five objects observed bailing out of damaged B-24. Only 4 chutes were seen to open. This plane was carrying Air Observer and was hit in No. 4 engine by AA fire.

1624 2/27 Bn. occupied Randwick without opposition.

1630 14 VTs and 11 VFs from carriers on station for direct support missions.

1721 One of the flyers who bailed out of damaged B-24 received aboard U.S.S. WASATCH (AGC 9) only slightly injured.

1725 B-24 hit by AA fire, ditched in water. (Three boats previously dispatched to scene of crash to pick up survivors.)

1727 Six VF and six VT made attack on targets inland.

1748 Area C under attack from beach, apparently mortar shells.

1750 ComLSMFlot 2 under heavy mortar fire, moved out.

1750 COLUMBIA (CL 56), STEVENS (DD 479) and EATON (DD 510) assigned fire support missions for tonight.

1752 STEVENS (DD 479) taking coast defense gun under fire.

1815 MONTPELIER (CL 57) reported one salvo landed on gun position.

1830 CAP (4 F6F) left station.

1841 KILLEN (DD 593) substituted for EATON (DD 510) on fire support mission for tonight.

1900 Major General Milford, GOC, 7th Australian Division, assumed command ashore

1930 Convoy 02-T departed objective area for MOROTAI.

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1935 KILLEN (DD 593) engaging target ashore.

1945 CAP (one F6F Nightfighter) arrived.

2048 KEY (DE 348) instructed to include LSM 129 in Convoy 02-N departing TAWI TAWI 1900 2 July for objective area.

2100 11 survivors from air observer's plane (3-24), which ditched earlier in the day, have been reported rescued.

2136 Submarine reports contacting 4 unidentified ships position Lat. 06-02 S, Long. 116-12 E, course 020° at 1400/Z 1 July.

2140 CAP (1 F6F) left station.

2145 STEVENS (DD 479) directed to use harrassing fire at irregular intervals throughout night.

2225 CAP (1 F6F) arrived.

2241 STEVENS (DD 479) directed to fire 10 rounds per hour plus 5 star shells per hour.

Report received that 6 killed, 1 wounded as result of bombing by friendly planes. Weather: Wind direction SW, Force 4. Barometer 29.85. Temperature 84°. Blue sky with detached clouds. Visibility unlimited. Slight sea, swells from SSW.

2 July 1945 (F/1)

0015 CAP (1 F6F) left station.

0053 ComEsCarDiv 22 requested to send night search to investigate southern Macassar Strait area for four unidentified ships reported by friendly submarine. Be prepared to execute dawn launch and day search. Strike group stand by for attack if ships located.

0115 CAP (1 F6F)(N)) arrived.

0332 ComCruDiv 12, plus 4 destroyers, directed to organize striking group to destroy unidentified ships reported by submarine should they be detected in Macassar Straits. Directed not to operate below 2°S unless in hot pursuit. Remaining 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers formed in separate Task Group for local protection if unidentified ships arrive in this area.

0400 CAP (1 F6F(N)) relieved by 1 F6F(N).

0424 Submarine reported contact lost on 4 unidentified ships. Now heading on a westerly course. Speed 10 knots.

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0603 ComEsCarGrp 12 directed to alert aircraft in support of search for 4 unidentified ships in South Macassar Straits.

0609 Beach conditions reported by Principal Beachmaster require 8 additional 2 x 30 pontoon causeways making a total of 22. Permission requested of Com7thPhib to launch additional pontoons.

0630 CAP (1 F6F(N)) left station.

0630 All night fire support missions completed.

0630 1/12 Bn. held up by enemy machine gun and sniper fire. Casualties - 5 wounded. Field artillery as yet unable to deal with defended positions. Enemy ammunition dump blown up.

0704 21st Inf. Bn. reports enemy patrols inactive during the night.

0716 Situation ashore unchanged. No contact made with enemy by 2/14 Bn.

0720 SAUFLEY (DD 465) relieved STEVENS (DD 479) for replenishment.

0728 CAP (4 VFs) reported on station.

0807 Six B-24s on station, each have 9 x 500 lb. bombs.

0830 Four B-24s reported on station for bombing strike.

0840 CASU ordered 6 B-24s to bomb specified targets north of advancing troops.

0840 KILLEN (DD 593) firing a mission against defended positions.

0840 STEVENS (DD 479) firing a mission against defended positions.

0927 Four P-38s on station with Napalm tanks. Available 30 minutes for call mission.

0930 STEVENS (DD 479) reports firing intense neutralization fire on target between 0845-0855. Ammunition expended 109 rounds. Fire very effective.

0937 Three B-24s expended all bombs and returning to base.

0945 Four P-38s directed to drop tanks on personnel, stores and defenses on hill west of barracks. Strafing run to follow on highway.

0946 Air observer reports bridges to east as far as Sepinggang destroyed.

1010 Report received all Sanga Sanga aircraft grounded due to flooded strip and weather.

51

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1010 Six B-24s on station for support mission.

1014 Report received that one P-38 crashed and chute landed near junction of pipe line and road behind enemy lines to the north of BALIKPAPAN town.

1024 Air observer reports being fired on by AA guns. Smoke prevents pin pointing of vehicles along road.

1030 2/12 Bn. reports visibility ashore zero due to heavy smoke.

1030 Request for launching 8 additional causeways approved by Com7thPhib.

1035 Postal 4 (GHQ plane) arrived to pick up press releases.

1040 Four F4U's ordered to strafe targets of opportunity in target areas.

1040 Three LCIs crippled in beaching to be towed in 9 knot convoy leaving tonight.

1043 Four P-38's on station for support mission, 3 have Napalm bombs, one 1 x 1000 lb. bomb.

1052 Com7thPhib advised that threat of surface attack now considered over.

1100 Air observer fired upon by AA; spotted trenches west of village.

1112 Air observer reports spotting 5 craft about 40 feet long near town. All appear serviceable.

1115 Five B-24's on station loaded with DDT spray. Troops ashore will be notified prior to runs.

1120 P-38 planes completed strike on signal hill. CruDiv 15 assumed gun-fire support. CruDiv 12 preparing to get underway.

1120 Four Planes (F4Us) completed strafing of oil tanks and trucks.

1136 Five B-24's made DDT spray run along beach areas.

1140 Six B-24s, each carrying 9 x 500 lb. GP bombs, making attack on gun positions, trenches and defenses alongside of Milford highway.

1153 Six B-24's reported on station for target mission.

1155 Six B-24's assigned to hit AA position. This is believed to be AA positior hitting our planes.

1200 ICI acting as control vessel was struck by enemy shell 400 yards off right flank of GREEN beach and sunk. Three men wounded.

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1200 Air observer reported for duty.

1205 Six B-24s completed mission of bombing AA positions. 80% of bombs in area.

1222 Com7thPhib in DENVER (CL 58) departed area for LEYTE, accompanied by CONY (DD 508).

1245 SHROPSHIRE (HMAS) firing on AA positions.

1249 B-24 (Air observer) hit by AA fire and crashed inside of enemy lines. Possibility of survivors doubtful. Entire area in flames. No chutes were seen to open.

1304 Six more B-24s assigned to hit AA guns which are hitting our planes.

1323 CruDiv 12 underway for LEYTE.

1325 Bogey bearing 209° T, distance 39 miles. General quarters sounded.

1326 A. W. GRANT (DD 649) assigned to fire on enemy positions.

1335 General quarters secured. Identified Bogey as B-24 with no IFF.

1350 Six B-24s assigned to hit AA were unable to locate guns due to weather and heavy smoke. Proceeding to new area to hit AA positions reported there.

1355 Five B-24s unable to locate AA position due to weather and heavy smoke. Assigned twin 127MM gun in another area as target.

1355 A. W. GRANT (DD 649) completed call fire.

1400 A. W. GRANT (DD 649) commenced call fire.

1420 B-24 strike completed on twin 127MM gun. 75% of bombs in area.

1430 A. W. GRANT (DD 649) completed call fire.

1435 YMS 47 required pump to keep water under control. CABLE (ARS 19) sent to assist and report damage and recommend best speed at which she can safely be towed to rear area.

1445 Relief air observer in TBF from CVE reported on station. Warned to exercise all precautions as AA fire has been accurate.

1500 Six B-24s, each with 9 x 500 lb. GP bombs, attacked heavy AA position reported firing on our troops.

1500 3" enemy mortar fire reported still falling in approaches and beach area.

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1500	Enemy battery fired on shipping 600 yards off GREEN beach. Battery engaged by naval gunfire and firing stopped.
1515	CAP (4 F4Us) now on station.
1520	A. W. GRANT (DD 649) eng ging AA position.
1530	PHILIP (DD 498) engaging gun position.
1538	HOBART (HMAS) ceased firing on target at request of Army.
1540	Four P-38s made Napalm attack on AA gun position. No results observed.
1545	PHILIP (DD 498) ceased firing on gun position.
1555	Pilot of P-38 reports direct hit on enemy gun positions.
1605	SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging AA gun position with aid of air spot.
1610	Six B-24s completed attack on heavy AA. Air obserber reports all bombs in area and one large explosion.
1659	Air observer reports bridge south end of Manggar Strip out at western end. Building damaged, whole area cratered. Road condition fair.
1708	SAUFLEY (DD 465) reports hit on gun position.
1709	ARUNTA (HMAS) engaging gun targets.
1730	7th Aust. Div. reported Jap booby traps throughout area concealed under discarded clothing.
1730	Report received that 2/14 Bn. consolidated Sepinggang airstrip area without contact.
1730	Large fires tank plateau area reported.
1750	Air observer reports no abnormal activities or traffic jam on beaches.
1830	Convoy 02-U sailed for MOROTAI.
1900	Engineering officer of LCI 700 transferred to WASATCH (AGC 9) for appendectomy.
1902	Group beachmaster reported 5 exits from GREEN Beach would soon be completed. Pontoon dock ready to take LSTs, but state of wind and surf prevents. Every effort being made to strengthen dock. All available beaching points being kept filled with craft. Surf 3 to 4 feet interval 8 seconds.

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1920 Four destroyers directed to fire star shells for illumination tonight.

1930 Close Support Unit reports receiving enemy fire.

2100 Commander Minesweeping Unit reported sweep unit now consists of 24 YMSs - 6 to be retired 3 July, 4 that reported at 1530 on 1 July would test magnetic gear the next day, 5 are operational magnetic sweepers, 8 are undergoing repairs to magnetic gear and 1 has ship's service generator casualty and is inoperative.

2220 CAP (1 F6F) on station.

2300 Six oil fires observed during the day in enemy held area of BALIKPAPAN.

Weather: Wind direction W, Force 3. Barometer 29.86. Temperature 81. Sky mainly cloudy, hazy weather. Visibility 7 miles. Slight sea, swells from South.

3 July 1945 (F/2)

0412 Bogey bearing 215° T, distance 63 miles.

0415 2nd Bogey bearing 195° T, distance 83 miles.

0430 Bogey bearing 205° T, distance 29 miles.

0430 2nd Bogey bearing 202° T, distance 48 miles.

0433 Flash Blue, control Green.

0438 Flash Blue, control Yellow.

0440 Flash Red, control Yellow.

0445 Bogey closing northerly bearing 220° T, distance 12 miles. 2nd Bogey bearing 060°, distance 15 miles, wide orbit.

0455 Bogey bearing 220, distance 14 miles, headed north.

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0502	CAP placed between ships and bogies.
0503	2nd Bogey 220°, distance 6 miles, course 024°T.
0505	Contact lost on first Bogey.
0523	Bogey 050°, distance 40 miles, orbiting.
0535	Bogey 075°, distance 23, course 150.
0558	Bogey 215°, distance 30 miles.
0612	Bogey 180°, distance 40 miles, going south.
0618	Bogey identified as twin float Jap fighter.
0620	Nightfighter (Hellcat) shot down one single engine twin float plane (Jake bearing 180° T, distance 50 miles, southward, apparently retiring.
0621	Flash white, control yellow.
0729	Air observer in B-24 on station.
0748	Six B-24s reported for close support mission.
0825	Air observer reported position of two twin heavy AA positions. Appeared occupied, no signs of any bomb hits in area.
0830	UDT # 11 conducting reconnaisance of beaches off SEPINGGANG Airstrip.
0900	Fighter Command 13th AAF advised ComPhibGrp 8 that P-38s scheduled to hit BALIKPAPAN at 1100 and 1300 cancelled due to weather conditions.
0901	Green beach under light fire.
0915	4 F4Us directed to strafe targets of opportunity.
0925	Convoy 02-K arrived.
0927	AA fire received by air observer.
0928	6 B- 24s unable to hit targets due to cloud cover and smoke.
0930	5 B-24s on station each with 9 x 500 lb. bombs for close support mission.
0934	4 P-38s reported on station with Napalm.
0937	FLUSSER (DD 368) engaging 4 guns.
0938	CONYNGHAM (DD 371) engaging target.

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0943	CAP (4 F4U) reported for strafing mission.
0945	4 P-38s directed to make Napalm attack on AA positions.
0950	6 B-24s completed bombing mission.
0950	20 mm AA fire reported by air observer.
0959	4 P-38s completed Napalm run. All bombs in area.
1020	FLUSSER (DD 368) completed firing against target.
1029	5 B-24s directed to hit AA positions.
1037	SHROPSHIRE firing into positions of reported enemy activity.
1058	CONYNGHAM (DD 371) completed firing against target.
1138	7th Division reports information obtained that enemy intends withdrawing to defense positions 5 miles northeast of landing beaches.
1140	SHROPSHIRE completed bombardment of AA guns. Guns reported silenced.
1150	Air observer reported that no enemy visible CAPE PENADJAM. Gun positions have guns, but no personnel. No movement seen except natives.
1150	6 B-24s reported for direct support mission with 9 x 500 lb. bombs each.
1158	FLUSSER (DD 368) opened fire on AA guns.
1158	B-24 taking pictures over beach area.
1200	B-24 ordered away from beach area.
1206	Air observer reported on station.
1215	Catalina, with special cargo of blood aboard, arrived and damaged tail surface in landing. No casualties. Plane towed to beach.
1241	4 VFs directed to strafe targets of opportunity.
1246	6 B-24s directed to attack AA and defense positions.
1259	SPENCER (CGC 36) came alongside of WASATCH (AGC 9) to fuel and receive CTG 78.2 and staff, to remain at objective area.
1300	RANCruRon (SHROPSHIRE, HOBART, ARUNTA, A. W. GRANT) departed for TAWI TAWI to replenish.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

1640 PHILIP (DD 498) reported fire on pillboxes and trenches very effective. Targets destroyed. PHILIP (DD 498) relieved by BURNS (DD 588).

1640 Heavy air strike by approximately 52 carrier planes did considerable damage to enemy troops, stores and equipment in area of withdrawal to northward of peninsula; large explosions and fires seen.

1703 BURNS (DD 588) ceased fire on designated target.

1710 Commander Balikpapan Attack Group shifted flag and operations temporarily to SPENCER (CGC 36). Routine administration remains in WASATCH (AGC 9)

1725 SPENCER (CGC 36) underway to new anchorage closer to the beach.

1739 PHILIP (DD 498) instructed to fire illumination every 10 minutes for 10 hours and then one every 30 minutes during remaining hours of darkness.

1830 2 P-61s reported on station as CAP. EsCarGrp 12 relieved of responsibility of air cover at BALIKPAPAN by AdRAAFCom.

1842 SPENCER (CGC 36) anchored in position: Lat. 01-18-50 S, Long. 116-52-35 E, approximately 4400 yards from beach.

1900 WASATCH (AGC 9), escorted by SCHMIDT (APD 76) (with UDT #18 aboard) departed for MOROTAI.

1900 EsCarGrp 12 (SUWANEE (CVE 27), BLOCK ISLAND (CVE 106), GILBERT ISLAND (CVE 107) and 6 escorts departed for LEYTE.

1930 1 P-61(CAP) left station.

2100 ComMinesweeping Unit reported completion of 1500 yds. sweep in area CHIEFS and completion of check sweep in area INDIANS for moored and influence type mines. Results negative. 10 YMSs are operational as magnetic sweepers, 8 YMSs repairing gear.

2130 CAP (1 P-61) left station.

2235 BELL (DD 587) commenced firing illumination shells every 10 minutes during hours of darkness.

2244 CHARRETTE (DD 581) commenced harassing fire mission.

2304 CHARRETTE (DD 581) completed harassing fire mission.

2343 BURNS (DD 588) commenced harassing fire mission.

2343 Fighter Command, 13th Army Air Force, advised that sea for past two days had 4 foot swells about 70° crown wind and are expected to continue. Sea

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

conditions make landing of Catalina type Planes dangerous, judging from fact that 3 planes have been damaged in landing during past 3 days.

Weather: Wind direction SW x S, force 4. Barometer 29.86. Temperature 84°. Sky mainly cloudy. Visibility unlimited. Slight sea, swells from SSW.

4 July 1945 (F + 3)

0000 BURNS (DD 588) completed harrassing fire mission.

0145 Illumination requested by patrol vessels due to suspected presence of enemy small surface craft.

0235 LCS 8 reported "Skunk" chased by him which disappeared on bearing 205° T from vicinity of his patrol station. No further attack or further contact.

0330 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

0525 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

0530 CAP (1 P-61) left station.

0730 CAP (1 P-61) left station.

0830 LST 721 standing out to transport area.

0845 LST 703 standing out to transport area.

0935 Cruisers and destroyers commenced firing special 4 July bombardment on designated target area to destroy Jap troop concentrations, buildings and supplies.

0945 LST 1016 standing out to retirement area.

1005 Bombardment completed. Jap ammunition dump exploded, area reported well covered.

1100 LST 935 standing out to retirement area.

1129 Entrance to SEPINGGANG beach marked 150 yards to seaward of outer barrier by buoys.

1229 CONNER (DD 582) completed call fire mission. Reported area well covered and small fires started.

1250 MANGGAR Airstrip reported captured.

1305 SEPINGGANG beach survey indicated 1 fathom curve 400 yards to seaward, 2 fathom curve 740 yards to seaward. Area unsuited for pontoon dock for LSTs. Area east and west worse.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

1310 PHOENIX (CL 46) commenced firing on guns which have our troops under fire.

1350 LST 750 standing out to retirement area.

1400 LST 1017 standing out to retirement area.

1421 Control officer directed to use all available lighterage to maximum for unloading amphibious shipping on round the clock basis.

1520 PHOENIX (CL 46) completed firing. Enemy guns neutralized. One pillbox direct hit.

1530 LST 938 standing out to retirement area.

1536 BELL (DD 587) commenced firing on suspected gun position.

1702 CAP (1 P-61) on station.

1720 MANGGAR airstrip under enemy artillery fire from guns about 1500 yards beyond airstrip. PHOENIX (CL 46) firing on enemy gun positions.

1730 LSTs 1018, 666 and 395 standing out to retirement area.

1747 BURNS (DD 588) commenced harrassing fire on defended area MANGGAR strip allowing battalion to withdraw at dusk.

1830 Convoy 02-W standing out with ComDesRon 5 as OTC in USS FLUSSER (DD 368).

1845 BELL (DD 587) completed firing mission.

1915 LST 777 standing in from retirement area.

1915 BELL (DD 587) and SAUFLEY (DD 465) commenced a bombardment mission.

1917 Advised by 18th Fighter Group that all convoy cover cancelled due to weather.

1919 LCM 632 sunk by explosion believed to have resulted from striking a mine. No casualties.

1920 Jap killed on hill overlooking beach area was equipped for observing and is believed to have been observing for 75 mm gun firing on beach area.

1920 CAP (1 P-61) on station.

1930 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

1940 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

2100 Considerable amount of enemy equipment, including small arms, searchlights, 20 mm guns and documents reported captured in the BALIKPAPAN town area.

2100 CONNOR (DD 582) and CHARRETTE (DD 581) furnished starshell illumination for an area Northeast of BALIKPAPAN at 10 minute intervals until 2230.

2130 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

2130 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

2225 Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 27 reported sighting underwater wake 30 yards wide at Lat. 01-50 S, Long. 117-21 E. No radar pip registered on scope and only wake was visible. Speed 10 knots. Courses varied from 090° T to 000° T. Wake abruptly disappeared when boats made run on it.

2230 BAILEY (DD 492) commenced starshell illumination and was directed to fire one starshell every half hour throughout the night.

2330 CAP (1 P-61) off station. No relief reported.

Weather: Wind direction S x E, Force 4. Barometer 29.90. Temperature 83°. Overcast, rainy weather. Visibility 7 miles. Slight sea, swells SSE.

5 July 1945 (F/4)

0600 Bogey reported.

0610 Flash Red, control Yellow.

0612 General Quarters sounded on Flagship (SPENCER (CGC 36)).

0625 Two bombs dropped on beach by unidentified enemy plane. 2 wounded, minor damage. No CAP on station at time of attack. Plane not sighted. Speed indicated float plane.

0630 Flash Blue, control Yellow.

0637 Bogey closing bearing 270°, distance 12 miles.

0639 Bogey closing bearing 290°, distance 9 miles.

0643 Flash Red, control Yellow.

0650 Bogey bearing 180° T, distance 22 miles, speed 248 knots.

0655 Secured from general quarters. Bogey retired to Southwest.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

0702	Flash Blue, control Green.
0745	Flash White, control Green.
0800	Sweeping of channel into harbor commenced.
0825	LST 168, 579, and 245 standing out to outer transport area.
0840	Convoy 02-N standing in.
1006	LST 714 standing out from beach.
1131	4 B-25s made DDT run over beaches.
1202	AdRAAFCom MOROTAI notified that night fighter cover considered essential at objective area and it is satisfactory to reduce convoy cover, if necessary, in order to provide this cover.
1230	LST 168 standing in to transfer ComLSTFlot 7 from LST 466 to LST 168.
1230	Bombardment by NASHVILLE (CL 43), BURNS (DD 588) and CHARRETTE (DD 581) to support subsidiary landing of elements of the 7th Australian Division in LVTs and LCMs to capture Point PENAJAM across the river from BALIKPAPAN commenced.
1324	Troops landed on Point PENAJAM. No opposition. Tanks bogged down on beaches. Use very improbable. Japs reported to have withdrawn the night before.
1335	NASHVILLE (CL 43) ceased bombardment of targets above Point PENAJAM.
1350	BURNS (DD 588) and CHARRETTE (DD 581) ceased bombardment of targets above Point PENAJAM.
1350	Spotting plane reported that Naval bombardment was very effective.
1730	CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.
1800	CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.
1920	CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.
1930	CAP (1 P-61) left station.
1935	CAP (1 P-61) left station.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Con'd)

1940 Convoy 02-X standing out consisting of LST 168 (OTC) and LSTs 579, 245, 714, 181, 753, 673, 911 and 471 with BAILEY (DD 492) and HOWARD (DE 346) as escorts.

1940 Convoy 02-J standing in.

2130 CAP (1 P-61) left station.

2150 HMAS GASCOYNE standing in.

Weather: Wind direction WNW, force 3. Barometer 29.88. Temperature 78. Drizzling rain, overcast. Visibility 10 miles. Slight sea, swells from the South.

6 July 1945 (F + 5)

0520 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

0650 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

0750 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

0800 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

0915 CAP (4 P-38s) reported on station.

1000 Y18, Y109, AOG 19 standing in to harbor.

1045 CAP (4 P-38s) relieved by 4 P-38s.

1135 BELL (DD 587), CONNOR (DD 582) and HNMS TROMP engaging in call fire.

1245 CAP (4 P-38s) relieved by 4 P-38s.

1350 2 mines detonated by sweeps in area BISONS.

1450 Mine exploded bearing 271° T from SPENCER. Struck MANGO (AN 24) anchor cable. No damage. No casualties.

1450 CAP (4 P-38s) relieved by 4 P-38s.

1500 CAP relieved on station by P-38s.

1505 Nine LCTs enroute to SEPINGGANG with airfield construction equipment.

1550 Convoy 02-Y standing out for MOROTAI.

1700 POINSETT (AK 205) unable to transfer ammunition to LST 67 due to heavy swells. LST 67 smashed boat and superstructure endeavoring to tie up alongside POINSETT (AK 205).

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Con'td)

1700 Pontoon causeway reported installed at SEPINGGANG Beach for unloading of heavy airfield equipment by LCT.

1710 CAP (4 P-38s) off station.

1730 Sweep of channel into harbor reported progressing satisfactorily.. 18 moored mines swept without damage to minesweepers.

1740 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

1803 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

1900 CAP (1- P-61) off station.

1902 CAP (1 P-61) returning to base. 1 P-61 remaining on station for 30 minutes.

1933 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

2000 Control of CAP, Air Warning and Air Support assumed by BALIKPAPAN unit of 1st TAF RAAF.

2007 NASHVILLE (CL 43), SAUFLEY (DD 465) and CHARRETTE (DD 581) reported on station for fire support missions in MANGGAR Area.

2007 BELL (DD 587) and WALLER (DD 466) on station in PHILLIES area.

2007 HNMS TROMP departed for MOROTAI.

2007 Convoy 02-M (PT echelon) arrived objective area.

2030 PHOENIX (CL 46) reported that from 1455 to 1930 hours she engaged in shore bombardment within a radius of 600 yards from an original map spot. Our troops were being shelled from this area. Spotter reported three direct hits on two dumps. The spotter reported the firing very effective.

Weather: Wind direction WSW, Force 3. Barometer 29.85. Temperature 86 degrees. Sky mainly cloudy. Visibility unlimited. Sea slight.

7 July 1945 (F + 6)

0304 CRANE barge and drydock reported adrift. ATR 61 sent to their assistance.

0515 CAP (2 P-61s) reported on station.

0730 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

0730 Crane barge and drydock reported grounded about 100 yards off beach, east of SEPINGGANG.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Con'd)

0730 Convoy 02-G standing in.

0740 PHOENIX (CL 46) commenced shore bombardment of personnel supply area.

0740 CAP (1 P-61) off station.

0750 LLOYD (APD 63), LIDDLE (APD 60), ALEX DIACHENKO (APD 123), WESTRALIA, KANIMBLE and MANOORA standing in.

1000 CruDiv 15 (PHOENIX, NASHVILLE, 3 DDs) released. SHROPSHIRE and 3 DDs will be assigned fire support.

1000 7th Division reported Japs using RIKO RIVER as escape route.

1000 NASHVILLE (CL 43), with ComCruDiv 15 aboard, with CHARRETTE (DD 581) as escort, departed for LEYTE.

1050 CAP (4 P-38s) reported on station.

1100 PHOENIX (CL 46) with BELL (DD 587), CONNOR (DD 582) and BURNS (DD 588) departed for SUBIC BAY.

1109 PT CELEBES strike delayed 24 hours due to bad weather.

1250 CAP (4 P-38s) off station.

1255 CAP (4 P-38s) reported on station.

1420 Repair party boarded grounded crane barge and drydock. Salvage ships endeavoring to refloat them at high water.

1450 CAP (4 P-38s) reported on station.

1500 CAP (4 P-38s) which reported at 1255, off station.

1600 Com7thPhib advised channel into harbor should be safe for shipping on 9 July.

1630 ComRANCruRon in SHROPSHIRE assumed control of Naval gunfire support.

1700 CAP (4 P-38s) reported on station.

1730 Convoy 02-Z departed for MORCTAI.

1730 CAP (1 P-61) reported on station.

1759 SPENCER (CGC 36), with ComPhibGrp 8 aboard, and screened by KLINE (APD 120), underway at various courses and speeds. Departing BALIKPAPAN Area for MANILA in accordance with directive of Com7thPhib. On departure of ComPhibGrp 8, Captain C. W. GRAY, USN, embarked in KEY (DE 348) assumed designation of CTG 76.14 as representative of SEVENTH Amphibious Forces in the BALIKPAPAN Area.

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PART II - Chronological Record of Events (Cont'd)

Weather: Wind direction West, force 3. Barometer 29.83. Temperature 84 degrees. Overcast, passing showers. Visibility 7 miles. Sea slight, heavy swells from SSW.

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PART III - ORDNANCE

A. PERFORMANCE OF OWN ORDNANCE.

1. No major casualties or derangements were reported. Individual ship reports will contain specific information on casualties, if any.

2. Without exception, performance of ships in all call fire missions was reported as excellent. Destroyers fired missions up to 15,000 yards with direct hits reported on targets. In one instance, at a range of 12,000 yards a mission was fired on a target only 100 yards from our troops. The whole operation was a tribute to the farsightedness of our designers in providing ships with accurate, fast-shooting armament, which beat down and held down enemy opposition and made this landing and subsequent consolidation possible. SFCP 4 reported on 4 July, after being under enemy fire at MINGGER, "Naval gunfire has saved our battalion many casualties and routed the enemy effectively."

B. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

The ammunition expenditures for this operation were necessarily high. Heavy expenditures from F-16 to F-1 were required in support of minesweeping and from F-6 to F-1 in support of U.D.T. Operations in reducing enemy defenses. The enemy made determined efforts to drive off the minesweepers, particularly in the earlier stage of the preparatory operations, and frequent and heavy counter battery bombardment was necessary to silence enemy batteries.

During "F" Day, after the pre-"H" Hour bombardment, much counter battery fire was necessary to silence enemy batteries which sporadically fired on assault shipping. Call fire missions also required heavy expenditures, due to the fact that the Japs had been "dug in", in pillboxes, trenches, tunnels, and other strong defense positions. Up to 1600 7 July reported ammunition expenditures were as follows: (Detailed accounts of missions and other features pertaining thereto are contained in individual ship accounts.)

PRIOR TO "F" DAY

8"	6"	5" A.C	5.9 H.E.	4.7 H. F.
438	8003	15, 062	105	179

GRAND TOTAL 23,,707 rounds.

"F" DAY (INCLUDING COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE)

SHIP	6"	5" A.C	8" H.F.	6"(CPBC)	6" H.F.	5.9 H.E.	4.7 H.E.
MONTPELIER	715	755					
DENVER	1396	900					
CLEVELAND	922	1022					
COLUMBIA	628	766					
FLUSSER		743					

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SHIP	6"	5" AAC	8" H.F.	6"(CPBC)	6" H.F.	5.9 H.E.	4.7 H.E.
CONYNGHAM		477					
DRAYTON		582					
SMITH		443					
CONY		751					
SHROPSHIRE			414				
HOBART				195	406		
TROMP						156	
ARUNTA							613
TOTALS	3661	6439	414	195	406	156	613

GRAND TOTAL - 11,884

Ammunition expended by Close Support Unit up to and including "F" Day is as follows:

4.5" Barrage Rockets	-	7361
3"/50	-	2831
40mm	-	55126
20mm	-	58840

Following is a list of call fires and special bombardment expenditures up to July 7, 1945.

	8"H.F.	6" A.P. & H.C.	5.9"	5"A.A.	5"Ill.	5"W.P.	5"C.	4.7 H.E.
MONTPELIER		75						
SHROPSHIRE	337							
TROMP			234					
HOBART		130						
KILLEN				69	35	8		
A. K. GRANT				417				
EATON				26			3	
STEVENS				359	20			
CONWAY				60				
ARUNTA								38

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	8" H.F.	6" A.P. & H.C.	5.9"	5" A....	5"Ill.	5"W.P.	5"C.	4.7 H.E.
CONY				34				
PHOENIX		1288						
NASHVILLE		464						
FLUSSER				82				
PHILIP				1639	87	8	200	
WALLER				139	63			
CONYNGHAM				126				
BAILEY					24			
CONNER				530	36	6		
BURNS				1205				
BELL				1011	64	2		
CHARRETTE				1210	20	9	100	
SAUFLEY				830	66	104		
TOTAL	337	1957	234	7737	415	137	303	38

GRAND TOTAL - 11,158 rounds.

Included in the call fire accounts are expenditures for the special bombardment on enemy troop concentrations arranged to coincide with the celebration of the 4th of July, and the bombardment of areas on CAPE PENDJAM in conjunction with Operation Independence on 5 July.

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PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. BATTLE DAMAGE TO OWN FORCES

SHIP OR AIRCRAFT	DATE	LOCALITY	DAMAGED OR LOST	REMARKS
YMS 50	18 June	Lat: 1-18-25S Long: 116-49-15E	Damaged by Allied magnetic mine on 1st pass.Later Sunk	Sunk by own gunfire in 5½ fathoms of water in grid pos. 5655.11 men injured.
YMS 368	20 June	Lat: 1-19-45 S Long: 116-56-15 E	Damaged by Allied mine	Some hull leaks, gyro rendered inoperative. 3 men injured.
YMS 335	21 June	Lat: 1-19-00S Long: 116-53-00E	Damaged by enemy shellfire	4 men killed, 6 men injured.
RAAF PBY5 (Courier)	21 June	BALIKPAPAN	Lost	Water too rough to take off. Taken in tow but sank after hitting floating object.
YMS 10	22 June	Lat: 1-18-00 S Long: 116-50-30 E	Damaged by enemy shellfire	Holed slightly above waterline by estimated 3" shell. No personnel casualties.
YMS 364	23 June	Lat: 1-18-30 S Long: 116-51-30 E	Damaged by enemy shellfire.	Projectile hit in char house but did not explode. No personnel casualties.
YMS 365	26 June	Lat: 1-18-00 S Long: 116-49-25 E	Lost	Sunk by mine detonations. Three men killed, Thirteen injured.
YMS 39	26 June	Lat: 1-19-05 S Long: 116-49-40 E	Lost	
RAAF PBY5 (Courier)	26 June	BALIKPAPAN	Lost	Cracked up during landing. No casualties.
SCC (COLUMBIA)	27 June	Over BALIKPAPAN	Damaged by 20 mm fire	Pilot suffered slight injury.
YMS 47	28 June	Lat: 1-18-40 S Long: 116-55-00 E	Damaged by mine detonation	Stern compartment flooded 10 men injured.

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A. Battle Damage to Own Forces (Cont'd)

SHIP OR AIRCRAFT	DATE	LOCALITY	DAMAGED OR LOST	REMARKS
LCS(L) 8	28 June	Near KLANDASAN beaches	Damaged by enemy shellfire	Hit three times by probable 3" projectiles. One officer and 4 men slightly wounded..Two UDT swimmers injured.
SMITH (DD 378)	1 July	KLANDASAN Area Near GREEN Beach	Damaged by enemy 3" fire.	3 holes in stack. No personnel casualties.
RAAF PBY5 (Courier)	1 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost	Cracked up during landing No casualties.
RAAF B-24 (Air Obs.)	1 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost due to enemy AA	Plane ditched. Three possible casualties.
13th AF P-38	1 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Damaged by enemy AA	On Strafing mission.
U.S.N. Fighter	1 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost due to enemy AA	No Survivor.
RAAF PBY (COURIER)	2 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost	Cracked up during landing No casualties.
13th AF P-38	2 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost due to enemy AA.	On strafing mission. Pilot bailed out behind enemy lines.
RAAF B-24 (Air Obs)	2 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost due to enemy AA.	Crashed in flames. No survivors.
13th AF PBY5A (courier)	3 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost	Cracked up during landing No survivors.
RAAF B-24 (Air Obs)	4 July	BALIKPAPAN Area	Lost due to enemy AA.	Crashed in flames. No survivors.
Army LCM	4 July	KLANDASAN Area off GREEN Beach	Lost	Believed by mine, type undetermined. 3 killed.

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SECTION B - BATTLE DAMAGE TO ENEMY.

1. Circumstances did not permit full and extensive examination of battle damage sustained by the enemy in the objective area. However, a limited survey of Balikpapan Town and the immediate beach vicinity revealed a scene of complete and widespread destruction.

2. The offshore barricade so carefully placed and which the enemy had extended and expanded just prior to the assault was destroyed successfully by the Underwater Demolition Teams.

3. The pre-assault bombardment, air strikes rocket barrages and fire from close support craft proved extremely effective in all defenses located on or near the beaches. Numerous pillboxes, buildings, and revetted positions were destroyed. Those not destroyed were made untenable.

4. The heavier defenses more permanently emplaced and located further inland showed evidence of the heavy preliminary air assaults and bombardment. Evidence of the accuracy of our weapons may be derived from the condition of the three twin-mount dual purpose 10cm Naval guns located on Malang Hill. Two of these mounts were completely destroyed and the third was rendered inoperative. A radar station situated in this same locality was also demolished, apparently by a direct hit, and one on Signal Hill is reported to have been smashed by the Japanese before their forced withdrawal from this area. An ammunition dump was hit during the special Fourth of July bombardment and exploded, causing widespread destruction in that particular sector. Many of the tunnels had received direct hits and were completely sealed, thus rendering them useless. Inland, barricades and weapons pits were badly damaged.

5. The lack of transportation and limited time available before departure from the objective area precluded a complete investigation of damage.

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PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. From a gunnery standpoint the BALIKPAPAN Operation presented a most difficult problem. Enemy defenses near to and in back of the beach were numerous, strong, and well placed. Typical Japanese defenses were present: tunnelled guns, concrete pillboxes, caves, and revetted C/D and D/P guns, all of which required a direct hit or a very near miss to neutralize or destroy. There were many houses, shacks and similar structures on or near the beaches, which, while not appearing heavily fortified, were nevertheless potential machine gun and small arms emplacements, and which had to be destroyed or neutralized. In addition the beaches themselves formed part of a natural amphi-theatre with high ground in the background and on the flanks. Finally, the minesweeping situation, the long approach lane, and the presence of shoals in area PHILLIES severely restricted the movement of Fire Support Ships in this area, and deprived them of their maneuverability.

2. Because of the very shallow water, cruisers were forced to remain at from 12,000 to 14,000 yards from the landing beaches. When destroyers finally managed to enter area PHILLIES some were operating in a minimum chart depth of 3½ fathoms plus a few feet gained from the state of tide.

3. The enemy opened fire prior to the landing on F day, with weapons ranging in size from 25 MM to 75 MM. Bombarding destroyers, control vessels and landing craft were straddled frequently but none were hit. These guns were eventually silenced, the close support craft (LCS's, LCI(G's) and LCI(R's) assisting greatly. Sporadic fire on the beach area continued from a single 75 MM gun until F + 2 when its location was discovered and the gun destroyed. One large gun, apparently a 6" coast defense type, fired on landing craft just off the beach, firing only one or two rounds a day. This gun apparently was situated to the northward of the Sepinggan Air Field and its position over run on F + 3 day, as no further fire from it fell off the beach.

4. Because of the state of wind and current, fire support ships anchored. Actually, this proved to be helpful rather than a handicap, as both wind and current appeared to hold the ships firmly in one position, thus aiding materially in the accuracy of gunfire.

5. Two rocket runs were made by the Close Support Unit. It was felt that the first run would not only stun the enemy and keep him off balance until the actual assault run, but might also betray him into revealing hitherto undisclosed batteries and defensive positions. Two such runs gave the Close Support Craft an opportunity to scout the beaches twice, and to mark for reference any positions left untouched on the first run.

6. Summarized below are the important events in the preparatory gunfire and covering action for the preliminary phase of the BALIKPAPAN Operation.

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(a) Summary from F-16 to F-1

From F-16 to F-1 the Support and Covering Group (TG 74.2), (MONTPELIER, DENVER, CONWAY, CONY, EATON and STEVENS), Rear Admiral Riggs, covered and supported Minesweeping and UDT operations, and engaged in systematic and deliberate reduction of enemy defenses in the objective area. This group was later joined by HMA Ships SHROPSHIRE, HOBART, ARUNTA, HNMS TROMP, U.S. Ships COLUMBIA, HART, METCALF and LCS(L)s 8, 28, 30, 41, 43, 44, 48, 29. Listed below are notes of gunnery interest from daily summaries during period F-16 to F-1.

15 June (F-16) - Fired on bogie using radar solution. Later recognized as B-24 but no recognition established.
16 June (F-15) - CONWAY made embarrassing attack on contact, later evaluated as non-sub.
17 June (F-14) - Fire 36 6" H.C. into beach areas at long range for harassing effect and familiarization of plane spotters. ASP in Sector 21 reported attacking possible submarine in Lat. 00-50 S, Long. 117-30 E. Same plane reported observing 3 unexplained underwater explosions at 01-00 S, 117-30 E. At 2000 Flash Red which continued from 2010 to 2055. Three raids made. Total of about 7 Planes dropped 7 bombs nearby, no damage. YMS Unit 5 miles astern not attacked.
18 June (F-13) - YMS 50 damaged by Allied magnetic mine and shore gunfire in first pass in area PHILLIES. Crew rescued by LCVP. After unsuccessful attempt to tow out of danger, YMS 50 was sunk by our gunfire in grid area 5655. Enemy gunfire estimated to come from three inch guns firing two at a time. Small number of air bursts over YMS 50 believed to have come from vicinity of top of Signal Hill. Gunfire at YMS 50 not too impressive, but difficult for cruisers to silence because of range and difficulty of getting exact location. At 1451 I enemy DINAH plane closed formation but retired after being taken under fire. At 1830 I picked up Bogey and CAP vectored to intercept. Bogey identified as PETE. From about 1850 to 1915 PETE circled formation in plain sight and P-61 trailed astern. At 1920 PETE lost over land and P-61 ordered to base because of low gas supply.
19 June (F-12) - HNMS TROMP arrived. Sweepers in area PHILLIES fired on once in forenoon and once in early afternoon. Not more than 20 rounds 3 inch fired each time. Guns definitely located in grid position 5760 S. One enemy radar heard with characteristics 107/500/25 believed to be on Signal Hill as this corresponds closely with characteristics as given by Intelligence Annex. Quite well observed that enemy starts large smoke screen cover on approach of our ships and planes in the morning. Expenditures today 632 rounds 6" H.C. and 488 rounds 5" for cruisers. For DD's 222 rounds 5". This expenditure for bombardment and repulsing air attacks.
20 June (F-11) - Harassing fire maintained in Areas 2 and 3. No installations positively known knocked out. At 1520 HNMS TROMP dropped depth charges on sound contact later evaluated as probable hulk.
21 June (F-10) - Sweepers being fired on by guns located in 5759 I, H, 5760 S and 5961 Y. Had been firing at these guns for two days without knocking them out. YMS 335 hit by enemy shell. It required 1347 rounds of 6", 270 rounds of 5.9", and 451 rounds of 5" projectiles to hold enemy batteries down enough to push sweepers through. Ordered LST 67 to report for ammunition replenishment. Hoped to be able to cut down ammunition

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expenditures in future but considered expenditures to date absolutely necessary. MONTPELIER aviator believes one gun in 5961 Y knocked out and MONTPELIER obtained one hit which set off magazine in this area. At least two guns in nest appeared to be serviceable. Smoke from bombing and smoke fires set off by enemy makes gun location difficult but positive practically all of our troubles have come from guns mentioned. Perhaps more will reveal themselves as time goes on.

22 June (F-9) - YMS 10 holed slightly above water line by estimated 3 inch shell. Fortunately compartment empty at the time and no personnel casualties resulted. Total ammunition expenditures on shore batteries this date 495 rounds 6" and 471 rounds 5". Fire support ships were positioned as close as was reasonably safe. No new batteries have shown up.

23 June (F-8) - COLUMBIA (CL 56) escorted by SCHMIDT (APD 76) arrived. Shore batteries opened fire 3 times this date, first firing at DENVER at 0835 I but short by 4000 to 5000 yards. Shore batteries fired twice at sweeps but were quickly smothered each time by counter-battery fire. YMS 364 hit in chart house by one projectile which failed to explode. Personnel recovered and threw over side what appeared to be a 3" projectile. No casualties. Expended 1029 rounds of 6", 18 rounds 5.9", and 2668 rounds of 5". Expect to take all 6" and 5" ammunition on LST 67. New shore batteries revealed themselves in 5658 D and E today. SOC pilots report revolving antenna on top signal hill in position of reported radar station. At 0950 I a six inch salvo from MONTPELIER apparently hit a magazine in 5961 Y which initiated a series of violent explosives and flames up to 200 feet lasting intermittently until 1230 I. Believe this battery silenced as no further fire received from it. Harassing bombardment and counter-battery fire was very effective today. Shore batteries were quickly silenced. Expect to put a DD in southern area PHILLIES tomorrow.

24 June (F-7) - Arrivals KLINE (APD 120), BELL (DD 587), LST 67 and LCS(L) 29, 28, 30, 41, 43, 44, 48 and 8. This days operations very encouraging. Two destroyers operated in southern 500 yards of PHILLIES with HNMS TROMP at southeast end all day for close fire support. Only enemy activity was AA fire first thing this morning from cave at 5559 G. COLUMBIA obtained 3 direct hits and set mouth of cave on fire. Used BELL for fire support today. DENVER obtained direct hit on gun positions in 5759 I and H. Now believe these guns effectively silenced. Tomorrow will complete ammunition replenishment and start UDT operations as scheduled. Ammunition expended this date 550 rounds 6" and 1663 rounds 5".

25 June (F-6) - Departures BELL (DD 587) and LST 67. Enemy opened fire twice this date. At 0850 I CL aviator reported firing from grid position 5664 S and at 1000 I about 6 projectiles fell short of EATON in area PHILLIES. Believed to have come from grid position 5759 E or M before silenced. At 2030 I under attack by 5 to 7 torpedo planes. One sure splash. Both COFER and CONY reported torpedo passing within 100 yards. Ammunition expenditures 905 rounds 6" and 2295 rounds 4". All 6" and 5" ammunition in LST 67 were taken. Underwater reconnaissance MANGGAR and MANGGAR KETJIL beaches completed successfully.

26 June (F-5) - UDT operations on MANGGAR and MANGGAR KETJIL beaches successfully completed. Air attack of last night centered on Minesweepers Unit about 4 miles to west of cruisers. One sure kill, one probable. Ammunition expenditures 392 rounds 6" and 1050 rounds 5". Total to date 5232 rounds 6" and 8667 rounds 5". No fire from shore batteries on minesweepers.

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27 June (F-4) - Arrivals CTG 74.1 in SHROPSHIRE with HOBART, ARUNTA, HART, and METCALF. Underwater reconnaissance made of KLANDASAN beaches. One floating mine sunk by MONTPELIER gunfire. Small amount of fire from beach believed to have been from grid position 5759 Y was quickly silenced for the rest of the day. Ammunition expenditures 612 rounds 6" and 1600 rounds 5".
28 June (F-3) - LCS(L) 8 hit three times by probable 3" shore fire while supporting UDT operations. Heavy fire support was rendered but very little of the shore fire received was visible from F.S. ships or spotting planes indicating mostly small caliber. UDT operations partially completed. Ammunition expenditures 8" 215, 6" 1238, 5" 2445.
29 June (F-2) - STEVENS on heckling mission KLANDASAN Beach area. Will conduct UDT operations tomorrow and complete in KLANDASAN Beach. Ammunition expenditures 8 inch 85, 6 inch 300 and 5 inch 310.
30 June (F-1) - Arrivals CLEVELAND, KILLEN, A.W. GRANT and F.S. 164. UDT operations completed on KLANDASAN Beach. Little opposition. Took all ammunition from FS 164, (2000 rounds 6 inch H.C.). Expenditures through today all types are 8 inch 438, 6 inch 8003, 5.9 inch 105, 5 inch 15062, 4 inch 179, grand total 23,787 rounds.

The operations during this period certainly "softened up" the enemy's defenses, and at least intimidated him into keeping his batteries hidden for the most part during later minesweeping and UDT operations. The Pre "F" day preliminary bombardment contributed greatly to the final success of the operation.

(b) Summary from "F" Day to 7 July

0700	Commenced scheduled bombardment.
0743	First spotting rockets fired.
0752	DRAYTON (DD 366) reports scheduled fire completed.
0802	First rocket run okeh. Rocket fire of all ships well in target area and appears very effective. No sign enemy movement.
0817	SMITH (DD 378) reports being straddled.
0821	CONY (DD 508) reports being straddled by small caliber, possible 3".
0825	STEVENS (DD 479) reported gun flashed from area 629-601.
0825	FLUSSER (DD 368) has taken guns under fire in 6161 Y.
0825	SMITH (DD 378) reports fired on by batteries in 6359 H.
0826	One Penrod left flank reported fire from Signal Hill. One or two shells only, no damage.
0830	SMITH (DD 378) silenced two batteries in 6359 HE and 6559 D.
0839	Some air bursts in left flank.

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0841 Second rocket run commenced.

0845 1st Wave 1300 yards from beach.

0847 Second rocket barrage effective. No sign of enemy movement.

0845 Air observer reports burning oil flowing Northward from tank plateau. Head of stream approximately 5660 E, and then 5661 T.

0851 CLEVELAND (CL 55) ordered to concentrate fire on Signal Hill. HOBART reports scheduled bombardment completed.

0855 1st Wave landed.

0900 ARUNTA reports scheduled fire completed.

0904 Close Support Craft finished firing, moving to flanks.

0905 Some small caliber fire in area of Support Craft on left flank.

0913 MONTPELIER reports scheduled fire completed.

0915 CONYNGHAM (DD 371), CONY (DD 508) and SMITH (DD 378) report scheduled fire completed.

0915 Close Support Craft under fire from small caliber. Bursts about 200 yards away.

0916 TROMP reports scheduled fire completed.

0918 Close Support Craft reports mortar fire from 571-591.

0926 Close Support Craft engaging battery in area 561-594. MONTPELIER (CL 57) firing CB in 5659 G and K.

0927 STEVENS (DD 479) engaging battery in 562-595.

0928 DENVER (CL 58) firing CB fire in area 5659 L and R.

0933 MONTPELIER (CL 57) engaging battery at 563-597.

0933 SHROPSHIRE reports scheduled bombardment completed.

0942 MONTPELIER (CL 57) reports resuming fire on same target. HOBART engaging guns at 6359 H with air spot.

0945 HOBART engaging gun at 635-914.

0946 DENVER (CL 58) firing on guns in 5659 U and K.

0949 CONWAY (DD 507) firing a gun at 5619 U.

0950 STEVENS (DD 479) engaging battery at 561-595.

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0953 MONTPELIER (CL 57) engaging hostile guns at 561-597.

1000 MONTPELIER (CL 57) reports fire visible in 5659 L.

1048 DENVER (CL 58) reports having engaged gun in 561-597 for 40 minutes. Still engaging.

1053 EATON (DD 510) reports fire from 633-596. Engaging 2 gun positions, securing direct hits. Gun crew dispersed.

1055 HNMS TROMP engaging battery in 6359 H.

1056 STEVENS (DD 479) neutralized gun in 5962.

1313 DENVER (CL 58) ceased fire on target in 561-597.

1316 C-1 reports gunfire on Green Beach most effective.

1340 C-5 reported that guns in target area 563-597 and 561-587 silenced by CL and DD. Engaged from 0925 to 0945.

1416 STEVENS (DD 479) engaged target at 613-595.

1424 ComLCSFlot 1 reports 6 direct hits with A.P. through slits of pillbox. Pillbox still standing but no firing from it. Watching. Evidently made of reinforced concrete.

1444 STEVENS (DD 479) reported ceasing fire on target.

1724 CHARLIE 4 reported to EATON (DD 510) that H-hour bombardment caused great damage.

1748 COLUMBIA (CL 56), EATON (DD 510) and STEVENS (DD 479) assigned fire support duty night 1-2 July.

1802 STEVENS (DD 479) engaged gun at 563-595 and silenced.

1811 MONTPELIER (CL 57) fired at guns in 5659 M. Salvos landed in area. No conclusive damage to gun.

1825 STEVENS (DD 479) reengaged gun at 565-595 and re-silenced.

1835 KILLEN (DD 593) substituted for EATON (DD 510).

1845 CONWAY (DD 507) neutralized area 5658 F. KILLEN (DD 593) and STEVENS (DD 479) fired illuminating and harrassing missions night of 1-2 July.

2052 STEVENS (DD 479) reported having engaged enemy digging in in area 563-597 from 1930-1950. C-2 reports fire very effective. Has been assigned that area for harrassing fire tonight.

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0845 KILLEN (DD 593) reported engaging target at 624-609.

0847 STEVENS (DD 479) engaged battery at 563-597. C-1 reports fire very effective.

0930 HMAS HOBART fired neutralizing fire on target 603. C-2 reported fire very effective. Illumination mission carried out by STEVENS (DD 479) previous night also very effective.

0946 KILLEN (DD 593) reports engaging target at 627-617. Spotter reports fire effective.

1100 HMAS HOBART firing on target 591-621.

1158 PHILIP (DD 498) opened fire on large gun firing from 5864 E.

1330 HMAS SHROPSHIRE firing on target in 5664. A.W. GRANT (DD 649) firing urgent mission in 579-633.

1523 A.W. GRANT (DD 649) engaged target at 5664 Q, with air spot. Twin 127 MM guns. Guns silenced.

1546 Pilot reports A.W. GRANT (DD 649) made direct hit on enemy gun positions.

1553 PHILIP (DD 498) engaged guns at 5964 L and M silenced.

1609 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging AA gun position at 6166 N with air spot.

1647 HMAS HOBART engaging guns at 598-641 and 599-641. Guns silenced.

1723 SAUFLEY (DD 465) firing on AA position at 6166 N, also twin guns at 5963 Q and 5763 T.

1817 SAUFLEY (DD 465) firing illumination mission 1 round every 15 minutes during hours of darkness.

1800 PHILIP (DD 498) fired on dugouts and trenches at 669-608. Fire effective. Also at 667-618 (TRUCKS). Fire effective.

1847 HMAS HOBART delivered call fire on 2 AA guns reported at 597-649. Direct hit on one gun. Near misses on other.

2019 HMAS SHROPSHIRE started night harrassing fire.

2022 SAUFLEY (DD 465) will fire night illumination mission all night starting about 2040. Beach from Signal Hill to 567-607 to be illuminated all night.

2153 PHILIP (DD 498) will fire illuminating mission all night in area 580-611.

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0440 All firing ordered ceased because of Flash RED.

0630 Flash WHITE; resumed fire.

0700 CHARLIE 1 reports that illuminating mission previous night excellent.

0720 HMAS SHROPSHIRE reports night harrassing mission completed.

0957 FLUSSER (DD 368) engaging twin naval guns in 579-633.

1000 Enemy AA fire from 599-649 engaged by HMAS HOBART. One direct hit. Other rounds within 10 yards of pits.

1015 CONYNGHAM (DD 371) engaging guns in 5863 P.

1045 CONYNGHAM (DD 371) ceased fire. Spotter reports target well covered.

1056 FLUSSER (DD 368) ceased fire. Reports 82 rounds in area.

1118 CONYNGHAM (DD 371) fired at AA guns at 582-624.

1130 HMAS SHROPSHIRE reports having completed bombardment on AA gun emplacement in 6065 CDHI.

1143 CONYNGHAM (DD 371) engaged enemy guns at 577-638. Possible direct hit as observed from flash.

1155 FLUSSER (DD 368) firing at target in 565-638.

1158 FLUSSER (DD 368) shifted target - both heavy batteries. Fire effective.

1200 HMAS SHROPSHIRE reported hits on AA gun revetments in 565-642. Area covered, small fire started, possibly ammunition.

1322 FLUSSER (DD 368) completed firing on third heavy battery.

1545 BURNS (DD 588) opened fire for C-4. 684-617.

1704 BURNS (DD 588) ceased firing; targets pill boxes and trenches. Fire effective.

1739 PHILIP (DD 498) received illumination instruction: 1 star/10 min. 5651-5663 for C-2. (Water front).

1750 C-4 reports very accurate shooting by BURNS (DD 588).

2040 PHILIP (DD 498) commenced illumination at 2001.

2208 BELL (DD 587) commenced illumination at 580-627.

2216 PHILIP (DD 498) ceased illumination.

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2242 BELL (DD 587) resumed illumination 588-642.

2244 CHARRETTE (DD 581) commenced harrassing fire in areas 6267 and 6367.

2343 BURNS (DD 588) commenced harrassing fire in areas 6267 and 6367.

4 July 1945

0938 NASHVILLE (CL 43), PHOENIX (CL 46), BELL (DD 587), CHARRETTE (DD 581), BURNS (DD 588), CONNOR (DD 582) and PHILIP (DD 498) commenced firing 21 salvo 4th of July salute in areas 6267 and 6367.

0945 PHILIP (DD 498) and BELL (DD 587) completed scheduled fire.

1014 CONNOR (DD 582) relieved BELL (DD 587).

1029 NASHVILLE (CL 43) ceased firing scheduled fire at 1000.

1030 Magazine reported exploded as result of 4th July salute.

1039 CONNOR (DD 582) firing on suspected AA guns 566-640.

1045 PHILIP (DD 498) reports engaged target 593-640 and 588-637 with C-1. 0953-1025. Fire started.

1047 PHILIP (DD 498) relieved by SAUFLEY (DD 465).

1129 CONNOR (DD 582) ceased firing. States target well covered.

1146 PHOENIX (CL 46) plane reports targets destroyed as follows: Trucks and tanks 5863, CD Guns 5664 Q, Heavy AA and Searchlight 5763 Oboe.

1207 BAILEY (DD 492) relieved BURNS (DD 588).

1229 CONNOR (DD 582) engaged earthworks - area well covered. 565-675.

1306 PHOENIX (CL 46) engaging target 748-679 - gun position. (MANGGAR).

1533 PHOENIX (CL 46) relieved by BELL (DD 587). PHOENIX (CL 46) to fuel.

1536 BELL (DD 587) engaging AA gun and defended area 748-679. (MANGGAR).

1555 PHOENIX (CL 46) results - 442 rounds - one direct hit on pill box, AA and field guns neutralized. Coastal Defense gun fired at PHOENIX (CL 46) at range 12000 yards. Splash 800 yards from PHOENIX (CL 46).

1630 BELL (DD 587) engaging gun in 748-679. SAUFLEY (DD 465) proceeding to MANGGAR area to assist BELL (DD 587).

1650 Battery silenced by BELL (DD 587).

1705 BELL (DD 587) reports machine guns at 748-679 neutralized and now ranging on two AA guns and pillbox.

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1709 CONNOR (DD 582) engaging 3 gunpits 543-663.

1845 CONNOR (DD 582) ceased firing target 543-663. Ineffective - poor observation.

2013 C-4, at MANGGAR reports "Naval gunfire has saved our battalion many casualties and routed the enemy effectively."

2118 CONNOR (DD 582) firing illumination mission for C-7. (BALIKPAPAN).

2130 CHARRETTE (DD 581) firing illuminating mission alternating with CONNOR (DD 582). (BALIKPAPAN).

2145 Illumination reported excellent.

2203 BAILEY (DD 492) assumed illumination missions. One Star every half hour until dawn. (BALIKPAPAN).

2225 CONNOR (DD 582) ceased illumination.

2230 CHARRETTE (DD 581) ceased illumination.

2255 SAUFLEY (DD 465) assigned harrassing fire missions. (MANGGAR).

2315 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaged C/D guns 748-678 - Tunnel 752-681. (MANGGAR).

5 July 1945

0642 BURNS (DD 588) relieved BAILEY (DD 492).

0645 BELL (DD 587) engaging AA guns TA 748-679. (MANGGAR).

0700 CTU 78.2.8 in LCI(R) 230 with LCS(L)s 28, 30, 29 and 50 enroute MANGGAR.

0755 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging two enemy guns. (MANGGAR).

0818 BELL (DD 587) ceased fire. Guns silenced.

0828 PHILIP (DD 498) relieved BELL (DD 587).

0927 NASHVILLE (CL 43) engaging guns sighted by plane in 507-623. (CAPE PENAJAM).

0944 CONNOR (DD 582) engaging 3 gun positions 530-664 for C-1. (BALIKPAPAN)

0945 BURNS (DD 588) engaging earthworks 535-665 for C-6. (BALIKPAPAN).

1014 BURNS (DD 588) ceased fire - 2 hits on revetted buildings.

1038 BURNS (DD 588) opened fire gun position 565-670.

1055 PHILIP (DD 498) opened fire target 708, heavy guns (MANGGAR).

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1105 BURNS (DD 588) expended 71 rounds. Targets obliterated - TA 565.2-669.4.

1106 BURNS (DD 588) opened fire - earthworks - TA 573-676 - target 806.

1121 BURNS (DD 588) shifted to tunnels - target 807.

1130 NASHVILLE (CL 43) ceased firing on C/D guns CAPE PENAJAM. Area covered, no visible results.

1133 BURNS (DD 588) ceased firing on target 806.

1146 PHOENIX (CL 46) engaged 2 C/D guns 739-677 (MANGGAR). Direct hit between guns. Guns silenced.

1200 BURNS (DD 588) - 50 rounds expended target 807 - target 806 straddled - target 807 near misses.

1215 NASHVILLE (CL 43) reports reengaging guns CAPE PENAJAM area.

1230 NASHVILLE (CL 43), BURNS (DD 588) and CHARRETTE (DD 581) commenced scheduled bombardment of areas 4963, 5061 and 5062 (CAPE PENAJAM) in conjunction with operation INDEPENDENCE.

1305 PHILIP (DD 498) reports - engaged AA guns, medium guns, machine guns 748-679. MANGGAR.

1315 PHOENIX (CL 46) - expenditure 18 - 6" defended area. (MANGGAR).

1329 BELL (DD 587) relieved CONNOR (DD 582).

1330 Roger hour - 1st wave hit CAPE PENAJAM. NASHVILLE (CL 43) and BURNS (DD 588) completed scheduled bombardment. (CAPE PENAJAM).

1340 PHOENIX (CL 46) engaging guns 739-677 (MANGGAR).

1350 CHARRETTE (DD 581) completed scheduled bombardment CAPE PENAJAM.

1441 PHOENIX (CL 46) firing CB 731-691 - area covered (MANGGAR).

1512 PHOENIX (CL 46) engaging C/D gun 739-677 (MANGGAR).

1635 CHARRETTE (DD 581) engaging target CAPE PENAJAM for C-5.

1825 CHARRETTE (DD 581) completed mission. Results negative due to range.

1825 SAUFLEY (DD 465) relieved PHILIP (DD 498).

1843 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging gun position 748-679 (MANGGAR).

1855 C-4 reports that PHILIP (DD 498) has silenced machine guns and mortars. Direct hit on one gun. 5 direct hits on pillboxes. 2 ammunition dumps exploded. Had fired continuously since about 1335.

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2100 C-4 reports WALLER (DD 466) assigned illumination mission over 6065 S (BALIKPAPAN).

6 July 1945

0735 PHOENIX (CL 46) firing against enemy concentration and supply area northeast of BALIKPAPAN. Areas 6267 Y and 6367 U.

0800 CONNOR (DD 582) relieved BURNS (DD 588).

0814 CHARRETTE (DD 581) and BURNS (DD 588) proceeding to MANGGAR to support C-3

0906 CHARRETTE (DD 581) engaged target 748-676 - defended area. (MANGGAR).

0915 PHOENIX (CL 46) ceased firing bombardment in 6267 Y and 6367 U - 198 B.

0935 CHARRETTE (DD 581) engaging C/D gun - MANGGAR.

0936 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging target 743-680 C/D and machine guns - C-4. (MANGGAR).

0954 BURNS (DD 588) engaging target 745-682. Defended locality. (MANGGAR).

1040 CHARRETTE (DD 581) reports C/D gun silenced.

1110 BELL (DD 587) commenced firing on buildings and enemy troops northwest BALIKPAPAN (5664).

1130 HNMS TROMP commenced fire in 6267 Y - 6367 U, N.E. of BALIKPAPAN.

1216 CONNOR (DD 582) engaged guns (urgent) 6035-6565 - guns silenced.

1220 BELL (DD 587) ceased firing - area well covered.

1245 HNMS TROMP covered 6267 STXY and 6367 PQUV - barracks and gun positions. 4 series direct hits and numerous straddles. Gun position destroyed. Ammunition expended 234V.

1247 BURNS (DD 588) engaging target 743-682 - defended area. (MANGGAR).

1300 CONNOR (DD 582) firing for C-1.

1305 CHARRETTE (DD 581) firing on TA 743-682. (MANGGAR).

1310 BELL (DD 587) engaging earthworks 584-688. (BALIKPAPAN).

1350 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging gun and machine gun 757-689. (MANGGAR).

1350 CONNOR (DD 582) ceased firing for C-1. No visible effect.

1515 CONNOR (DD 582) ceased firing on target. Shooting excellent.

1528 BURNS (DD 588) engaging enemy personnel TA 749-680. (MANGGAR).

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1551 BURNS (DD 588) engaging target at 766-673. (MANGGAR).

1644 BURNS (DD 588) engaging target 733.4-673.0 - 71 rounds - fire effective.

1645 CHARRETTE (DD 581) relieved BURNS (DD 588). BURNS (DD 588) and CONNOR (DD 582) proceeding to LST 67 to discharge ammunition.

1653 WALLER (DD 466) firing TA 6035-6565 for C-1. (BALIKPAPAN).

1803 WALLER's (DD 466) target neutralized.

1844 CHARRETTE (DD 581) engaging HMGs at 746-682. (MANGGAR).

1917 NASHVILLE (CL 43) also firing on above target.

1920 SAUFLEY (DD 465) engaging 37mm guns MANGGAR.

2009 SAUFLEY (DD 465) completed firing, reports guns silenced.

2044 NASHVILLE (CL 43) completed firing - guns silenced.

7 July 1945

0045 SAUFLEY (DD 465) illuminating area 747-678 (MANGGAR).

0124 SAUFLEY (DD 465) commenced harrassing fire.

0145 SAUFLEY (DD 465) completed harrassing fire.

0555 SAUFLEY (DD 465) commenced harrassing fire 747-678 as arranged with C-4.

0611 SAUFLEY (DD 465) ceased above mission.

0700 HMAS SHROPSHIRE and A.W. GRANT (DD 649) checked into net. BELL (DD 587) proceeding to LST 67 to discharge ammunition.

0720 SAUFLEY (DD 465) relieved by PHILIP (DD 498).

1000 CHARRETTE (DD 581) commenced mission for C-4 (MANGGAR).

1208 CHARRETTE (DD 581) reports still firing on UF and personnel areas MANGGAR area.

1432 PHILIP (DD 498) engaging pillboxes and machine guns at 743-687 (MANGGAR) also 748-679.

1545 PHILIP (DD 498) engaging target at 738-684 - Dumps. (MANGGAR).

1640 PHILIP (DD 498) engaging target at 742-683 pillboxes (MANGGAR).

1700 CTG 78.2 checked out of Net. CTG 74.1 in HMAS SHROPSHIRE has control of Naval gunfire support.

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SPECIAL BOMBARDMENTS

1. INDEPENDENCE DAY CELEBRATION

On the Fourth of July a special bombardment was executed in honor of Independence Day. Participating in the bombardment were USS NASHVILLE, USS PHOENIX, USS BELL, USS CHARRETTE, USS BURNS, USS CONNOR and USS PHILIP.

Each ship fired 21 salvos; cruisers firing 21 six gun salvos and destroyers firing 21 five gun salvos into enemy troop and supply concentrations at grid positions 6267 and 6367. This bombardment exploded an enemy ammunition dump located in these areas causing heavy damage in the surrounding area, and was reported to have caused dispersal of enemy troops followed later by evacuation of the area.

2. CAPTURE CAPE PENAJAM

At 1230, 5 July, the 2/9 Bn, Australian AIF proceeded via LCMs and landed at CAPE PENAJAM. USS NASHVILLE, USS BURNS and USS CHARRETTE began firing a preparatory bombardment to neutralize enemy gun emplacements, entrenchments and defended positions in grid areas 4963, 5061 and 5062. USS NASHVILLE and USS BURNS ceased fire at 1330, ROGER HOUR, when the first wave landed successfully. USS CHARRETTE continued firing upon an enemy suspected gun position in grid position 4963 until 1350. The 2/9 Bn landed without casualties and rapidly consolidated a beachhead. Beach neutralization was accomplished by Royal Australian Artillery located in BALIKPAPAN.

NAVAL GUNFIRE COMMUNICATIONS

1. Naval Gunfire Communications were well above average.

2. In this Operation two frequencies were used to perform the usual functions of the Naval Gunfire Common. The Naval Gunfire Common was used only as an administrative and command circuit, and was manned by ship's personnel. The Naval Gunfire Controller controlled the movements and positions of the ships and exercised general supervision over their firing. The Bombardment Information Circuit was manned by Australian BLO Personnel and was used mainly as a tactical information circuit. In this way not only the Headquarters Ship, but also each firing ship had a complete, up-to-date picture of the tactical situation ashore. Because of this, missions could be cleared rapidly, and fire commenced sooner than otherwise would be possible.

3. The use of these two circuits divided the load which otherwise would fall upon the Naval Gunfire Common. Naval Gunfire Common was never seriously overloaded during the operation, and considering the number of ships which were at times using this circuit, this is remarkable. In the same manner, the Bombardment Information Circuit was free for messages pertaining to it. At various times, because of noise interference or other causes, these circuits were interchanged to transmit information which normally belong to the other circuits.

4. As a result of this, at no time during the operation was important information lacking, either ashore or afloat, and the speedy progress of troops both the Eastward, toward MANGGAR, and across the Bay to CAPE PENAJAM was facilitated and efficiently supported.

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5. The performance of the Australian SFC Parties was outstanding. Ship to shore communications were excellent with only one reported instance of difficulty encountered. The TBX radios used by the SFCPs functioned perfectly.

Australian Bombardment Liaison Officers (BLOS)

1. The presence of BLO Parties on board the Headquarters Ship, which carried the Senior Bombardment Liaison Officer (SBLO), and on board each ship actually in support, and upon the Flagship of Close Support Unit, not only afforded a timely source of vital information concerning front line positions to these ships, which enabled missions to be cleared rapidly, but also furnished each ship with material information concerning prospective troop movements and the Scheme of Maneuver on Shore.

2. The Bombardment Liaison Officers were well indoctrinated and trained, and were of great help in coordinating support in this difficult task. The spirit of cooperation encountered in all members of the 1st Australian Bombardment Group contributed substantially to the success of the operation.

3. Of particular note were the SITREPS (Situation Reports) which were sent from each SFCP to the SBLO via the BLO party in the supporting ship. These reports are remarkable for their clarity and detail, and afforded the Gunfire Controller a complete picture of the tactical situation ashore and facilitated detailing of ships in support. Three of such summaries are included below as examples: one for "F" Day, one for F/2 Day (3 July) and one for F/4 Day (5 July).

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY ON F DAY DERIVED FROM BOMBARDMENT INFORMATION CIRCUIT

"Preliminary Naval Bombardment commenced as scheduled at 0700 I. One B-25 strike scheduled between 0750 and 0800 cancelled due to late arrival. Gunfire well directed and maintained. Prior to landing, CB fire encountered from areas at Signal Hill and Hill 87. 3" shell fell among craft on line of departure and straddled some of the firing destroyers. No damage or casualties reported. Batteries engaged and silenced temporarily. Batteries in these areas have remained semi-active throughout the day, but have been prevented by gunfire from inflicting serious damage and casualties. Mortars and 37mm from area 561594 fell among craft at and shortly after H-hour. Reports later in day stated one company of Japs in defended locality there. Small craft silenced these weapons. Landings on all beaches successful. Approximately 3 minutes early. No report on landing casualties, presumably very light from later figures. Phase 1 completed. 2/10 Bn. 0947. 2/12 Bn. 1020. 2/27 Bn. 1030. 2/16 Bn. formed up in assembly area at 1030. Nil casualties reported from 2/16 Bn. 2/14 Bn. ready to move through 2/27 Bn. at 1110. Up to completion of Phase 1 no opposition. SFCP 3 contacted at 0920. SFCP 2 at 0959. SFCP 6 at 1030. SFCP 5 at 1054. SFCP 4 at 1058.

Enemy battery at 633596 engaged by DD and silenced at 1053. Cruiser engaged defended locality at 614559 with SFCP 3. Area neutralized 1050. Cruiser engaged battery at 633596 and silenced it again at 1100. Situation 1130. 2/12 Bn. one company at 590605. 2/27 and 2/16 Bns. no change. Tanks in support of 2/10 Bn. forward troops at 1200. Enemy reported moving East from Humphries Road to defensive position at 583603. At 1300 2/14 Bn. held up at crossroads 607600 by heavy fire from pillbox to north. 2/16 Bn. occupied RAVENSHOE and RECORD. Opposition on right flank. At 1400 2/14 Bn. reported crossroads at 607600 clear

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and troops moving East. 2/10 Bn. at North end of PARRAMATTA. DD engaged defensive position at 613595 but ceased fire when our troops advanced rapidly in the area, and at 1430 2/16 Bn. had patrols out to MALANG at 602612. Occasional mortar fire only in Bn. area. At 1600 2/14 Bn. occupied area up to line from 615592 and 615600. No opposition encountered. At 1705 TBF planes reported to have bombed and rocket-strafed our troops on PARRAMATTA feature. Casualties 6 killed, 1 wounded. One section 2/12 Bn. on feature 583608. Defensive position at 583604 being engaged by artillery. 2/27 Bn. occupied feature at 615604. Enemy defenses this area deserted.

"Final SITREP for night received at 2359. Positions all Bns. unchanged from above reports. Total casualties for day as reported on gunfire circuits from local reports. Own, 9 killed, 71 wounded. Enemy, 87 killed. Enemy movement: Concentration of one company plus forming in defended position in 5860. This position well contained by our troops. Considerable activity in Cape area west of our FDLs. Vehicle movement along main road from beachhead to BALIKPAPAN and on road running Northeast from township. Several tanks observed among this traffic. Aircraft destroyed and damaged about 20 vehicles during day. Preliminary bombardment reported to have caused great damage and to have cleared beachhead of enemy."

SUMMARY OF SITUATION AS OF 2300 HOURS 3 JULY

"Right flank: 2/27 Battalion has taken over defense of SEPINGGANG airstrip and is patrolling actively along a line of 100 yards inshore. Two disabled AA guns were found in 661CD. 2/14 Battalion has exploited East along coast road to 6962R. Front line on the Battalion's Northern flank is 1000 yards inland. Strong positions in 6861BGL were overcome during the afternoon with the aid of naval gunfire. Scattered resistance only has since been encountered. 2/7 Gav Cdo Regt is centered on area 6362H and is responsible for active. 2/33 Battalion advanced 800 yards during the day and is now in occupation of 6061P to 6062P to 5962G. Situation secure; no enemy encountered as yet. 2/31 Battalion advanced 1000 yards to occupy area from 5962G to 5862N to 5862P. Strong enemy opposition was encountered, particularly from strongposts in areas 5962F, 5763X and 5861A. 2/12 Battalion also advanced approximately 1000 yards to position 5863P to 5762A. Strong opposition encountered along whole front particularly heavy fire coming from 5962F and 5763X. Heavy flanking fire was encountered from 5762Y before that point was overcome. 2/10 Battalion advanced 600 yards during the day to 5661-O and 5660K.

"Illumination is being provided in township area tonight, harrassing fire on reported enemy concentrations in 6267 and 6367.

"It is intended that one battalion of 18 Brigade will attack CAPE PENAJAM in 5162 E on the morning of 5 July."

SUMMARY OF SITUATION AS AT 0519301
DERIVED FROM SFCP REPORTS

"2/9 Battalion in PENAJAM Area. Front lines at 520622, 513624, 502613, 505623, 502625, 495630, 494, 639, 513632. Patrols operating on all fronts. No contacts have been made since the landing. At about 1530 an enemy gun estimated at 3" fired on our troops. Gun was reported at 4736A2. It was engaged

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by a DD with air spot. Engagement was unsuccessful. Planes bombed and strafed. Results unknown. One Jap only encountered and killed. One 5" gun captured intact. Six natives found hung and with bullet and bayonet wounds. No casualties have been incurred by 2/9 Battalion. 25 Brigade in BALIKPAPAN Area. 2/31 and 2/33 Battalion with 2/7 Cavalry Commando Regiment have made rapid advance to the following positions: 2/7 Cav Cdo. Complete Cape area around square 5664. 2/31 Battalion. 572648, 583650, 589644. 2/33 Battalion 595644, 600647, 613644. Information as to enemy resistance encountered in this advance is limited. It would appear the enemy withdrew leaving strong pockets which were dealt with mainly by artillery. The area between square 6163 and SEPINGGANG airfield and up to square 6963 is under control by patrols of 2/7 Cav Cdo Regt and 2/27 Battalion. Enemy activity on a small scale has been found in squares 6363 and 6362. 2/14 Battalion at MANGGAR. Front lines at 745663, 743665, 743669, 740670, 732665, 732662. Our troops were under very heavy shell, mortar and machine gun fire sporadically throughout the day. Defenses are situated mainly in squares 7367 and 7467. Guns have also been firing from 7368 and 7469. The two main centers of resistance are at 739677 and 748677 which contain four to five inch probable dual purpose guns. Naval, artillery, and air support has been provided throughout the day. Fire has been neutralized from time to time but only after long duels. An ammunition dump has been destroyed. Direct hits have been observed in several pillboxes which were destroyed. Guns were continuously straddled. One AA gun dug into a heavy shelter was destroyed by an anti-tank gun. All positions are well dug in and heavily covered. Two of our tanks were destroyed by enemy guns and numerous personnel casualties were incurred, as yet not reported in detail."

4. It should be noted that these summaries were available to all F.S. Ships carrying BLO Parties.

5. The only deficiency experienced in the use of the BLO Parties was that there were not enough of them, a fact which necessitated transfers to relieving F.S. Ships. This was no serious handicap, but in using these parties it would be extremely desirable to have one party attached permanently to each F.S. Ship participating in an operation.

6. It is suggested that the system of Bombardment Liaison Officer - Shore Fire Control Party Teams - be studied in detail with a view to possible adoption by our own forces.

Joint Assault Code.

The Joint Assault Code was invaluable. To aid security, a similar code such as the Aircraft Contact Code would be beneficial at times.

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B. AIR SUPPORT

1. Planning and Organization

(a) Air Support for the Balikpapan Operation was supplied by the RAAF, THIRTEENTH Air Force, FIFTH Air Force, Fleet Air Wing Ten under Com Air SEVENTH Fleet and ComTHIRD Fleet. As the Operation was in the RAAF area of responsibility that organization acted as a coordinating agency for all pre-invasion strikes and close support. Heavy strikes and close support by B-24 aircraft were provided by bomber groups of the RAAF, THIRTEENTH Air Force and FIFTH Air Force. In addition the RAAF supplied B-24 aircraft for the use of the air observer and PBYs for daily courier planes between BALIKPAPAN and MOROTAI. The THIRTEENTH Fighter Command under the THIRTEENTH Air Force provided day fighter cover for all convoys and the objective area and strike groups of P-38s and B-25s for close support. This organization also provided dawn and dusk fighter cover for all convoys. The FIFTH Air Force provided one group of specially equipped longrange night fighters for night cover at the objective area. Fleet Air Wing TEN supported the operation by adjusting Sectors 1 and 2 of Search Plan King, which covered Makassar Straits, so as to give an early morning search over the southern approaches to BALIKPAPAN. Com Air SEVENTH Fleet also provided anti-submarine searches over all convoy routes daily and sector searches in the vicinity of the objective area. At the request of the Commander BALIKPAPAN Attack Group (CTG 78.2) three escort carriers were provided by Com THIRD Fleet to support the operation during the actual landing and consolidation of the beachead (F-1 through F + 2 Days).

(b) The original Air Plan was drawn up on the assumption that the RAAF would have available adequate air facilities located at TARAKAN for the support of the opeeation. However, due to adverse weather conditions and existing local terrain conditions, the plan for support from TARAKAN strip was abandoned. This necessitated a complete revision of the existing air plan. As the handicaps of weather and distance began to effect noticeable the committments made by the Air Forces it was considered advisable to include an escort carrier group as part of the task organization. Additional revisions of the Air Plan became necessary after the inclusion of this group.

(c) The Air Plan for the operation was developed in conjunction with plans submitted by the RAAF, THIRTEENTH Air Force, and the SEVENTH Australian Division. Plans formulated by Commander BALIKPAPAN Attack Group (CTG 78.2), RAAF and the SEVENTH Australian Division were mutually agreed upon and were then submitted to the supporting agencies for execution.

(d) Personnel for the Support Air organization were obtained from AdComSEVENTHPhib, THIRTEENTH Air Force, RAAF, ComASCUPhibsPAC and the SEVENTH Australian Division. AdComSEVENTH Phib supplied 20 radiomen and radiomen strikers for use in monitoring radio channels. Three of these men were placed aboard the USS MONTPELIER (CL 57) for use of the Advance Commander Support Aircraft. THIRTEENTH Air Force provided two officersto act as Support Aircraft Controllers and one officer to act as Advance Commander Support Aircraft. The RAAF supplied two

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Support Aircraft Controllers for the Support Air Team and one for the Advance Support Air Team aboard the USS MONTPELIER (CL 57). In addition the RAAF supplied three officers to man the Support Air Request nets and the SEVENTH Australian Division provided two officers to man the Support Air Observation net. The RAAF also provided an additional five officers to act as a standby Air Support Team aboard the USS SPENCER (CGC 36). In addition to the above personnel, ComASCUPhibsPac supplied one officer to act as Commander Support Aircraft, an Aircraft Combat Intelligence Officer, a net control officer, an officer qualified to handle Air Sea Rescue Work and also one radio technician and three radiomen.

2. Training.

(a) Air Support Control personnel reported aboard just prior to departure for the objective area. Mock-up drills were immediately instituted and carried out daily while enroute. Internal communications were tested and training afforded the enlisted personnel. Coordination and team work were developed between the various members of the Air Support Request missions with the Naval Gunfire Control party and the Australian SEVENTH Division. Special emphasis was placed on drills covering scheduled air strikes in support of H-Hour.

3. Conduct of Operation

FOX DAY

(a) At 0600 on F Day Control of Air Support passed from Advanced Support Air team in MONTPELIER (CL 57) to Commander Support Aircraft in WASATCH (AGC 9).

(b) Pre-H-Hour. All scheduled air strikes in support of H-Hour were met with the exception of the H-70 strike by the B-25s. These arrived late due to weather and were cancelled. A total of 342 x 500 pound bombs was dropped on the landing beach area by 38 B-24s in support of H-Hour.

(c) Air Support during Fox Day was met according to plan, all flights reporting in for missions at scheduled times. In addition, two strike groups consisting of 16 VT and 14 VF total were furnished by TG 78.4 upon request. Ex-Combat Air Patrol fighters were used for strafing missions. During the afternoon carrier plane strike, it was reported that one bomb landed on friendly troops, causing several casualties. The strike was called off immediately; no amplifying details were received.

(d) Plane Losses. The Air Observer in a RAAF B-24 was hit by AA and forced to ditch alongside friendly shipping. Full information regarding recovery of the crew was not received but three are believed unaccounted for. One carrier based VF on a strafing mission was shot down behind enemy lines; no survivor was observed.

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(e) Summary:

Sorties	Type	Loading
24	B-24	216 x 500 lb. bombs.
15	P-38	15 x 1000 lb. bombs.
10	P-38	10 x 165 gal. Napalm.
16	VF	full ammunition.
16	VT)	45 x 500 lb. bombs.
14	VF)	80 x 100 lb. bombs.
	)	64 x 5" rockets.

FOX PLUS ONE

(a) Air Support was continued according to schedule. During the day the Air Observer in a B-24 was shot down in flames behind the enemy lines and no survivors were observed. Upon request, TG 78.4 furnished a VT with a qualified AIF observer for the remainder of the day. One P-38 was lost but pilot was seen to parachute and land well behind enemy lines. Five B-25s furnished DDT spray on the target.

(b) Summary:

Sorties	Type	Loading
28	B-24	252 x 500 lb. bombs.
11	P-38	11 x 165 gal. Napalm.
1	P-38	1 x 1000 lb. bomb.
4	VF	full ammunition.

FOX PLUS TWO

(a) Two P-38 flights were cancelled due to weather and base airstrip conditions. The morning air observer had just been relieved on station by the afternoon air observer when his B-24 was hit by AA and went down to crash in flames; no survivors observed. A maximum effort air strike from the CTG 78.4 was requested to strike a heavily defended area on Samarinda Road. This resulted in a 52 plane strike with effective results. Two planes were holed but returned to base safely.

(b) Summary:

Sorties	Type	Loading
23	B-24	257 x 500 lb. bombs.
4	P-38	4 x 165 gal. Napalm.
8	VF	full ammunition.
24	VF)	80 x 500 lb. bombs.
28	VT)	256 x 5" rockets.
	)	140 x 100 lb. bombs.

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(c) TCAP was relieved on station at 1830I by two Army P-61s, at which time, TG 78.4 departed from the area and control of Air Support passed ashore to Commander Landing Force RAAF Air Support Control Unit.

4. Comments and Recommendations:

1. By bitter experience it was definitely proven that the B-24 was not suitable for Air Observer work but was an excellent clay pigeon for Jap AA. By contrast, the carrier based VT was found to be a more difficult and elusive target, besides furnishing better observation results.

2. Communications were generally satisfactory; some feed-over was experienced but not sufficient to interrupt communications.

3. Planes coming in to the area did not make sufficient use of the SAD-HF for reporting in. All planes had a tendency to stick to the SAD primary VHF which placed an unnecessary burden on this one channel.

4. The RAAF, FIFTH and THIRTEENTH Airforces are to be commended on the manner in which they met their schedules flying from distant bases and through changeable weather.

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C - MINESWEEPING

1. As described fully in Annex (F) to ComPhibGrp 8 OpPlan 6-45 it was known that the approach to the assault beaches at BALIKPAPAN was blocked by a large field of very sensitive allied acoustic and magnetic mines set for as many as seven ship counts and planted in about three and one half fathoms of water. In addition, intelligance reports indicated the likelihood of enemy mines being in the entrance channel to BALIKPAPAN Harbor and in a line about 6000 yards long in the vicinity of Point Simon, (See Appendix III to Annex (F) to OpPlan). Although the Dutch had planted some mines before the war it was assumed that they would no longer be effective even if the Japanese had not disposed of them.

2. Sixteen days were available to the Group Commander for sweeping prior to Fox Day. The pattern of the field, location of shoals, types of mines and enemy defenses all combined to make this both a hazardous and difficult sweeping task. It was, therefore, necessary to work out a plan that would clear a path to the beaches in the time available with minimum practicable risk to sweepers.

3. For planning purposes the assault area was divided into several sections: first, all waters where ships would have to maneuver inside the 100 fathom curve and in which no mines were reported; second, that small area near Point Simon in which the presence of controlled enemy mines was suspected; third, that area in which single ship count Allied influence mines had been planted; last, that area in which multiple ship count Allied influence mines had been planted.

4. It was decided to sweep for moored and acoustic mines an approach track about five miles wide from the 100 fathoms curve to the objective. Zone Pirates was then laid out around the suspected line of enemy controlled mines near Point Simon. An estimate was made as to the location of the enemy swept channel, and the southern boundary of PHILLIES was drawn along that line from the eastern edge of the multiple ship count area west to a point beyond the line of departure and the assault beaches. Zones GIANTS and ATHLETICS were next established. Zone BEAVERS was set up to provide a fire support station to the west of the assault beach and BISONS was laid out to cover the harbor entrance and part of the harbor. The area containing single ship count influence mines was divided into two zones, SENATORS and INDIANS, divided along the five fathom curve, and zone CHIEFS was established to cover certain waters that would not have to be cleared prior to the assault. The remainder of the area near the objective was then divided into suitable zones whose shapes and sizes were governed largely by the depth of water and the size of the outer swept area desired for the Support and Covering Group.

5. The plan provided for sweeping the approach track and outer fire support area and then clearing SENATORS, INDIANS, PHILLIES, GIANTS, BEAVERS, and ATHLETICS to provide inner fire support areas and a swept channel to the beach. The sweepers were to enter the multiple ship count field along the southern boundary of PHILLIES in order to minimize the risk involved in making the initial pass. It was decided that motor launches equipped for magnetic sweeping would not be of any value because of their slow speed and the strong current in the area. All sweeping inside the 10 fathom curve was to be done by YMS's. The YMS after their arrival on 5-2

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were to complete whatever sweeping remained to be done outside the 10 fathom curve.

6. From the time planning began it was apparent that it was by no means certain that a satisfactory coverage of the required area could be made in the time available. In the first place the mines were so sensitive that even a well degaussed YMS was in great danger in unswept water. Secondly, the water was so shallow that the gear would be in constant danger of fouling on the bottom or on submerged wreckage. Thirdly, the fire support ships would be compelled to remain so far off shore during the first few days of the sweeping in PHILLIES that it was likely that sweepers and gear would be damaged by enemy gunfire. Finally, since the best magnetic sweep that could be employed swept a path only about 100 yards wide, it would be necessary to navigate with the greatest accuracy if extensive holidays were to be avoided, and there were few reliable aids to navigation in the vicinity of BALIKPAPAN.

7. On the other hand, there were certain factors that could not accurately be determined that made the assigned sweeping appear feasible. The enemy had been continuously sweeping in the harbor and its approaches and it was certain that he had detonated some Allied mines. In addition, it was felt that a certain number of the Allied mines would probably have fired prematurely or failed to arm.

8. In response to a request from Commander Amphibious Group EIGHT the Commander Service Force Seventh Fleet sent a degaussing officer to the staging area to do what he could to improve the YMS degaussing. The officer who was sent did an excellent job with the limited time and facilities at his disposal and undoubtedly the improved degaussing contributed to the success of the sweeping. The only minesweeping tender available was the LSM 1 and she was to proceed to BALIKPAPAN directly from the BRUNEI BAY operation. Her hold was largely taken up by two 50 foot motor launches equipped for magnetic minesweeping and she had no facilities for transferring magnetic cables even if she had had them aboard. She did, however, have a minesweeping gear repair unit embarked. Some spares were also carried by the COFER (APD 62).

9. A day by day summary of minesweeping follows. Little mention is made of other units as their activities are covered elsewhere in this report.

15 June: Sixteen YMSs plus COFER (APD 62) with LCVPs fitted with light moored minesweeping gear, arrived in MAKASSAR STRAITS of BALIKPAPAN. An approach track 6000 yards wide from the 100 fathom curve to Point SIMON plus zone RED SOX were swept for acoustic mines and for moored mines to a depth of sixty feet with negative results.

16 June: RED SOX, CARDINALS, and 20% of BRAVES were swept for magnetic and acoustic mines. CARDINALS and 20% of BRAVES were swept for moored mines to a depth of sixty feet. LCVPs explored PIRATES to a depth of six fathoms. All results were negative. Two YMSs under repair.

17 June: Magnetic sweep of BRAVES completed and PIRATES explored for magnetic and acoustic mines. Moored sweep of BRAVES to 10 fathom curve and PIRATES to sixty feet completed and SEALS and DODGERS explored for moored mines to the same depth. All results were negative. Three YMSs under repair.

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18 June: Thirty percent of SENATORS swept for magnetic and acoustic mines, Moored sweep of BRAVES inside 10 fathom curve completed. Magnetic sweep of PHILLIES commenced. YMS 50 exploded influence mine under her on western edge of PHILLIES. After an unsuccessful attempt to tow her out she was abandoned and sunk by cruiser gunfire. Eleven of crew were wounded in action; all were rescued, none killed or missing. No other mines detonated. A buoyed enemy channel was observed along southern boundary of PHILLIES.

19 June: Nine YMSs able to sweep magnetic mines at beginning of day. SENATORS completed up to 70% for magnetic and acoustic mines. No effective sweeping accomplished in PHILLIES. Four magnetic tails lost, two damaged. Sweepers fired on twice by shore batteries, but no hits. No mines swept.

20 June: Eleven YMSs had magnetic tails at beginning of day; six were in poor condition. Completed single coverage of SENATORS and PIRATES for magnetic and acoustic mines. Moored sweep of PIRATES to eighty feet and SEALS and DODGERS to sixty feet to ten fathom curve completed. YMS 368 badly damaged by mine explosion in SENATORS, three wounded. No other mines detonated. Three magnetic cables repaired, two damaged, one lost.

21 June: Ten YMS with magnetic tails, five in poor condition at start of day. Three hundred yards from southern boundary and 100 yards from northern boundary of PHILLIES swept for magnetic and acoustic mines. SENATORS swept to thirty feet for moored mines. YMS 335 struck by enemy shell, four killed, six injured. No mines swept. One ship jettisoned magnetic cable while maneuvering to avoid gunfire; six tails were damaged, one beyond repair, three of these by gunfire.

22 June: Started day with six magnetic sweepers. Arrivals were CTU 78.2.9 (ComMinDiv 34) in SENTRY (AM 299) with SCOUT (AM 296), 3 YMSs, and LSM 1. Area 500 yards north of south boundary PHILLIES covered for 4 ship counts. BEARS and BROWNS swept to 15 feet for moored mines. Conducted exploratory searches for moored mines to depth of sixty feet to south and east of CARDINALS. YMS formation in PHILLIES was shelled, YMS 10 being hit but suffering no casualties. Four ships jettisoned magnetic cable while maneuvering to avoid gunfire. One other's cable was damaged beyond repair. No mines swept.

23 June: Five magnetic sweepers available at start of day. Completed magnetic and acoustic coverage of southern 500 yards of PHILLIES of six ship counts and made exploratory passes through center of zone. TIGERS and BREWERS swept to depth of twenty feet. All results negative. YMS 364 holed by enemy shell that did not explode, damage superficial. Four mental patients transferred from sweeps. An average of only three magnetic sweepers was available at any one time. Two cables were jettisoned by sweepers avoiding gunfire. Two new cables arrived in area on an APD; two more were transferred from AMs to YMSs. Continued negative results in PHILLIES led to an optimistic note in daily report for the first time.

24 June: Southern 1500 yards and northern 200 yards of PHILLIES now covered for average of four ships counts and for acoustic mines. ORIOLES swept to 10 feet to 10 foot line and sweep extended 3 miles beyond to check enemy reaction which was nil. Approach track widened. No gear lost, no mines swept. YMS 9 arrived. Two destroyers operated in Southern 500 yards PHILLIES with TROMP (HNMS) at southern end, all rendering excellent fire support that proved to be a major factor in the

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successful completion of the sweeping. Thereafter, destroyers operated in PHILLIES each day, and no gunfire directed at the YMSs was reported.

25 June: Three hundred yards north of south boundary of GIANTS and 300 yards in center of PHILLIES swept for magnetic and acoustic mines. Approach track widened. One moored mine swept on western boundary PHILLIES. One influence mine swept in eastern GIANTS, two in western PHILLIES. Two previously jettisoned cables removed from PHILLIES, one serviceable. Two cables damaged by explosions this date. Total twelve ships with magnetic tails, six of these under repair. At about 2030 Minesweeping Unit was attacked by estimated four enemy aircraft launching torpedoes; ships shot down three.

26 June: Arrivals were SCUFFLE (AM298) and YMS 196. Southern 30% of GIANTS now swept for acoustic mines and for magnetic mines up to five ship counts. Southern 1900 yards of PHILLIES also swept for influence mines. Moored sweepers led magnetic. YMS 39 and 365 were mined and sunk near western boundary PHILLIES with 3 killed, 13 seriously wounded. Rescue boat reported sighting 5 moored mines with cases awash in northwest PHILLIES. Magnetic mines were swept in Eastern GIANTS and ATHLETICS, northeast PHILLIES eastern BEAVERS, a total of six plus three moored.

27 June: Three magnetic sweepers available to start operations, nine under repair. INDIANS 60% completed for single ship count magnetic and acoustic mines, PHILLIES swept to fifteen feet for moored. One moored mine cut in PHILLIES: one influence mine swept in SENATORS. Six previously jettisoned cables recovered, some salvageable.

28 June: Nine magnetic sweepers available at dawn. Sweeping GIANTS, PHILLIES and INDIANS for influence mines continued to progress. The western edge of PHILLIES was swept for moored mines with negative results. Two influence mines swept in western INDIANS, one badly damaging YMS 47, wounding 10 men. Minesweeping unit commander estimated that PHILLIES and GIANTS but not ATHLETICS and BEAVERS would be reasonably safe by F day, having been swept for an average of five ship counts.

29 June: Of 15 remaining YMSs, 3 were inoperative mechanically, 9 could sweep magnetic mines, 3 with badly damaged cables were being used as moored sweepers. Two damaged magnetic cables were being repaired. Sweeping for influence mines continued to progress with all available magnetic sweepers in PHILLIES and INDIANS. Results were negative. Fifty percent of INDIANS was swept to 15 feet for moored mines. Four contact mines exploded, three near northwest corner of PHILLIES, one in transport area ABLE, having been dragged there by YMS 10 while recovering gear. This same ship dragged two more moored mines out into deep water far to the south and buoyed them.

30 June: Assault channel and western half of INDIANS were reswept for moored mines with negative results. Swept additional 900 yards in PHILLIES, GIANTS and ATHLETICS with average of three ship counts for magnetic and for acoustic mines. Zone INDIANS completed for single ship count. Magnetic sweepers swept 3 contact mines in PHILLIES and northeast BEAVERS with the Mark VI (a) sweep. One magnetic mine was swept in western INDIANS. Two magnetic cables were damaged. YMS 65 and 269 arrived and CHEPACHET brought 5 used magnetic cables that were not of immediate value beacuse of damage caused by handling without proper equipment.

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1 July: At the time of arrival of the assault echelon at dawn on Fox Day, the following zones were considered to be clear of mines: the approach track, RED SOX, CARDINALS, BRAVES, ORIOLES, BEAVERS, TIGERS, SEALS, DODGERS, SENATORS, and PIRATES. The following zones, although not thoroughly swept, were considered to be safe enough to warrant their being entered by assault shipping: southwestern third of INDIANS, PHILLIES, GIANTS, (except for that small part west of PHILLIES) and the western half of ATHLETICS. As will be noted elsewhere in this report, no assault shipping was damaged by mines.

The check sweep for magnetic and acoustic mines in INDIANS and the southeastern 1500 yards of CHIEFS was continued on F Day. One influence mine in southern CHIEFS was detonated.

2 July: Continued influence sweep commenced on Fox Day. Results were negative.

3 July: Completed influence sweep commenced on Fox Day. Results were negative.

4 July: Ten YMSs operational as magnetic sweepers, eight repairing gear. Commenced sweep for moored contact and influence mines in eastern ATHLETICS and that part of CHIEFS to the east thereof. Results were negative.

5 July: Completed sweep begun on 4 July, no casualties to ships or gear. No mines swept. Sent 5 YMS back to MOROTAI, one in tow of an LST.

6 July: Commenced sweep for moored contact and influence mines from the southwest corner of PHILLIES into the harbor of BALIKPAPAN. Eighteen type 93 Japanese chemical horn moored contact mines were swept. Nine exploded in gear, nine were cut loose. Seven sets of "O" type gear were lost due to mine explosions and three ships damaged magnetic gear. All mines were found along southwest third of BEAVERS.

7 July: Continued work on channel into BALIKPAPAN. Two mines swept.

SUMMARY OF MINES SWEPT, SHIPS SUNK AND DAMAGED, AND CASUALTIES FROM F-16 THROUGH F + 6

	MOORED	INFLUENCE
MINES SWEPT	34	16
YMS SUNK BY MINES	0	3
YMS DAMAGED BY MINES	0	1
YMS damaged by gunfire 3		
Sets magnetic gear lost (Approx.)	15	
Personnel casualties in sweepers:		
Killed in action	7	
Missing in action	None reported	
Wounded in action	43	
Mental cases transferred	10	

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Recommendation Based on Minesweeping:

1. It is understood that all YMSs assigned to the Pacific Fleet are being organized into squadrons for administrative purposes. Such an arrangement is considered to be very desirable, as it is felt that these small ships need to be in frequent contact with some experienced officer whose primary concern is their Administration, training and efficient operation. In this operation it was necessary for the Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force to detail his Minesweeping Officer to the Attack Group Commander for temporary duty as YMS Unit Commander.

2. The critical shortage of minesweeping gear at the objective very nearly resulted in the failure of the minesweeping operation. For any operation where difficult minesweeping is a possibility, it is recommended that there be available to the Attack Group Commander at the port from which the sweepers stage, a ship capable of maintaining at least the speed of an LST with an adequate stock of magnetic, acoustic, and moored minesweeping gear for all types of sweepers. It is recommended that such a tender have embarked a minesweeping gear repair unit with adequate equipment and also with spare parts not only for the sweep gear but also for the main engines and auxilliaries of the YMSs. Such a tender should be equipped not only to carry a number of sets of magnetic and "O" type gear, but should also be capable of transferring it to the sweepers under the rather unfavorable conditions that may be encountered at the objective. This gear is too heavy and too large to be flown by air at the last minute and the AMs and YMSs cannot carry a sufficient stock of ship spare parts to supply their needs during a difficult operation. Between operations the tender could perform maintenance and repair work on sweepers in forward areas. If such a tender cannot be made available it will be advisable to maintain at the objective about three times the number of sweepers required to be operational each day if difficult sweeping is likely to be encountered.

3. The navigational assistance rendered to the sweepers by the destroyers of the Support and Covering Group is well worthy of mention. This Command has in a number of operations found that destroyers are of invaluable help to YMSs in localities where it is difficult for small ships to obtain an accurate fix. Accurate navigation was of the greatest importance in this operation.

4. In one of his daily reports the Commander Support and Covering Group stated "The entire problem of meeting target date has been lack of ability of assigned minesweepers to cope with the Allied magnetic mine". If all of the Allied influence mines not equipped with sterilizers that fell within the area to be swept had been alive on F-16 day it is doubtful that a large enough area could not have been swept by F day to have permitted safe passage for the Assault Forces. No clue was found as to what sort of gear the enemy had used to clear the channel. Perhaps some of it will be located later by investigators who remained in the area after the departure of the Attack Group Commander on F/6.

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D - SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

1. The landing problem for the BALIKPAPAN Operation was a very difficult one due to several unusual features of the site selected for the landing beaches.

(a) Shallow water extended out a great distance from shore which made it necessary to locate the Transport Area 14000 yards from the landing beaches.

(b) Extensive Allied and Enemy minefields were present between the Transport Area and landing beaches.

2. To overcome the above difficulties an approach lane was designed to permit the landing craft to traverse the least dangerous and most completely swept part of the minefields. This required two turns in the approach channel. To simplify the boat coxswain's problem the approach lane was buoyed by the USS MANGO (AN-24) prior to F Day.

3. Due to the above complexities the landing plan was made very detailed and complete with sketches of the boat waves and approach lanes.

4. To better acquaint key personnel with the complexities of the problem numerous conferences were held at which time the control officer gave detailed instructions to officers and boat coxswains participating in the ship to shore movement. A rehearsal was held at MOROTAI which duplicated the conditions of the assault as nearly as possible. This rehearsal ran smoothly and afforded excellent training for all personnel participating.

5. Due to the detailed planning, rehearsal, conferences and other measures outlinedabove the landing went off in an outstanding manner. The initial waves landed without casualties.

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E - FIGHTER DIRECTION

1. Organization and Planning

(a) Control of Fighter Direction for the BALIKPAPAN Operation was in the USS WASATCH. The USS SPENCER was designated as the standby Fighter Direction ship and five destroyers equipped with Fighter Director teams were used as radar guard ships and Fighter Direction ships for convoy movements. The USS MONTPELIER acted as Advance Fighter Direction ship and controlled all air cover at the objective area until the arrival of the USS WASATCH. Adequate radar coverage was obtained from the station occupied by the USS WASATCH, which permitted the Flagship to maintain control at all times.

(b) Prior to the time of departure for the objective contact was made with the 110 Mobile Fighter Control Unit and an exchange of general information was made. Such items as shackle code, voice calls, frequencies to be used, and the type of shore based radar being installed were discussed. A representative of this unit accompanied the USS WASATCH to the objective area.

(c) A complete schedule of convoy movement giving dawn and dusk positions, SOA, ETD, and Fighter Direction voice calls was submitted to the Air Force prior to the time of departure of the first echelon.

2. Communications.

(a) Radio channels monitored in CIC during the approach and upon arrival consisted of the Primary Fighter Net (142.02 mcs), Secondary Inter Fighter Director Net (142.56 mcs), General Area Warning Net (3000 kcs), Local Air Warning Net (3115 kcs), Primary Inter Fighter Director Net (2530 kcs), TBS, and 34.8 mcs. The Secondary Fighter Net (142.74 mcs) and Secondary Air Sea Rescue Nets (4475 kcs and 140.58 mcs respectively) were logged in the Joint Operations Voice Filter Room.

(b) Radar reports were made on TBS or 34.8 mcs and duplicated on the Inter Fighter Director nets if the reporting ship was equipped to do so.

(c) Radio communications were satisfactory and Net discipline was good except on the Secondary Fighter Net which was very much overloaded.

3. Fighter Cover

(a) Air cover was supplied by the THIRTEENTH Air Force from TAWI TAWI, which was 420 miles from the objective area and by the FIFTH Air Force from ZAMBOANGA a distance of nearly 550 miles. Because of the distances involved and unfavorable weather conditions both enroute to the objective area and at the staging areas, committments made by these forces were not in all cases met. Considering the handicaps under which the forces operated the results obtained, however, were very commendable.

(b) From Fox minus 1 until Fox plus 2 cover was supplied by the Escort Carrier Group. Cover supplied by this group was on station twenty-four hours each day and was in all respects excellent.

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4. Air Defense Summary

(a) Prior to Fox day the forces operating in the objective area were subjected to light harassing air raids on two instances and were reconnoitered by single enemy planes on two other occasions. In only one of the above instances did the force have protective fighter cover and in this case the night fighter was unable to overtake the enemy fighter. Three enemy planes were destroyed by ship's anti-aircraft fire during one of the harassing night raids. All enemy air activity occured during the hours of dusk and darkness, except one snooper which appeared over the force near midday.

(b) While enroute to or from the objective area no enemy planes were detected by any convoy. Innumerable bogeys were investigated. In every case where identity was determined faulty IFF was found to be the cause of the bogey report.

(c) While at the objective area the assault force was reconnoitered on two occasions by single flights of enemy planes. Both of these appeared in the early hours before dawn. Of the two single flights of enemy planes appearing over the objective area on 3 July one was shot down upon retirement, by the night fighter, and the other disappeared from the radar screen overland in the close vicinity to the objective area. On 5 July another single plane appeared from the South, reconnoitered the beach area and dropped two bombs before retiring. No Combat Air Patrol was on station at this time.

(d) Patrols were maintained south of the objective area at an intermediate altitude and were not permitted to fly over the beach or transport areas.

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F. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communications were in general, excellent. Radio discipline was outstanding. The absence of unauthorized transmissions and idle chatter on the voice circuits was noted with pleasure. The thorough indoctrination and supervision of communication personnel by Task Unit Commanders and Commanding Officers to accomplish the above is most creditable.

2. Formal voice circuits requiring stations to request permission to transmit, were not established as it was believed that with proper radio discipline a greater volume of traffic could be handled by an informal circuit. Control stations took effective action promply on the few occasions their circuits tended to get out of hand.

3. The cooperation of the Australian Forces in communication planning left nothing to be desired. The painstaking thoroughness of this work plus careful checking of every detail was well worth while. The absence of interference between circuits as well as the absence of transmissions to clear up unforeseen difficulties were noteworthy. Although messages were not transmitted as rapidly as they would have been on purely U. S. Naval circuits nor as fast as they would have been on purely Australian circuits, they were reliable. Speed of transmission improved as the operation progressed. Considering the difference between Australian and American pronunciation, en unciation, and phraseology the results were gratifying. It is believed the results attained can, to a considerable extent, be attributed to the establishment and use of voice circuits between the two forces during the planning phase.

4. Communications with the HNMS TROMP were excellent. English was used on the circuits. Lack of requests for repetition of messages indicates there was no difficulty in pronunciation, enunciation or phraseology.

5. All "CW" traffic was cleared promply throughout the entire operation. This was facilitated by previous arrangements made with Radio LEYTE and ComAdCom7thPhib who cooperated to the fullest extent and gave precedence to all traffic originated by the Attack Group Commander. The special circuit established with Radio MOROTAI on 6310 kcs for clearing traffic to the 1st Australian Corps and other activities located at MOROTAI proved invaluable.

6. To eliminate "CW" interference with the voice circuits during the assault phase of the operation, outgoing "CW" traffic from the Attack Group Commander's Flagship was restricted until the last wave had landed. The only exception was for a period of approximately 40 minutes after the signal "DEPLOY" had been made to clear accumulated outgoing traffic and effect necessary tuning of transmitters. As a result, the voice circuits were remarkably free of interference during the critical phase of the operation.

7. The inclusion of major voice calls on the Cruising and Assault Frequency Chart eliminated the necessity of looking up most calls by the voice operator.

8. The use of charts for indicating the Area and Assault Circuits resulted in a considerable reduction in the size of the Communication Annex.

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G - INTELLIGENCE

1. Beaches

(a) The Intelligence Plan to CTG 78.2 OpPlan 6-45 included a full and complete description of the Primary and Alternate Landing Beaches which obviated the necessity of a separate intelligence annex being promulgated for the Alternate Landing Plan (Annex O). The description of the landing beaches, terrain, off-shore approaches and aids to navigation were sufficiently accurate to enable the Underwater Demolition Teams and assault forces to locate them accurately. The location and condition of exits, data concerning sea and swell, tides and currents and composition of the soil were all adequately reported. It was only in the matter of gradient and location of the 1 and 2 f thom lines that any major discrepancy appeared, and in these instances the estimates given were not as favorable as conditions actually found.

(b) The quality of the beaches left much to be desired but was not unexpected. LCTs and LCMs were able to beach, but LSTs unloaded by the "ramp to ramp" method and lighters and later discharged their cargo directly on to pontoon causeways.

(c) No landings were attempted at either of the alternate landing beaches (Manggar Ketjil and Manggar) although demolition of beach obstacles was completed on Fox-5 Day. A comparison of conditions actually existing, as reported by Underwater Demolition Team 11, with those anticipated revealed marked similarity and confirmed poor beach characteristics which would permit beaching of no craft larger than LCTs. Demolition of beach obstacles off Manggar was 600 yards to right of beach assigned, but this incident was due to extremely poor visibility caused by smoke from oil fires which enveloped the whole area.

(d) On F/3 Day, beach obstacles off Sepinggang beach were blown in order to expedite the landing of heavy air field equipment and to avoid serious transportation problems over a badly bomb-cratered roadway. Conditions at this beach were as expected, with poor beaching characteristics necessitating the use of pontoon causeways.

2. Enemy Defenses

(a) The defenses at BALIKPAPAN were vastly superior in strength, construction and complexity to any thus far encountered in this area. They were, however, with few exceptions, almost identical to those predicted in the Intelligence Plan to CTG 78.2 OpPlan No. 6-45. The defenses actually observed or those concerning which reliable reports had been received up to the time of departure from the objective area were as follows:

(1) Allied, and Japanese Magnetic, Acoustic and Moored contact mines were found located in the general area as defined in the Intelligence Plan referred to above, and in Part V, Section C, of this report. Three controlled mines in the form of two depth charges and one "flying pig" were also discovered 10 yards to seaward of offshore barricade, approximately 500 yards west of the left flank of RED beach. The control box, plunger type, was situated in a cave ¼ mile inland.

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The mines had been laid in such haste that the lead cable was still on the surface of the ground. Two other such units have been reported but have not as yet been located.

(2) An offshore log barricade extended from just east of Point BABI to MANGGAR Airfield. At the KLANDASAN beach area it consisted of three lines of heavy wooden posts, set five feet apart, with an interval between verticals of five feet. The center line was offset and the posts were braced at the top with spiked double diagonal timbers, and occasionally at the bottom with horizontal supports. The barricade was located about 10 to 15 yards offshore and apparently had been placed to coincide with the surf line. This close proximity to the beach brought it within easy range of shore gunfire and Jap snipers, thus making any attempt to breach the obstacles a most hazardous and dangerous mission.

(3) Beach defenses, consisting of automatic weapons including 20 mm, and 37 mm and possible 40 mm guns, were found in earth and log emplacements and concrete pillboxes along the entire shore line, but were concentrated mainly between RED Beach and Point BABI.

(4) Tank traps from 10 to 14 feet wide and from 8 to 10 feet deep with spoil banks and log palings were found where indicated in the defense overlay and conformed to expectations.

(5) The heavier defenses were located further inland on higher ground and, consisted of guns of the following calibre: 37 mm, 40 mm, 3 inch, 75 mm, 10 cm and 127 mm. These installations were principally located in the SIGNAL HILL area on the high ridge just east of BALIKPAPAN town; in the BAROE area, in the vicinity of MALANG and immediately north of MANGGAR. The probable presence of mortars was also indicated by the frequent reports of mortar shells falling on the beaches and in the approach lanes during the assault phase. An unusually effective AA installation was also reported by airforce personnel to have been located about 3 miles north of the right flank of GREEN Beach. Two of the most interesting emplacements observed were the twin-mount, dual purpose, 127 mm NAVAL guns located at BAROE and the twin-mount, dual purpose 10 cm NAVAL guns at MALANG. These installations consisted of two and three mounts respectively, a range finder and director. The guns were securely emplaced in circular concrete revetments, and stowage compartments were provided for ammunition in the walls. Both batteries were on high ground which afforded excellent command of the surrounding area. Information found on the 10 cm guns revealed that they had been manufactured in KURE in 1944 and they appear to be identical in every respect to the 10 cm 65 calibre guns found at IWO JIMA. Five inch guns as well as smaller weapons, were reported captured at CAPE PENADJAM after the successful landing there on 5 July. Reports were also received from RAAF personnel that two coast defense guns of unknown calibre were located about 700 yards northeast of the right flank of GREEN Beach. These guns were very well emplaced in the side of a hill, and from all appearances, had not been fired during this operation. The Dutch coast defense guns reported to be located in the vicinity of SIGNAL HILL have not yet been located.

(6) Some Land Mines and Booby Traps were found throughout the general area but not in such large numbers as expected. The former were principally located near the main highways, and were contact mines of the depth charge,

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aerial bomb, disc and yard stick types. The customary booby traps were found in limited numbers with one unique addition: dead fowl were "booby trapped" and detonated by means of a trip wire.

(7) Elaborate systems of tunnels were found, beginning approximately 500 yards north of the beach. The interiors were well braced and from the appearance of the timber the tunnels were of recent construction. Food, clothing, arms, and medical supplies were found stored therein and they were, no doubt, also used as personnel shelters during Allied air raids.

(8) Trenches, bunkers, rifle pits, barbed wire and road blocks were found inland and were obviously placed to control the exits from the beach and the approaches to BALIKPAPAN town.

(9) The anticipated employment of burning oil as a defensive measure was not encountered. This probably was due to the fact that the pipe line had been broken in accordance with the plan.

(10) That the enemy did intend to flood oil into streams and ignite this to serve as a barrier is now substantiated by the following captured documents dated 8 March 1945 and dealing with precautions against Allied landings:

"An abundant supply of oil will be secretly stored at a desired point up stream and when the situation arises, the oil will be released and ignited to burn the enemy, stop the advance and cut off retreat.

Preparations:



Key:
1. Oil Ditch.
2. Cut off gate.
3. Oil vats (tanks).
4. Oil supply pipe.
5. River.
6. Oil pipe line.

Oil Storage: One to three small type crude oil tanks (50 tons-100 tons) will be buried (or surrounded by a shelter) in concealed positions upstream.

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Oil Supply: Oil will be supplied to the tanks by means of supply pipes. When it is difficult to supply oil by means of supply pipes, oil drums may be used.

Oil Ditches: Small ditches will be prepared to lead the oil into the river and if necessary, cut off gates will be arranged to control the flow of oil.

Use in combat: The above mentioned arrangements will be made in positions where the descent of enemy airborne forces, movement of large forces, accumulation of supplies, etc., are anticipated.

NOTE:
(i) The velocity of the flowing oil and rate of burning must be as rapid as possible.
(ii) To encircle a wide area with oil, canals will be constructed to join rivers and streams.

Preparations will be made for streams crossing the anticipated approaches of the enemy force and will be used as follows:

(i) If time permits, the oil is released and ignited in order to cover the movement of our troops, change of positions, withdrawals, etc., and to check the advance of the enemy.

(ii) When isolating the main force of the enemy or cutting off aid from the rear, the rivers and streams in the centre or the rear of the enemy force are ignited and an attack is carried out.

NOTE: In the above method, the following precautions are necessary: The outflow of oil must not be too rapid and suitable positions down stream must be dammed up. Contact with the attacking force must be attended to.

Remarks:
This method of combat is a specific feature in the defense of areas where oil is abundant. However at present with exposed and closely gathered oil tanks it is possible that the free use of this method may be denied by the enemy. Therefore, it is extremely important to conceal and protect oil tanks.

A large number of small tanks are preferable to a small number of large tanks. Drums may be used when the use of tanks is difficult, however, with less than two tanks per river it is not effective.

To ignite the oil secretly with a small number of men the heavy box type igniter may be used. In direct ignition a flame thrower will be concealed at necessary positions and ignited at the desired opportunity.

This method is particularly suited in the BALIKPAN area".

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3. Enemy Ground Forces

It is almost impossible to estimate accurately the number of enemy ground forces present on F-Day, but it is believed that there were not more than 3,500 Japanese combatant troops in the objective area at that time. It is reliably reported that they had been evacuating BALIKPAPAN for several weeks prior to the assault; the Army personnel moving north to SAMARINDA and thence overland to KUCHING and PONTIANAK, while the Navy were for the most part moving south through TANAHGROGOT to BANDJERMASIN from whence they hoped to move by surface craft to SURABAYA. These movements continued at an accelerated pace after the Allied landing.

4. Enemy Naval Forces

There was no surface or subsurface interference with the attacking forces and none was expected with the exception of possible attacks by improvised suicide craft.

5. Enemy Air Forces

Sporadic raids of a harassing nature by flights of limited numbers of planes were expected. Four such attacks were experienced. The first occured the night of 17 June when seven bombers attacked the Minesweepers and the Support and Covering Force after a snooper had been within reconnaissance range in the morning. No damage was sustained by our ships and attacking planes escaped unscathed. Two individual snoopers were over again on 18 June with no resulting action. The second raid developed on the evening of F-6 when four to seven torpedo bombers attacked our vessels at the objective area. Again no damage was inflicted by the planes. Three enemy planes were shot down by our surface forces. On F/2, two reconnaissance planes came over and one was shot down by CAP, the other retiring to the southward. The morning of F/4 one enemy aircraft flew over the objective area and dropped two bombs near the Australian 7th Division Headquarters causing two casualties.

6. Photographic Coverage

The desired photographic coverage was obtained only under the most difficult conditions. Intense, heavy and accurate AA fire forced the planes to remain at high altitudes and from three weeks prior to F Day smoke from oil fires resulting from air bombardment enveloped the entire objective area.

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H - LOGISTICS

1. Preliminary

Commander Service Force SEVENTH Fleet and Commanding General FIRST Australian Corps provided logistics support for the BALIKPAPAN Operation, including the assault and resupply phases.

2. Logistics at Staging Area

(a) Prior to departure from the staging area, MOROTAI, ships were directed to load, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the following:

(1) Ammunition: To authorized capacity.
(2) Fuel and lubricants: To authorized capacity.
(3) Dry provisions: To maximum capacity not exceeding 120 days for ship's company and 30 days for embarked troops.
(4) Fresh provisions: To maximum capacity.
(5) Clothing and small stores: 120 days.
(6) Ship's stores stock: 120 days.
(7) Medical stores: 120 days.
(8) Fresh water: To maximum capacity.

(b) The logistics at the staging area were handled in a most satisfactory manner. The ammunition, fuel, fresh and dry provisions and fresh water were all available or arrived in the area in sufficient quantities, and in sufficient time, to permit all ships participating in the operation, with minor exceptions, to complete their logistics requirements before departure for the operation. The cooperation and assistance given by the Service Force Representative, CTG 72.2, and members of his staff was, in a large measure responsible for the excellent logistics services. A number of ships received repairs at MOROTAI, without which they could not have participated in the operation. To CTG 72.2's Maintenance Officer in USS CULEBRA ISLAND and the members of his organization goes a large share of the credit for the high materiel condition of ships participating in the operation at the time of their departure from MOROTAI.

3. Pre F Day Logistics for the Support and Covering Group and the Minesweeping Unit

(a) The operation of the Support and Covering Group and the Minesweeping Unit for a period of 16 days prior to F Day at a distance of 460 miles from the nearest supply base necessitated special arrangements. Because the exact amount of logistic support required by the Support and Covering Group and the Minesweeping Unit and the exact dates at which this support would be required could not be predicted with any degree of certainty the plans were purposely designed to be flexible. Ships containing ammunition and fuel were sent forward to TAWI TAWI and placed under the operational control of CTG 74.2 until F Day to be called forward by CTG 74.2 as required. This system worked out very well and the ships in the objective area were able to replenish needed items in the objective area, without returning to a rear area. This prevented the loss of valuable time and saved much fuel for the fire support and minesweeping ships.

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(b) The CHEPACHET was made available at TAWI TAWI on F-19 Day to fuel the cruisers and destroyers of the Support and Covering Group enroute from BRUNEI BAY to the B LIKPAPAN area. On F-9 Day the CHEPACHET arrived in the objective area to fuel the Support and Covering Group departing the same day for TAWI TAWI. On F-7 Day at TAWI TAWI the CHEPACHET replenished fuel oil from the WHITE CLOUD (IX 143). On F-1 Day the CHEPACHET again arrived in the objective area to fuel the Support and Covering Group.

(c) The GUALALA loaded with diesel oil and fresh water for the support of the minesweeping Unit departed MOROTAI with the Minesweeping Unit on F-20 Day and proceeded to the objective area and remained there until F/2 Day when she departed. The fresh water capacity of the GUALALA was not sufficient to supply the YMSs who therefore received fresh water from the cruisers and destroyers. The GUALALA did, however, keep the YMSs supplied with diesel oil, received rescued survivors, and in general rendered excellent service to the Minesweeping Unit.

(d) The POINSETTE was made available at TAWI TAWI to the Support and Covering Group on F-19 Day to replenish ammunition. The LST 67 departed MOROTAI on F-15 for TAWI TAWI to be available for call forward to the objective area if required. The LST 67 arrived in the objective area on F-8 Day and after the Support and Covering Group replenished ammunition departed on F-7 Day for TAWI TAWI, returning to the objective area with the assault echelon arriving on F Day.

4. Post F Day Logistics at the Objective Area

(a) Ammunition

(1) The LST 67 arrived in the objective area on F Day with a balanced load of naval ammunition.

(2) The POINSETTE (AK 205) arrived in the objective area on F Day with a balanced load of naval ammunition.

(3) The LSM 129 arrived in the objective area on F/4 Day with 4000 rounds of 6 inch naval ammunition.

(4) On F/7 Day the POINSETTE transferred remaining 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition to LST 67 in preparation for leaving the area.

(5) In order to conserve the ammunition supply remaining in the area ships departing transferred ammunition to ships remaining wherever possible.

(b) Fuel and Lubricants

(1) The CHEPACHET (AO 78) and GUALALA (AOG 28) were in the objective area on F Day. The CHEPACHET was loaded with fuel oil, diesel oil, a balanced supply of lubricants, and fog oil. The GUALALA was loaded with diesel oil. On F/2 the GUALALA transferred remaining diesel oil to the CHEPACHET and departed the objective area.

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(2) On F/2 the BANSHEE (IX 178) arrived in the objective area and topped off the CHEPACHET with fuel oil and departed the objective area on F/3 Day.

(3) In as far as possible small craft obtained diesel oil from LSTs prior to the departure of LSTs from the objective area.

(4) The LST 67 and LST 171 each had a deck load of 20 drums of lube oil, Navy Symbol No. 9370 and 20 drums of lube oil, Navy Symbol No.9250.

(5) The CHEPACHET, LST 67 and LST 171 each had supplies of fog oil. As each ship equipped with smoke making apparatus carried sufficient fog oil to supply the demand, this reserve of fog oil was not needed.

(c) Dry and Fresh Provisions

(1) The LST 171 arrived in the objective area on F/2 Day. This ship was loaded with 100 units of balanced stocks of dry provisions weighing approximately 4800 pounds each. In addition the ship had small stores and ship's stores stock for emergency issue.

(2) The LST 67 and LST 171 each carried an extra 2000 pounds of frozen meat to be issued to small ships not able in themselves to carry a sufficient supply.

(d) Fresh Water

The LST 67 and LST 171 each departed from MOROTAI with 120,000 gallons of fresh water. Every opportunity for the small ships to obtain water from departing LSTs was taken. The result was that no shortage of fresh water developed in the objective area.

(e) Ships scheduled to depart from the objective area transferred provisions, fuel, ammunition and water to ships remaining to the greatest extent practicable.

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I - MEDICAL

1. Organization at the staging area

(a) Early contact was made ashore in the staging area with senior medical officers of the First Australian Corps and the Seventh Australian Division for the purpose of establishing a comprehensive insight on the respective plans of the Landing Force and the Naval Task Group.

The medical problems of the operation likely to occur at the far beach were discussed in detail during several meetings of the Medical Officer of the Australian Beach Group and the Task Group Medical Officer. The thorough coordination of the medical facilities at the far beach was the result of a complete understanding of the procedure agreed on at these meetings.

(b) Four U.S. Navy surgical teams were assigned for this operation to function on designated LSTs. One of the latter had a ship's Medical Officer aboard which increased the efficiency of casualty care on that ship. One team was below complement by one Medical Officer which vacancy was filled prior to sortie.

An additional surgical team consisting of two Medical Officers and four hospital corp orderlies from the First Australian Corps were placed on each Australian transport (LSI) which together with the ship's medical personnel provided two separate teams on each of these ships.

The medical personnel of the Group Flagship (USS WASATCH (AGC 9))were prepared to perform major chest surgery on that ship.

Thus a total of eleven surgical teams were present in the target area on F-Day.

Two medical officers on TAD orders for the purpose of making an epidemiological survey of the target area were placed aboard the LST 395 which had a medical officer attached and surgical team equipment aboard. If the situation had demanded additional medical facilities this ship could have been used subsequent to unloading.

(c) Before departing from the Staging area a conference of Medical Officers attached to the various ships of the Group was held aboard the Group Flagship at which time a copy of the Medical Annex (M) to OpPlan 6-45 was distributed to each one of them. The ensuing discussion bore evidence that all were fully aware of the intents of the Medical Plan and their own individual functions applicable to its successful execution.

A copy of the Casualty Doctrine of the Seventh Amphibious Force was issued to ships lacking same.

(d) The Commander Task Group arranged for the presence of a U.S. Hospital Ship at TARAKAN during the operation to come forward to the target area on two hour notice.

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2. Logistics

(a) It was arranged to obtain a limited amount of supplies from the 93rd Division U.S. Army Supply Depot in the Staging Area.

A further source of available supplies was aboard the USS GOLD STAR. The equipment and supplies left by Surgical Team No. 8 aboard the LST 171 used in this operation for a supply ship were made available to draw on if necessary.

(b) One hundred and ninety two pints of whole blood was distributed to casualty handling ships three days before departure for the target area. The expiration dating on this blood was F/6 Day and F/7 Day.

3. At the objective area

(a) There were no casualties inflicted on the Landing Force in the initial landing at the beaches. The Australian Main Battle Dressing Station was originally set up at the junction of RED and YELLOW beaches at 0955 on F Day. The first casualty was received at 1005. Later the dressing station was moved toward the center of Y LLOW beach at an ideal evacuation point clear of unloading activities, where by 1400 twenty-three casualties had been evacuated to ships. Casualties from the other two beaches were brought to this area for treatment and evacuation from that time on.

(b) Evacuation of all casualties on F Day was to transports lying out approximately nine miles from the assault beaches. They were taken out in previously designated LCVP's having aboard one enlisted medical personnel with necessary equipment for administering routine treatment enroute to the ship. There were eight of the latter LCVP's used specifically for casualty haul.

The LST 397 was priority loaded and prepared to receive casualties aboard on F Day if necessary.

It was found necessary to employ LCM's in evacuating to LSTs since none of the latter were beached and the intervening water was rough. Ramp to ramp unloading could thus be accomplished with minimum discomfort to the patient. Litter bearers were embarked in the LCMs from the beach to facilitate the transfer of casualties at the ship.

Subsequent to F/3 Day only the LST 777 with a surgical team embarked remained in the target area. On F/6 Day the casualties aboard this ship were transferred to the HMAS MANOOR (LSI) arriving in the objective area that date. This arrangement allowed the LST 777 to remain for further reception and treatment of casualties.

(c) Not enough use was made of LSTs having only one medical officer aboard for the treatment of ambulatory casualties.

(d) Summary of casualties

U.S. Navy casualties aboard mine sweeps prior to F Day:

Killed in action	7
Wounded in action	43
Mental cases	10

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Killed in action F Day to F+5 Day (Australian Army)	11 officers 64 enlisted 75
Evacuated from assault beaches F Day through F+6 Day (Includes 12 U.S. Army Personnel)	271
Evacuated from the target area by shipping F Day through F+6 Day (Includes 8 U.S.N., and sick personnel of the Landing Force not landed.)	293

4. Recommendations

(a) It is desirable to have a ship's medical officer aboard LSTs carrying Surgical Teams to assist in casualty care.

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J - PRESS RELATIONS.

1. The Press Unit (TU 78.2.18) as provided in the plan was to be composed of PCE(R) 849, FP 47, and LCI 635. Prior to the departure from Morotai for Balikpapan, PCE(R) 849 was ordered to Manila and thus was not available for the Balikpapan Operation.

2. LCI 635 was used for headquarters, quartering and messing of War Correspondents, Photographers, and Public Relations Officers. FP 47 was the communication link between Balikpapan and Manila. GHQ and SEVENTH Fleet attached censors to the Press Unit to expedite the transmission of copy. An air courier service was arranged between the objective area and Manila but due to sea conditions, Catalinas were unable to take off and so radio and ships had to be relied upon.

3. At Morotai a press conference was held aboard the USS WASATCH on the afternoon prior to the sortie. Because the Press Unit did not join the Assault Echelon until it reached the vicinity of Tawi Tawi, only the Australiann War Correspondents and those embarked in the USS WASATCH (one Dutch correspondent, one U.S. News Commentator, one U. S. War Correspondent and two U. S. Photographers) were present. They were briefed thoroughly on the operation and at the end of the briefing they were given a chance to ask questions. Present at the briefing were Vice Admiral Barbey, USN (CTF 78); Rear Admiral Noble, USN (CTG 78.2); Major General Milford, AIF, (GOC 7th Australian Division); Captain Solomons, USN (Chief of Staff, CTG 78.2); Lieutenant Colonel Wilmoth, AIF (General Staff Officer Grade 1, 7th Australian Division); and Lieutenant, (junior grade) Taggart, USNR, (FIDO, CTG 78.2).

4. While enroute to the objective area, War Correspondents aboard the USS WASATCH were given bulletins of the progress of the operations at the objective area prior to F day. Since CTG 78.2 was not cognizant of the location or numbers of war correspondents on the other ships of the Assault Echelon, these bulletins were not disseminated further. LCI 634 and FP 47 joined the Assault Echelon in the vicinity of Tawi Tawi on F-2 Day.

5. At Balikpapan on F day the Press Unit was assigned anchorages adjacent to the USS WASATCH. Because of the danger from enemy shore batteries, the ships of the Press Unit were not permitted in the inner anchorage until F + 2 day. Prior to H Hour on F day four LCVPs reported to the Press Unit as provided in the Plan. These boats were furnished daily after F Day. A second press conference was held aboard the USS WASATCH on the afternoon of F Day.

6. Recommendations

In order to accommodate and brief correspondents so that there will be complete coverage for an operation, it is highly desirable that the Attack Group Commander be informed as to the number, their identity and their recommended assignments.

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K. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF MEIU ONE

1. The preliminary report of MEIU ONE is quoted herewith as received. "Beach obstacles shown in the Operational Plan were found to consist of logs 8 to 10 inches in diameter driven solidly into the sand in three parallel rows set about 5 feet apart with interval betweenlogs of approximately 5 feet. These uprights supported X shaped cross pieces secured with bolts. Seaward from these obstacles were recovered several electrically controlled charges placed about 10 to 15 feet outboard from the obstacles. The installations recovered consisted of two depth charges arranged in echelon with a Jap Mark 2, Mod. 1 Explosive Hook set between them. 500 yards of two strand demolition cable lead inland to a bunker where the device was to have been fired from an electric magneto plunger type exploder. This installation was rendered inoperative when the pre-landing bombardment cut the cable to shreds.

"2. So far no evidence of any mining on the beach itself has been found; however, in the grassy, vine covered areas extending inland were planted a new type of detonating element installed in 50, 100, and 250 kg bombs planted nose upwards in the ground and naturally camouflaged by the surrounding vegetation. A heavy steel rod plunger with a flat round head 3 inches in diameter rode in an adapter ring fitted in the bomb nose; it was prevented from sliding down by a very weak trip wire (in some instances a small bamboo toothpick was used.) Beneath this blunt plunger was positioned a small glass vial, 1 1/4 inches long, 1/4 inch diameter, lying at a 45 degree angle in a small tin funnel. Beneath the funnel orifice was a small detonator whose top end contained a chemical powder. When the trip wire was pulled or sufficient pressure exerted to shear the small wire, the glass vial was crushed allowing its fluid to drain into the top of the detonator, firing the main charge. The vial and detonator are being returned to MEIY ONE for chemical analysis. This type of locally improvised land mine has been found rigged in many combinations in all areas examined and in fact has accounted for approximately 90% of the more than 2000 land mines and booby traps rendered safe to date.

"3. Another new locally constructed anti-vehicular land mine has been recovered in quantity. It is of welded construction fashioned from a 12 inch section of 12 inch diameter pipe with octagonal steel plates at each end. The filling is approximately 30 pounds of Amatol. The booster is made from a Dutch .50 cal. shell case filled with type 88 explosive. The booster is fitted to an adapter ring which positions a striker over the firing cap. This striker is made in the same form as that used in the acid detonated land mine already mentioned with the addition of a machine point. It is held off the cap by a small shear wire and is fired by applied pressure.

"4. Numerous depth charges had been planted in road shoulders. They were rigged to fire from a trip wire which allowed the booster to slide down onto the detonator. These were found to have failed in many instances where the booster failed to slide freely in its central tube. No case is known at present where any of these aforementioned devices have been effective as intended. This is due largely to widespread indoctrination of combat troops in the pre-invasion period by Bomb Disposal personnel in the dangers inherent in land mines and booby traps and necessary precautions to be taken. However, some unfortunate accidents have occured where objects in plain view were handled and two cases have been reported where Officers Swords were cunningly prepared so that a small charge was detonated not when the sword was lifted from the ground but when the handle was grasped to withdraw it from the sheath.

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"5. As requested by the Chief of Staff, a survey was made of enemy gun positions; the results to date are shown below. Explosive ordnance rendering safe requirements, lack of transportation, and the time element have delayed completion of this study. When compiled, a complete report will be made to the SEVENTH Fleet Intelligence Officer and a copy sent to COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP EIGHT if desired.

"At position:
598594 a twin 25mm CD Mount, Type 96 Model 2, manufactured 1944. Traverse 100 degrees, elevation 10 degrees. Emplacement had top third and front of concrete, remainder of log shoring. Magazine was located in rear dugout with connecting trench. A ten foot wide 3 foot deep anti-tank ditch was in front of the position.

"604598 An empty emplacement for a heavy CD gun. Dimensions about 18 feet square. Constructed of 8 x 8 hand hewn timbers with an 18 inch thick concrete roof covered with fresh dirt. Fresh shovel marks in the earthen floor indicated preparations for laying a concrete deck were rudely interrupted. Four posts, with black rope netting for camouflage attached, were spread on the ground at the emplacement mount.

"604601 A Six in 45 calibre CD gun was found. Manufactured at Maizuru Naval Arsenal 1942. Type 41. Traverse 140 degrees, elevation 20 degrees. Emplacement similar to that at 604598 but with concrete deck. Connecting tunnel aft to ammunition storage. A rangefinder and fire control installation was located about 50 feet Northeast of this position on a slightly higher level.

"599601 A Battery of three twin 10cm dual purpose guns. Manufactured at Kure Naval Arsenal in 1944. No cover or camouflage present. A range finder and gun director to the rear and a slightly higher level.

"573599 75mm CD gun mounted in reinforced tunnel mouth. No name plates found.

"5658 Two 4 inch pipes rigged as dummy guns sticking out of air raid shelters and bunkers. No guns at this position.

"5558 No gun found.

"553598 Two twin 25mm AA guns placed on side of road at foot of cliff.

"5664 Two twin 127mm mounts with director, plotter, and 150cm searchlight, ammunition storage, all with no cover or camouflage.

"5662 Two dummy gun emplacements.

"6. Two new types of locally manufactured hand grenades, a new type of improvised mortar, and a prepared demolition charge using large caliber shell cases have been found. In addition, through close liaison with Atis, a document was brought to our attention which described the manufacture of the hand grenades just mentioned with very specific details of construction. This was issued by Army Headquarters in the Empire.

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"7. To date no specific evidence of controlled harbor minefields has been discovered. Several false leads have been checked in an effort to locate a shore control station without results. It is planned that the location vessel YP 421 search suspected areas for mines and cable connections."

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SHEET NO. 1





LAND MINE

OCTAGONAL TOP CAN BE USED AS BOOBY TRAP OR MINE.



PREPARED DEMOLITION CHARGE

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SHEET NO. 2

IMPROVISED MORTAR



SHEET TIN CASE APPROX.-3.5 INCHES IN DIA.



BOOBY TRAP



DEPTH CHARGE
BOOBY TRAP

MAP REPRO. AGC 9

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SHEET NO.3



BEACH DEFENSE

DC'S SET OFF SYMPATHETICALLY

V-S 49 MAP REPRO. AGC 9

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PART VI

PERSONNEL, PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. The training, experience and quality of Naval personnel of this group was reflected in the outstanding performance of duties under exacting conditions encountered during this operation.

2. Naval casualties due to enemy action were as follows:

DATE	UNIT	KILLED IN ACTION	WOUNDED IN ACTION
June 18	YMS 50	-	11
June 20	YMS 368	-	3
June 21	YMS 335	4	6
June 26	YMS 39 and YMS 365	3	13
June 28	YMS 47	-	10
June 28	Underwater Demolition Unit	-	2
June	Close Support Unit (LCS(L) 8)	-	5
	TOTAL	7	50

3. The forces engaged in the Balikpapan Operation consited of units of the following:

Naval and Air Units of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet.

Escort Carrier Unit, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Naval Units, Royal Australian Navy.

HMNS TROMP, Royal Netherlands Navy.

Air Units, FIRST TAF, Royal Australian Air Force.

Air Units, THIRTEENTH and FIFTH U. S. Army Air Forces.

Elements FIRST Australian Corps, Australian Imperial Forces.

SEVENTH Australian Division, Australian Imperial Forces.

The Attack Group Commander desires to make it a matter of record that the cooperation of all units was excellent in every respect and the performance of duty of each unit was outstanding. The execution of tasks and missions was unfailingly successful and coordination between the several units left nothing to be desired. It is considered that each unit contributed to the utmost in assuring the success of the operation. It is regretted that it is not possible to continue further operations with the same forces.

4. Recommendations for awards for personnel under the command of the Attack Group Commander have been made in separate correspondence.

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PICTORIAL

SECTION

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

1. Swimmers of the Underwater Demolition Team starting for the beach towing their equipment on flotation pads.

2. Breaching of off-shore barricade.

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

3. The end of a job well done.



4. View of pre-assault rocket barrage.

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

5. Oil fires on beach resulting from naval gunfire and aerial bombardment (F-Day).

6. LCT's unloading on YELLOW Beach (F-Day).

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7. Landing craft unloading supplies and equipment on GREEN Beach (F-Day).

8. LSM unloading vehicles and equipment onto pontoon causeway.

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9. LCI's discharging troops over GREEN Beach.



10. Searchlight on Malang Hill.

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

11. Damaged air search radar installation situated on Malang Hill.

12. Off-shore log barricade immediately east of GREEN Beach at low water.

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13. Off-shore log barricade immediately east of GREEN Beach at low water.

14. Roadstead of general beach area as seen from behind 10 cm gun mount on Malang Hill.

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15. 25 mm twin-mount automatic AA gun found in Bay area.

16. 3 inch naval dual purpose gun found undamaged in cave emplacement east of Signal Hill.

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17. Uncompleted section of anti-tank ditch behind YELLOW Beach showing improvised pile-driver used by Japanese.

18. Uncompleted section of anti-tank ditch behind YELLOW Beach showing improvised pile-driver and displaced concrete pillbox.

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19. Anti-tank ditch behind YELLOW Beach disclosing placement of log palings.

20. Damaged concrete pillbox located behind YELLOW Beach.

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21. Two camouflaged pillboxes found immediately behind general beach area.

22. Earth-covered concealed concrete pillbox situated close behind beachhead.

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

23. Result of direct hit on concealed reinforced concrete pillbox located behind RED Beach.



24. Close-up of result of direct hit on concealed reinforced concrete pillbox.

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25. Anti-tank ditch from shore side showing spoil bank and log palings.



26. Demolished pier in BALIKPAPAN Bay.

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27. Result of naval gunfire and aerial bombardment in general vicinity of Cracking Plant situated in Sepoeloeh area.

28. Entrenchments and tunnel entrances on high ground northwest of RED Beach.

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29. Effect of direct hit on twin-mount dual purpose 10 cm naval gun emplacement on Malang Hill.

30. Base for rangefinder (estimated 4 meters) located on Malang Hill.

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31. Tank traps in road leading to top of Malang Hill.

32. Interior of supply tunnel characteristic of those found in objective area.

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

33. Electrically fired .256 calibre sub-calibre rifle found in BALIKPAPAN.

34. Native victim of Japanese atrocity left in oil swamp near Pandansan Refinery.

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File No. FE 25/A16-3
Serial No. FF-0655

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
CTG 78.2 conf. ltr.,
serial 0235 of 14 August
1945.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force)
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR-BORNEO
June 15 - July 6, 1945.

1. Forwarded.

2. This operation was well planned and executed.

D. E. BARBEY

Copy to:
CTG 78.2 (ComPhibGrp 8, 7thFlt)

(3)

11 0231

141

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3/(F-3-2/egw)
Serial: 0328

REG. NO F522
REG. SHEET NO 18
9 OCT 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

11 0231

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to :
CTG 78.2 conf. ltr.,
serial 0235 of 14 August
1945.

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - C.T.G. 78.2 (ComPhibGrp 8, 7th Fleet) - BALIKPAPAN-MANGGAR-BORNEO June 15 - July 6, 1945.

Reference: (f) 7th Phib Force conf. ltr. FE25/A16-3 serial FF-0747 dated 18 Sept. 1945 (2nd End. to ComCruDiv 12 conf. ltr. FB 3-12, A16-3 serial 0103 dated 15 July 1945).

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remark of the first endorsement.

2. To the excellent comments and recommendations of the basic report the following comments are added:

3. Paragraph 6 page V-17. The Australian gunnery liaison organization has been the subject of careful study. In reference (f) the conclusion is reached that the inflexibility and extra personnel entailed by the Australian system offset the advantages of having a Bombardment Liaison Officer attached to each ship. As an alternative, it is desirable that JASCO officers and ships' officers be brought together whenever practicable before the operation to discuss mutual problems.

4. Paragraph 2 page V-27. The loss of sweep gear and damage to minesweepers in recent months have been far above expectations, with resulting delays in planned operations. Experience at Balikpapan demonstrated conclusively the need for an adequately stocked parent ship for minesweepers. It is understood that LST's are now being prepared to operate in this capacity for minesweep groups in Japanese waters.

T. C. Kinkaid
T. C. KINKAID

4-0 3866
(2) X

CC: CTF 78 (Com7thPhibForce)
CTG 78.2 (ComPhibGrp 8, 7thFlt)

1425